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VOL. XXIV · JANUARY 1972 · No. 2

CONTENTS

Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies — *Richard N. Cooper* 159

The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution — *Chong-Do Hah* 182

Deterrence in the MIRV Era — *Benjamin S. Lambeth* 221

RESEARCH NOTE

The "Correlates of War" Project: Interim Report and Rationale — *J. David Singer* 243

REVIEW ARTICLES

Securing Authority: The View from the Top — *Raymond F. Hopkins* 271

National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas — *Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout* 293

The Contributors ii

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ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES

By RICHARD N. COOPER*

A CASUAL reading of contemporary news reports suggests that during the past decade economic issues have taken on growing importance in the relations of non-Communist developed countries. The disputes between the United States and Japan over textiles, between the United States and the European Economic Community over agricultural trade, and between France and Germany over currency alignments come readily to mind. It is perhaps symbolic of the enormous success of early postwar foreign policy that issues no graver than these play such a prominent part in relations among countries that, earlier in the century, were sporadically at each other's throats. But I contend that economic issues are becoming, and will continue to become, more problematic in relations among advanced non-Communist countries, and that their relative prominence today is not merely due to the fact that other, more fundamental issues have been resolved. Indeed, the trend toward greater economic interdependence among countries will require substantial changes in their approach to foreign policy in the next decade or so.

To clarify this proposition, we first need some delineation of the terms "trends," "economic interdependence," and "foreign policy." By "trends," I mean developments that can be confidently projected into the future on the basis of information now available, but not, of course, projected with certainty, since future developments are also influenced by future policies. Indeed, a principal reason for ascertaining trends is to suggest what policies will be required in order to change those that are disagreeable. Moreover, trends represent a projection of observable forces, not a description of present reality.

"Economic interdependence" normally refers to the dollar value of economic transactions among regions or countries, either in absolute terms, or relative to their total transactions. I shall use it in a more restricted sense: to refer to the *sensitivity* of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations. This approach means that two countries with much mutual trade would still experience a low degree of interdependence if the

* An earlier version of this paper was presented in December 1970 at the Council of Foreign Relations' Conference on Trends Affecting International Relations.

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value of that trade were not sensitive to price and income developments in the two countries; on the other hand, two countries would be highly interdependent if their transactions were greatly sensitive to economic developments, even if their mutual trade were initially at a low level.[1] *Inter*dependence implies two-way sensitivity; one-way sensitivity leads to a dependent economy. The reason for this focus on sensitivity rather than on level will become clearer as the argument proceeds; for the moment I will simply observe that the economy of the United States is becoming highly interdependent with that of Europe and Japan, even though total U.S. exports to those areas account for only about 3 per cent of total output and (so far as we can tell) international financial transactions are a similarly small proportion of the total financial transactions in the United States.

"Foreign policy" is the most difficult term to define. It may be interpreted to mean all points of contact between the residents of one country and those of another, but surely that—although important—would be too broad. The term "policy" would seem, at a minimum, to reduce the term to mean all points of contact between national governments. But even this is broader than is usually understood in the press and in casual discussion; it probably refers to points of contact between governments concerning the territorial integrity of the nation-state and the security of its citizens (and possibly their well-being, but that broadens the meaning considerably)—in short, what has come to be called national security, broadly defined. A third notion of foreign policy is a grand conception of world economic and political order that provides a consistent framework for, and guidance to, the month-to-month decisions that nations must take in their relations with other nations.

There is, of course, a continuous gradation between grand conceptions and day-to-day operating decisions, with many proximate objectives advanced for guidance in specific instances, on the (sometimes incorrect) assumption that those proximate objectives will serve to advance the grander and inevitably more general conceptions of what is desirable. Despite this continuous gradation, I believe it is useful to distinguish between the grand conceptions of desirable relations among

[1] This definition of interdependence contrasts with that implicitly used by Kenneth Waltz, who emphasizes the importance of foreign trade to the welfare and security of the countries under consideration. See his "The Myth of Interdependence" in C. P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 206-210. As will be made clear below, trade may become less valuable to countries at the same time that it is becoming more sensitive to price, income, and other economic variables, and indeed for the same reasons.

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the peoples of the world and the usually all-absorbing concerns for day-to-day decisions that typically govern foreign ministries.

Growing economic interdependence has important implications for the first and third of these concepts of foreign policy—for the number and the character of contacts between governments and, more importantly, for the conception of a world economic and political order that is both desirable and attainable. In particular, it bears on the viability of the nation-state as the principal unit of decision-making. The implications for the second concept of foreign policy—national security—are less immediately compelling and are largely derived from the other two.

In the observations that follow I take up, in turn, the fact of growing economic interdependence, the challenge this poses for domestic economic policies and balance-of-payments adjustment, the actual and potential national responses to this challenge, and the implications of the resulting tensions and pressures for foreign policy in the seventies.

GROWING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

The extraordinary and unprecedented growth in international trade has frequently been mentioned. The increase in international travel has been even faster, and is equally unprecedented. It is not clear whether international trade has grown in relation to total economic output (GNP); the relative growth of "services" would argue against this. But, in any case, that is less important than the sensitivity of international transactions to domestic economic developments such as taxation, inflation, and interest rates. There is no question that this sensitivity has increased in certain dimensions. Although merchandise imports account for only 4 per cent of total U.S. expenditure, for example, imports account for a much larger share of the increment during periods of rapidly rising expenditure (17 per cent in 1968, in real terms). When demand runs ahead of output, the rest of the world fills the gap. This process has long been more operative in other countries than in the United States, but even there the response has become more rapid and more complete.

It is less clear whether the *price* sensitivity of international demand has increased. Improved transportation and communications, wider acceptability of foreign styling, and narrowed cost and quality differences among nations suggest that it has; but growing product differentiation, with each major firm trying to establish its secure niche in the market, cuts the other way. So does the growing importance of the multinational firm wherever market-sharing conventions prevail among its various components. But these firms have also contributed to

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the convergence of cost and design and to the wider acceptability of "foreign" products. On balance, price sensitivity for international trade has probably increased as well.

This increased sensitivity has extended even to labor, an area in which the integrative forces of policy and technology are undoubtedly weaker than in any other. In 1967, when Germany slumped into its first post-war recession, one-third of the unemployed workers who lost jobs were foreigners on short-term contracts. On returning to their homelands they raised unemployment there and reduced it in Germany, literally representing an exportation of unemployment. The reverse occurred once Germany expanded again. When reductions in federal funding, the stock market slump, and rising prices combined to bring about a sharp reduction in new hiring of university teachers in the United States, graduate students in Britain—whose higher educational establishment continues to grow at a rapid pace—nonetheless also felt the pinch: Britons and Commonwealth students studying in the United States started to look for jobs in Britain to replace those they could not find in the United States.

Finally, the greatest growth in interdependence has undoubtedly been in investment, both real and financial. The great growth in direct foreign business investment in the sixties testifies to the new search for earning opportunities everywhere, not merely in the national market. Barriers of language and law have gradually been broken down or surmounted by large and even not-so-large American firms, who have flocked to Europe to exploit new or newly perceived market opportunities and tax advantages. Financial capital has also become much more sensitive to yield differentials among major financial markets, and an increasing number of both borrowers and lenders scan a world horizon for sources of funds and investment opportunities; in doing so, they tie national markets more closely together. German firms can borrow from Arabian sheiks and Iowa farmers in London's Eurodollar market. Even national stock markets, although they are subject to diverse influences, have shown increasing parallelism of movement during the past decade.[2] As in other areas of economics, it is the marginal transaction that counts in linking markets together.

This growing interdependence may be confidently projected into the future, in the absence of strong government action to retard the

[2] For a more systematic review of the evidence of increased interdependence, see Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York 1968), chaps. 3-5; and Cooper, "Towards an International Capital Market?" in C. P. Kindleberger and A. Shonfield, eds., *North American and Western European Economic Policies* (New York 1971), 192-208.

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process, because it is based on the technological advances in transportation and communication which increase both the speed and the reliability of moving goods, funds, persons, information, and ideas across national boundaries—in short, the same forces that are producing the much-touted shrinking world, in terms of both economic and psychological distance.

Although this process is world-wide, it is much further advanced among the industrial countries of the non-Communist world—Western Europe, North America, and, increasingly, Japan—countries that, in the last few decades, have converged remarkably in their objectives of social and economic policy and in their political processes for reconciling differences and for executing policies. Although these countries will continue to be concerned about the second and third worlds, their concerns will derive largely from considerations other than growing economic interdependence. (Economic interdependence must, in this context, be distinguished from the growing psychological interdependence brought about by increasing direct exposure through television and other media.) The remarks that follow will largely concern relations among the Western industrial countries.

A second kind of growing economic interdependence, institutional rather than structural, can be discerned among industrial nations. This institutional interdependence occurs when these countries must, by prior agreement, confer, and even reach joint decisions, on matters of economic policy. The two outstanding examples of this, neither of them present a decade ago, are the periodic decisions leading to the creation of Special Drawing Rights (paper gold) at the International Monetary Fund, and the decisions concerning the formation of commercial and agricultural policies within the European Economic Community. Both involve truly supranational decision-making, although of course only after prior negotiations among nations. Less dramatic instances are the attempts by donors to coordinate foreign aid to particular countries in "consortia" under the general direction of the World Bank, and the attempts, so far largely unsuccessful, to coordinate trade policies of the developed countries with respect to the products of the less developed countries. This kind of institutional interdependence is in some measure a response to the growing structural interdependence, but it often also has a quite different, more strictly political origin, and thus is a separately identifiable factor in the economic area.[3] It

[3] This second form of integration corresponds to what Karl Kaiser has called "intergovernmental regional subsystems," to be distinguished from "transnational society subsystems," of which economic integration through joined markets would represent one possible example. But joined markets also create pressures for intergovernmental

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will therefore be ignored in my argument, as will British accession to the EEC.

THE CHALLENGE OF GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

Domestic policies. Most national economic policies rely for their effectiveness on the separation of markets. This is true of monetary policy, of income taxation, of regulatory policies, and of redistributive policies (whether the last be through differential taxation or through direct transfers). Increased economic interdependence, by joining national markets, erodes the effectiveness of these policies and hence threatens national autonomy in the determination and pursuit of economic objectives. The term "threaten" is used nonpejoratively; there are also economic advantages to the joining of markets, and in some—but not all—cases these outweigh the resultant loss of economic autonomy; indeed, that is what creates the predicament. It is aggravated by the fact that during the past few decades the peoples of all industrial countries have substantially raised their expectations of governmental activity in managing the economy with respect to employment, inflation, growth, income distribution, and a host of other objectives, leading to the emergence of what is sometimes called the welfare state.

The loss of autonomy has been most prominently discussed in the area of monetary policy.[4] As national money and capital markets are joined by international flows of funds, interest rates in various markets are drawn together. Subsequently, if an individual country wishes to pursue a contractionary monetary policy in order to discourage a domestic boom, it will find, in the course of trying to tighten monetary conditions, that it is merely drawing funds from abroad; the more its central bank tightens, the more its would-be domestic borrowers will satisfy their needs by borrowing abroad rather than at home. Under these circumstances, monetary policy becomes an effective tool for influencing the short-term balance-of-payments position of a country, since it can attract or repel short-term funds; but it has become an ineffective tool for its customary objective of influencing the course of domestic economic activity.

The international mobility of firms and funds also erodes the tax

action. See his "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems," *World Politics*, XXI (October 1968), 84-107.

[4] The term "autonomy" is preferred here to the more usual "economic sovereignty." In fact, nations retain actual as well as legal control over their instruments of policy (sovereignty); the problem arises because these instruments of policy lose their effectiveness, so that countries find themselves able to pursue their objectives, but unable to achieve them.

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policies of nations. It is no secret that the nascent international bond market has thrived on funds that engage in tax evasion. Host countries such as Luxembourg have a disincentive to police carefully the taxation of interest earnings on foreign funds: they thereby attract financial business. Without the full cooperation of countries where the earnings take place, the difficulty of enforcing tax laws on residents holding funds abroad will enable the wealthy and astute residents of all nations to maintain a tax-free source of interest income; as more people become aware of the possibilities open to them, this will, in turn, increasingly erode both the revenue and the redistributive objectives of many countries.

For operating business firms it is more difficult to avoid an accurate declaration of earnings. But by adjusting the prices at which transactions take place among branches in different countries, they may sharply reduce their total tax liabilities and thereby thwart the fiscal objectives of countries with high tax rates.

In both of these cases—tax evasion and transfer pricing for tax avoidance—national authorities are not without countervailing courses of action. But, as will be made clear, in some respects these courses of action either infringe on the sovereignty of other nations or place their own international firms in a difficult competitive position. So a dilemma remains.

The same is true of regulatory policies of business, such as antitrust regulations, capitalization requirements, disclosure requirements, trading regulations, and the like. In each case the international mobility of funds and firms erodes the national capacity to impose and enforce limitations on business behavior. A Swiss corporation, faced with local requirements to give initial rights to new equity to existing stockholders, found it convenient to establish a subsidiary in Curaçao instead, and to raise its new equity from that base, drawing on international (including Swiss) sources of funds. If it were not for laws extending the jurisdiction of the United States to its citizens everywhere—a powerful irritant to some countries—American firms could escape U.S. proscriptions on trade with Cuba simply by locating in countries more sympathetic to such trade.

Although labor is still far less mobile than capital, the mobility of certain groups of people is sufficiently high to limit policies designed toward redistribution, whether through taxation or, as in the case of the British Health Service, through imposed conditions of work. This force can be seen most clearly within the United States, where states and municipalities with generous welfare programs have been swamped by

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immigrants from elsewhere in the country; in the end this requires a fiscal bale-out by the federal government.

Mobility unites previously fragmented markets, and in so doing threatens policies that, for their feasibility, depended on the fragmentation of markets. As nations become increasingly interdependent, as capital and skilled labor become less exclusively national in their orientations, countries desiring to pursue tax or regulatory policies that deviate widely from those policies in other countries will find themselves stimulating large inflows or outflows of funds, firms, or persons; these induced movements will in turn weaken the intended effects of the policies, or make them more costly. Economic policies that have hitherto been regarded as exclusively domestic will come under increasing influence from the international environment.

Balance-of-payments policy. In addition to affecting domestic economic policies, increased interdependence will also, and more importantly in the immediate future, affect our methods for dealing with imbalances in international payments. Under the present rules of the game, laid down in the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, countries are required to fix their exchange rates and to finance out of reserves, or by borrowing at the International Monetary Fund, any temporary imbalances in payments. "Fundamental" imbalances are to be corrected by moving a country's fixed exchange rate parity to a new level. This system requires a governmental judgment concerning when a given imbalance is fundamental rather than merely temporary; while this judgment is being made, the public at large can speculate on whether or not the value of the currency is going to be changed. In the event of a change, this speculation results both in a redistribution (from government to successful domestic speculators) and in a loss (from government to successful foreign speculators) of national wealth.

This system presupposes fragmentation of the markets for financial assets. Such fragmentation was implicit in the Bretton Woods Agreement, to be achieved, if necessary, by the imposition of controls on movements of capital. (Article VIII, Sec. 2(b) requires all members of the IMF to help police the capital controls of any member.) For various reasons, restrictions on capital movements have seemed both less desirable and less feasible than they appeared twenty-five years ago; therefore, as the barriers of ignorance and cost in undertaking international transactions have fallen, the potential speculative movement of funds has increased enormously. Just as the reduction in barriers has increased the sensitivity of funds to transnational interest rate differentials, and

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thereby eroded the effectiveness of national monetary policy, it has increased the sensitivity of funds to prospects for speculative gain, and thereby rendered more difficult (because more costly) the use of changes in the exchange rate to correct imbalances in payments. A crude quantitative indicator of these developments is provided by contrasting the maximum daily speculation of under $100 million against the pound sterling, in the "massive run" of August 1947, with the maximum daily speculation of over $1.5 billion in favor of the German mark in May 1969, and the movement of over $1 billion into Germany in less than an hour in May 1971. Moreover, as the barriers of ignorance fall further, there is no reason why $1.5 billion should not rise to $15 billion, or even to $50 billion, in a day. A 10 per cent gain over the weekend is a tidy rate of return: if the speculator guesses wrong, he has lost, under the Bretton Woods arrangements, only the relatively modest transactions costs. Such huge speculative movements impose proportionate losses on countries that do change their exchange parities.

Reluctance to make an adjustment in the exchange rate will induce a search for alternative devices for correcting payments positions, and these, in turn, will impinge—as, indeed, they already have—on both domestic politics and foreign policy. One can make a plausible case in conjectural history that the governments of France, Germany, and Britain were turned out in 1969–1970, as was that of Canada in 1963, on grounds that fundamentally reflect this growing economic interdependence among nations and the resulting influence on the ability of countries to cope satisfactorily with balance-of-payments difficulties. The exchange rate figured explicitly in the German election. De Gaulle was ostensibly rejected on the basis of his proposals for regional government in France, but one may argue that the more fundamental reason for his rejection can be found in the economic factors that led to the disruptions of May-June 1968, namely, France's restrictive economic policy after 1965. This policy represented an attempt to halt the deterioration in France's balance-of-payments position, and, *inter alia*, it involved sharp cuts in the planned educational budget and produced the highest level of unemployment in France since the 1930's. Harold Wilson's promise that the devaluation of the pound in 1967 would not devalue the pound in the pocket of the average Briton, which was followed by the most rapid price increases in two decades—linked in turn to the devaluation and to Britain's dependence on the world market, where prices were also rising—despite growing unemployment, played a key role in his electoral defeat in 1970.

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RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL AUTONOMY IN ECONOMIC POLICY

Domestic policies. The intrusions of growing interdependence into domestic economic policy, which are already visible but are likely to become much more intense in the next decade, have elicited five quite different, but not mutually exclusive, types of response by national governments: passive, exploitative, defensive, aggressive, and constructive. These designations are meant to be descriptive, not normative.

A *passive* response involves acceptance of the loss of domestic economic autonomy and virtual abandonment of any attempt to pursue courses independent of those determined by the countries to which the passive country is closely linked with ties of trade and finance. It is largely a resort of small countries who have become aware of their dependence on others and for whom the costs of independent action (i.e., of foregoing the benefits of linked markets) are likely to be high.

Some of these countries also pursue an *exploitative* course, which attempts to take advantage of the growing interdependence in ways which are successful if pursued by only a few countries, but which cannot be generalized for the world economy. Thus, we observe countries offering flags of convenience on ocean shipping, light registration and disclosure requirements for securities, nominal taxation on certain forms of business activity (tax havens), and generous subsidies to foreign investment.[5] So long as only a few countries create especially favorable conditions for certain forms of economic activity, they will succeed in attracting that kind of activity from elsewhere; if many countries begin to compete for the same activities in similar ways, international location will be little influenced, and net benefits will accrue to the favored activities at the general expense of governments, consumers, or labor. This kind of policy competition is already noticeable in the tax concessions, and even direct subsidies, given by many less developed countries to foreign investors; as the practice spreads, revenue bases will be eroded while the effect in attracting investment will diminish. Competition can also be observed in the export credit terms given by the industrialized countries, in subsidies to hotel-building and other aspects of tourism in Europe, and in the use, by municipalities *within* the United States, of tax-free industrial development bonds to attract industry. (This development has recently been restrained by Congressional action.) Success in exploiting the new mobility is therefore lim-

[5] For a general discussion of these issues as they affect foreign investment, see Charles P. Kindleberger, *American Business Abroad* (New Haven 1969).

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ited to those countries who *begin* the process, and continues only so long as other countries do not follow or retaliate.

A *defensive* response involves attempts to reduce economic interdependence by preserving or restoring the fragmentation of markets in order to retain some economic autonomy. An early example was the imposition of restrictions on immigration into the United States. This was done, among other reasons, in order to protect the distribution of income then prevailing and to reduce the flow of new immigrants to a level which might reasonably be assimilated. More recently, Britain, Denmark, and Switzerland have all imposed limits on the number of foreign workers. The reasons are both political (on the assumption that certain minimum requirements of homogeneity in the population must be met in a functioning democracy) and economic (concerning in particular the distribution of income between relatively unskilled labor and other factors of production). The United States has long maintained an escape clause on its commitments to lower tariffs that can be invoked if foreign competition creates insuperable adjustment problems for domestic firms and labor. Some countries have for years imposed impediments to the movement of financial capital across their boundaries. Others have started to do so more recently. The United States has its interest equalization tax on purchases of foreign stocks and bonds, and its mandatory restrictions on foreign lending by U.S. firms and banks. Britain and France have even more stringent controls. These restrictions are often imposed under the heading of balance-of-payments measures, but they are more correctly viewed, I think, as devices to insulate national capital and money markets from one another in order to preserve some degree of national monetary control. This view is supported by the fact that countries such as Germany and Switzerland, with strong or neutral payments positions, have also resorted to such measures.

Some countries have engaged in *aggressive* as well as defensive actions to preserve national autonomy. Rather than reduce mobility, these actions attempt to extend national control to the mobile factors wherever they be. Thus, the United States (which because of its size and relative importance is in the best position to engage in extraterritorial extension of its laws and regulations) has from time to time extended its antitrust laws to the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and even to the foreign parents of foreign subsidiaries operating in the United States. For example, it has demanded the disclosure of financial information by foreign firms whose securities are traded informally in the United States, prevented foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations

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from selling to certain Communist countries, imposed minimum limits on repatriation of earnings by American firms operating abroad, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to compel submission of certain business information by foreign sea and air carriers. These various actions invariably provoke cries of outrage from other countries,[6] for they attempt to extend U.S. regulatory jurisdiction to economic agents that are the legal entities of other countries and hence under their jurisdiction, despite their American ownership. On the other hand, failure to subject these foreign entities to U.S. regulations or their equivalent invites circumvention of the regulatory intent through movement abroad. If the records of American-owned firms outside the United States are not subject to subpoena, for example, firms which are prevented by law from conspiring to fix prices or share markets within the United States may do so abroad, with impunity. Or, if United States firms operating from foreign bases are not affected by the U.S. proscription on exports to Cuba, the restrictive policy can be vitiated simply by locating abroad. (This observation is not meant to imply approval of this proscription—only that a national policy can be undercut by international mobility of its firms.) In other words, while the response of the United States in these cases has been aggressive, it has not been capricious; it is addressed to a real problem in which the decision-making domain of businesses covers a wider geographic area than the jurisdiction of government.[7]

A fifth type of response involves the *constructive* attempt by governments to frame their policies jointly, so that mobility among the cooperating countries ceases to offer an escape from governmental jurisdiction. Examples of true coordination of policies are rare, although in the area of monetary management there have been several faint signs of coordinated action, notably in the general lowering of interest rates in 1967. There have also been attempts, partially successful, to limit export credit concessions by government-sponsored export credit institutions. Bilateral tax treaties have, of course, for years been used to reconcile the conflicting claims of tax jurisdiction over business income. But this approach through coordination could go much further, and encompass a wide range of policies concerning taxation, the regulation of business structure and activity, the framing of monetary policy, and

[6] Or worse. In 1963 Britain threatened to seize Pan American and TWA planes if the CAB did not back down from its insistence on regulating trans-Atlantic fares.

[7] The actions by Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands to halt "pirate" radio stations operating off their coasts in international waters also represent extraterritorial claims to jurisdiction, as does the unilateral extension, by Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Iceland, of territorial claims far into international waters, in order to control rich fishing grounds.

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other "domestic" policies. It is an approach that requires considerable patience, however, for joint regulation can proceed only as rapidly as the most laggard participant; since some potential participants have successfully exploited the new mobility, they will be reluctant to give up their gains.

Balance-of-payments policies. The same five types of response can occur in the area of balance-of-payments adjustment. The passive response, which represents a return to the feature of the nineteenth-century gold standard that required domestic economies to be keyed to balance-of-payments conditions, has proven acceptable to few countries. There is a wider danger, already observable, that, in their attempt to avoid exchange rate adjustment, some countries will engage in exploitative responses. By altering the domestic tax system to take advantage of a feature of the international trading rules (embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that permits certain types of border tax adjustments but not others, these countries will attempt to improve their trade positions; by subsidizing the tourist industry, they will try to increase foreign exchange receipts.

A defensive response involves imposing restrictions on various payments to foreigners in order to improve the balance of payments—restrictions that could in the past be observed with respect to virtually all international transactions: trade, tourist expenditures, foreign aid, private capital movements. Canada in 1970, and Germany and the Netherlands in 1971, adopted quite a different defensive response in allowing their exchange rates to float freely, to be determined by market forces. This expedient, long urged by many academic economists but prohibited by the Bretton Woods Agreement, insulates those economies from inflows of interest-sensitive and speculative funds.

The United States is in the unique position of being able to adopt an aggressive response in this area. It has been suggested by some that the United States should cease to pay gold for dollars offered by other central banks, in order to force the world onto a dollar standard or to induce other countries to allow their currencies to float against the dollar—in the expectation that most countries would reject the latter option and prove willing to accept and hold large (unlimited?) numbers of dollars, thereby relieving the United States of concern over its balance-of-payments condition.[8] Others have claimed that for all practical purposes we have already reached this state. But in terms of foreign

[8] See C. Fred Bergsten, "Taking the Monetary Initiative," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (July 1968), 713-32, who discusses the proposal but rejects it. It was, however, put into force by President Nixon while this essay was going to press.

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policy, there is a vast difference between an explicit arrangement that most governments would find deeply offensive, and an implicit arrangement with many of the same features in practice. The former would create considerable public as well as official resentment, which might lead to actions on grounds of national pride that are neither in the economic interests of the countries undertaking them nor of the world economy; the latter would have enough ambiguity to permit both the United States and other like-minded governments to maintain with semi-truth that nothing has changed and that each country retains its freedom of action while still enjoying the benefits of international intercourse.

Finally, it is possible to imagine truly cooperative forms of payments adjustment, in which rules or conventions are established to determine which countries should make what adjustments, with derogations subject to international consultation. The rules of Bretton Woods made an attempt in this direction, but the possibilities for private speculative gain surrounding discrete alterations in exchange rates that are the system's keystone have in practice rendered the IMF consultative procedure a dead letter. Nevertheless, in recent years tense and sometimes acrimonious consultation on exchange rate changes has taken place outside the IMF among the major countries.

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

The foregoing excursion into the challenge that increased interdependence constitutes to domestic economic policies, and the possible national responses, sets the stage for an examination of the implications for foreign policy.

Obviously, the impact on domestic politics is one route whereby economic interdependence can influence a nation's foreign policy, hence the problems facing the foreign policy of the United States. The shift from De Gaulle to Pompidou and from Labour to Tory may not basically alter the shape of world affairs, but it can affect them in important details. For example, France's willingness to consider Britain's entry into the European Economic Community blunted Britain's general foreign policy role as long as negotiations were in process, and will divert British and European official attention and energy from other matters for some time. Another example is the restoration of Britain's military commitment east of Suez before the withdrawal had proceeded so far as to become irreversible. The important influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is also demonstrated by the election of a Communist as President of Chile. It has been alleged that the very rapid

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growth of foreign ownership in Chilean manufacturing in the late sixties, much of it in the form of takeovers, played a significant role in the public appeal of Sr. Allende, who during his campaign raised the spectre of foreign domination of Chile's infant manufacturing sector.

The impact on political leadership may possibly lead to the most important effect of interdependence on foreign policy, but it is too subtle and too uncertain in direction to be analyzed with any confidence. More direct and clearly identifiable effects arise from the challenges to national autonomy in the realms of economic policy. These challenges take foreign policy right into the thicket of domestic politics. On the whole, foreign policy, in the narrower sense of national security and military-strategic considerations, has in all countries been elitist—the interest and province of a relatively small group of persons. Strategic considerations do become political issues, but generally in a rather abstract fashion, as broad issues and postures. Even the foreign policy budget—largely military—has until recently been relatively immune from domestic political considerations. (This is equally true of foreign aid, where one small group is pitted against another, and the public remains passive and uninterested.)

With the advent of increased economic interdependence, however, foreign developments will intrude on a whole range of policies that are traditionally domestic, and these bread-and-butter domestic political issues will in turn influence and greatly complicate the management of foreign policy.[9] It follows that foreign policy in the sense of all official relations between countries will become more intricate both in the range of issues and the frequency with which they arise. National reaction in the seventies will undoubtedly blend all five types of response. Many of these responses will create frictions between countries, and diplomats will be kept busy at their traditional task of smoothing ruffled feathers. If foreign policy is to be regarded as successful, it will have the additional task of channeling and controlling the reactions to

[9] This has long been true of trade policy, of course, and this fact has set trade policy apart from other aspects of foreign policy—a much wider range of political interests and persons had to be brought into the picture. Indeed, in the early 1930's, tariffs were considered exclusively a matter of domestic concern. Such success as trade policy has had as foreign policy has hinged on the brilliant idea of reciprocity, which in effect pits one set of domestic economic interests against another and thereby restores to the executive some of the freedom of action that he has in other areas of foreign policy. On the general relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in Britain and the United States, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston 1967). Curiously, Waltz does not discuss trade policy at all; if he had, he might have qualified his judgment that the American executive has more scope for pursuing foreign policy than does the British Prime Minister.

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greater interdependence in order to prevent the dominance of those exploitative, defensive, and aggressive responses that, if generalized, are detrimental to international order and hence to all participants. This means, in particular, confining the exploitative responses to *de minimus* cases and introducing some kind of order into the defensive and aggressive responses so that they will not provoke retaliation that is damaging to all parties.

To say this, however, is to say little more than that in times of tension and conflicting objectives it is in the interest of all to avoid outcomes that are detrimental to all. It is far more difficult to define the maximal task for foreign policy (even in an area limited to economics), for that depends, among other things, on our basic objectives and in particular on the value we attach to the preservation of *national* autonomy as such. We must sooner or later face in a global context the issue of centralization-decentralization that is so prominent within the United States. In thinking about these issues, I find it helpful to consider three extreme cases—Weberian "ideal types." None of them will be realized during the next ten years, but each may serve as a model, or general guideline, toward which we might move; all of them accept as given the fact of extensive government influence on the operation of market forces.

The first is a regime of nation-states, each successfully pursuing its own objectives that have been determined in its own way, democratically or otherwise. As noted above, successful pursuit of economic objectives at the national level requires markets that are fragmented at least to the national level, and this in turn implies that each nation is sufficiently insulated from other nations to pursue its independent course (although groupings of like-minded nations need not be excluded). This does not rule out trade and capital movements, but it does presuppose some instrument of policy (tariffs, quotas, taxes on international transactions, flexible exchange rates, or other defensive measures) that will permit the country to prevent emaciation of its domestic policies by international transactions that are highly sensitive to them. It is the sensitivity of international transactions that must be reduced, and that objective does not require autarky.

The second regime involves a supranational state that will take over many of the functions that are now performed by the nation—an extreme form of "constructive" response. In the area of economic policy this would mean economic stabilization, taxation of mobile factors, regulatory policies concerning businesses and unions, and even, up to a point, redistributional policies. In other words, the span of government control would be brought into correspondence with the decision-making do-

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main of mobile businesses and individuals. Such a superstate need not be global in scope. Businesses, funds, and labor are not free to move globally, and they will not be for some time. The Communist countries and many less developed countries are effectively insulated from the main economic centers of the industrial world, either by policy or by uncertainty inherent in the absence of policy under politically unsettled circumstances.

There is a natural historical analogy here. It is the gradual passage of responsibility for increasing areas of economic management from the American states to the federal government. As American business became truly national rather than regional or local in character, the states found it increasingly difficult, in a country within which free trade prevailed and contracts made in one state had to be honored in others, to regulate business activity effectively. Businesses simply left the states that imposed onerous restrictions on their activities; or at least the head offices migrated. Consequently, the federal government gradually took over regulatory responsibilities.

The third regime involves American hegemony, an extreme form of "aggressive" response. Rather than turn responsibility over to a superstate, the United States would gradually extend its regulations to cover U.S. citizens abroad and foreigners residing in, or dealing with, the United States. By a combination of persuasion and (nonmilitary) threat, it would either bring other countries into line or drive them into the first regime, thereby insulating them from such contact with the United States as they find offensive to their sovereignty. The world would be on a dollar standard, and many nations would adopt systems of regulation and taxation similar to those of the United States in order to avert punitive reactions from it, and to avoid internal embarrassments arising from differential treatment favoring American over domestic enterprises. This state of affairs could not be brought about, of course, without overcoming a certain amount of domestic American opposition, concerning, for instance, the taxation of income from foreign sources even when it is not repatriated.

None of these regimes is immediately foreseeable, for none is politically feasible. But the model regime which we implicitly use at present —autonomous and purposeful nation-states in harmonious and unrestricted economic intercourse, through the competitive market place, at fixed exchange rates, governed by occasional treaties and conventions to assure good conduct and to iron out modest problems of overlapping jurisdiction, leaving virtually all economic decisions to national governments—is simply not viable in the long run, for the reasons already

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given. Unless we develop some new conception of world economic order, the search for specific solutions to specific problems will run a substantial risk of slipping into practices that are detrimental to all. We will enjoy neither the full benefits of economic integration on a "global" scale nor the full benefits of national autonomy in the establishment and pursuit of economic and social objectives. In short, it is the third notion of foreign policy, the grand conception of a world economic order, which will be profoundly affected by the impact of increased economic interdependence, for greater interdependence will inevitably compel a basic re-examination of the kind of world we ultimately want.

Various viable compromises among these three regimes are of course possible, and we should no doubt work toward one of them in the near future rather than toward the ideal types. Three come to mind. The first leans toward preservation of national autonomy by reducing the degree of interdependence through action by individual governments; such actions would be governed by international conventions to assure that they were mutually consistent and that they went no further than necessary to achieve their purposes. Thus, agreement might be reached, and controls instituted, to limit movements of financial capital between countries. The blockage would not have to be complete to preserve some degree of national autonomy in monetary policy, but it would have to cover the major sources of flows. Similarly, taxes could be imposed on the outflow of business capital to prevent modest national differences in taxation and regulation of business from influencing the location of industry. Tariff quotas might be used to inhibit any rapid growth of imports that would greatly disturb domestic industries; the quotas could be allowed to grow automatically so that loss of competitiveness would be reflected in a relative but controlled decline in the domestic industry.

A second, preferable approach accomplishes much the same objective by introducing somewhat greater flexibility in exchange rates, with international rules governing the changes in rates and surveillance of adherence to the rules.[10] This approach would, I believe, help enormously with respect to balance-of-payments adjustment, and considerably with respect to the movement of yield-sensitive funds and price-sensitive goods from country to country, but it would still leave the whole area of business regulation untouched. It might therefore be combined with

[10] A proposal along these lines can be found in Cooper, "Sliding Parities: A Proposal for Presumptive Rules," in George N. Halm, ed., *Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates* (Princeton 1970), 251-59. This volume contains extensive discussion of a number of similar proposals.

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a third approach, involving intensive efforts to discover areas of potentially overlapping jurisdiction with a view to reaching common tax and regulatory policies among countries—preferably while the process of extensive foreign investment is still at a relatively early stage, so that a reasonably firm framework of expectations regarding corporate practices is available. (Recent inconclusive discussions between the United States and Swiss authorities, regarding the prosecution of tax evaders, indicate just how difficult agreement will be in some areas, and with some countries.)

The new requirements of the international scene will undoubtedly revive the debate between those with a *dirigiste* philosophy of economic policy and those who lean toward *laissez faire*. The former have largely carried the day domestically,[11] with governments committed to stabilize the economy, assure growth, and establish an equitable distribution of income. The latter will therefore welcome a chance to reopen the issue in a new context; they will resist attempts to restrict international transactions and to regulate international firms and financial transactions through intergovernmental cooperation. International mobility offers a welcome escape from domestic regulation. The new circumstances will also result in some major realignments on broad issues at home. American labor has generally been internationalist in outlook and position, but it correctly sees the mobility of American firms as a threat to its welfare. Its opposition to "tariff factories" has begun to spread to all foreign investment and even to liberal trade policy, just as, in a somewhat different context, British Socialists regarded a restriction-free international economy as a threat to their plans for domestic social reform in the late 1940's. *Laissez faire* might logically be regarded as a fourth extreme regime, reflecting a universal passive response, but its manifest conflict with accepted domestic objectives warrants its exclusion.

In summary, increased economic interdependence will result in more varied and more frequent official and semi-official contact between nations—far more than foreign ministries can handle in volume, scope, or technical detail. As a result, the relative importance of foreign ministries in relations among the Western industrial countries will decline. In-

[11] Some years ago Gunnar Myrdal identified and lamented the tension between national pursuit of domestic objectives that are desirable in themselves, and the preservation of an integrated international economy. He argued that the growth of the welfare state had led to disintegration of the world economy. I believe that this judgment unduly idealizes the "integration" of the world economy before the rise of the welfare state and that, in any case, it is premature; but the tension between national pursuit of national economic aims and the attainment of harmonious and unrestricted international transactions is certainly present, and indeed will become more acute. See Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (London 1960), especially chap. 10.

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creased economic interdependence will also compel a reassessment of the prevailing model of world economic order.

The impact on foreign policy in the sense of national security is not likely, in the medium run, to be any greater than it was in the fifties or sixties.* Such influence as there is will come through two channels: the tone of public attitudes toward foreign nations, and the process of adjustment to imbalances in international payments. Public feelings of benevolence or malevolence toward particular foreign nations are easy to underrate because of their intangible quality; although they rarely prove decisive, they can influence the flexibility with which the executive can pursue foreign policy. In the absence of an adequate adjustment mechanism, balance-of-payments pressures can of course have very tangible effects on a nation's flexibility, as Britain and France have both learned during the past fifteen years. These limits have been brought home to the United States in a variety of ways that range from the perceived need to tie foreign aid to procurement in the United States (the most important irritant in our relations with some countries), to the persistent pleas for reduction of force levels in Europe and elsewhere on balance-of-payments grounds. Such pressures erode the confidence of other nations in our ability to carry out our stated commitments and objectives. What is clearly needed is the introduction of some instrument of control that would achieve a balance-of-payments adjustment among major countries, but would also further the cause of international cooperation.

It is important to recall that most of the tensions between international transactions and the autonomous pursuit of domestic economic policy arise from the *sensitivity* of movements of goods, services, funds, firms, and persons to economic developments at home and abroad, and not from the absolute magnitude of the flows. The value of trade to a country, in terms of its contribution to national welfare, may depend neither on the sensitivity nor on the magnitude of the flows, although it is more likely to be related to the magnitude than to the sensitivity. Indeed, value and sensitivity are inversely related in one important respect: high sensitivity results precisely from the capacity of a country to substitute domestic for foreign production or investment, in response

* This statement did not anticipate the extraordinarily aggressive response of the United States in President Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971. Imposition of the ten per cent surcharge on imports and declaration that the dollar would no longer be convertible into gold, without any prior consultation even with our closest allies, are bound to induce others to re-examine their dependence on, and trust in, the United States in matters of national security, and may even accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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to relatively small margins of advantage; yet when such substitution is easily possible at relatively low cost, the value per dollar of trade or investment to the country is correspondingly diminished. (It is of course possible that the total gains from trade remain high even when the gains close to the margin are small, so that sensitivity is high up to a point, but not beyond that point.) Where the total gains from trade are high, preservation of trade becomes a matter of high foreign policy, as it is sometimes called, or even of national security. Thus, a high value placed on trade may lead countries to war over it, as it led Japan in 1941 to attack the Philippines and the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor to remove threats to its oil trade with the East Indies. Increased interdependence in the sense used here will greatly reduce that risk, but it also greatly increases the intrusion of international transactions into domestic affairs, thereby augmenting and aggravating a very different range of problems in foreign policy.

Growing economic interdependence thus negates the sharp distinction between internal and external policies that underlies the present political organization of the world into sovereign, territorially-based nation-states—sometimes called the Westphalian System, after the Treaty that marked an end to the universalism of the Middle Ages—that are inviolable in their domestic actions and subject to voluntarily agreed rules and conventions in their foreign policies (including war).[12] The growing interdependence of the world economy creates pressures for common policies, and hence for procedures whereby countries discuss and coordinate actions that hitherto were regarded as being of domestic concern exclusively. These pressures arise because market forces increasingly circumscribe the ability of nation-states to achieve their desired aims, regardless of their formal retention of sovereignty. Where autonomy implies success in achieving objectives, and not merely the freedom to make futile attempts to achieve objectives, some autonomy in policy can actually be restored by yielding sovereignty in certain areas.

The Westphalian System formally treats all nations as equals, and diplomatic forms preserve that fiction. But there are many important asymmetries in the world, so that "interdependence" is not always even-handed in its circumscribing impact. The asymmetries do not, however, always favor the larger countries. It is true that the United States, by virtue both of its relative economic size and of the interna-

[12] See Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order," in Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order*, I, *Trends and Patterns* (Princeton 1969), 43-48.

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tional use of its currency (which in turn is partly related to size) retains much more autonomy in the use of monetary policy for domestic purposes than do other countries, for its own actions strongly influence world monetary conditions. Tight money in the United States means tight money in the world (as in 1969), with capital inflows eroding the tight money position only modestly. Similarly, the importance of American investment abroad means that American corporate tax practices (and in particular the provisions for crediting foreign taxes against U.S. corporate tax liabilities) have a strong influence on corporate tax treatment in other countries, thereby preserving some autonomy to the United States.

On the other hand, small countries are sometimes in a more favorable position to exploit the international rules and the increased mobility of firms and funds than large ones. Like an oligopolistic firm, the large country must be alert to the reactions of others to its own actions; it must concern itself with the viability and stability of the system as a whole. The small country, in contrast, can, within limits, consider the system as being beyond its influence and can therefore act freely in ways that, if generalized, would alter the system, often for worse. It can act with impunity so long as the resulting movements of funds or firms remain relatively small—that is, so long as they do not threaten the system as a whole. Thus we see the emergence of "flags of convenience" and their analogues in matters of corporate structure, disclosure of information, and taxation.

Throughout this discussion the less developed countries have been largely excluded from consideration. This is not because their problems are unimportant, but because economic interdependence among the developed countries is moving so rapidly that it creates a common range of problems among countries with broadly similar objectives and institutional setups, and therefore calls for common and often collectively agreed solutions. The European Economic Community as a center for economic decision-taking is rapidly becoming obsolete in the face of growing economic interdependence; the United Nations, on the other hand, is much too large and reflects much too diverse a range of economic concerns among its members to be a useful instrument for international collective action in this area. An unhappy by-product of relying on a small group of largely industrial nations, a rich man's club, is the accentuation of the perceived differences between the rich and the poor. As time goes on, problems facing the initial group will undoubtedly spread; therefore the club should have a flexible approach to membership, as required by the problems at hand. A much broader

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group will be appropriate for some issues, for example in defining the relationship between foreign-controlled firms, host governments, and home governments. But even here the concerns and anxieties of less developed countries, still groping for national identity, may have quite a different character from those of more mature and more self-confident countries, and this in turn will require different solutions.

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION:

An Interpretation Based on an Analytical Framework of Political Coalitions

By CHONG-DO HAH*

THE greatest convulsion in Chinese politics since 1949, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, has subsided. The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in April, 1969, seems to have been one of the final steps in consolidating the fruits of the revolution. It involved, above all, an unprecedented scale of upheaval in the party leadership and the party organization.

The past several years have witnessed a spate of articles and a few monographs attempting to explain the Cultural Revolution. According to Gene T. Hsiao, there are five general theories about the cause of the revolution.[1] First, it is held that the Cultural Revolution involved essentially a power struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i. Second, the upheaval is seen as a result of developments in China's foreign and domestic policy. The third view, closely related to the second, stresses Sino-Soviet relations and the American intervention in Vietnam as decisive factors. The fourth position contends that the revolution is best seen as a continuation of Chinese tradition. Finally, some attribute the revolution to insanity on the part of Mao.

In our view, which combines elements of the first and second explanations, the Cultural Revolution represented an ideological struggle between power groups. The Vietnamese war, as Franz Schurmann and others have argued, may also be considered directly relevant.[2] The

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[1] Gene T. Hsiao, "The Background and Development of 'The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,'" *Asian Survey*, VII (June 1967), 390.

[2] Franz Schurmann, "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Ideology and Organization," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, Bk. 2, Vol. 1 (Chicago 1969), 525-65. See also Tanio Matsutani, "Rin Pyō jidai no gaikō rosen" [The Foreign Policy Line of the Lin Piao Era], *Jiyū* (November 1966), 24-34, and his "Kōeihei undō to Rin Pyō taisei" [The Red Guard and the Lin Piao System], *Sekai* (November 1966), 150; Humio Kusano, *Zoku—Chūgoku shakai kenkyū* [A Study

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theory that the Cultural Revolution was a continuation of traditional Chinese practices must be rejected because specific grounds for possible "falsification" (in Karl Popper's definition) cannot be advanced. A conclusive argument that underlying ideological and policy consideration were involved will negate the view that attributes the revolution to insanity on the part of Mao.

As far as we know, none of the extant studies of the Cultural Revolution is based on an *explicit* conceptual framework.[3] The main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by systematically analyzing and interpreting the dynamics of the revolution on the basis of a framework for analysis of political coalitions. In the interest of economy, we have used a framework of analysis developed by Albert O. Hirschman.[4] It would also be fruitful to draw on the methodological orientations of game theory in such an analysis and interpretation.[5] Hirschman's framework, however, is simpler and more manageable.

I

Hirschman's framework suggests an analytical technique for locating political actors with respect to any number of political issues within a schema. Political actors may either strongly favor issue *A*, indicated as *a*; moderately favor it, *a′*; moderately oppose it, *-a′*; or strongly oppose it, *-a*. Similarly, they may hold any of four analogous positions on issue *B*. Assuming that this group of actors is confronted with both *A* and *B*,

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of Chinese Society—Continued] (n.p., n.d.), 483-90; Symposium, "Chūgoku no bunka daikakumei shindankai e" [China's Great Cultural Revolution to a New Stage], *Asahi janaru* (February 5, 1967), 9; Tadao Ishikawa, *Gendai Chūgoku no shomondai* [Aspects of Modern China] (Tokyo 1967), 161. Cf. Eiichi Imakawa and Kazuhiko Hama, *Chūgoku bunka daikakumei to Vetonam sensō* [China's Great Cultural Revolution and the Vietnamese War] (Tokyo 1968); Yoshizō Ikurai, *Gendai Chūgoku ron* [On Modern China] (Tokyo 1968), 189-96; Ezra Vogel, "Comments [on Franz Schurmann's chapter]," in Ho and Tsou (above), 568.

[3] Robert J. Lifton's *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York 1969) may be an exception. In this connection, we *certainly* do not wish to give the impression that those studies which fail to show methodological consciousness and rigor are necessarily inferior; many China specialists have made significant contributions without clamoring for "more political science or social sciences." In fact, this paper shamelessly utilizes the ideas and research of many of these specialists, with a view to placing them in the perspectives of systematic approaches in modern social scientific analysis as a means of demonstrating the interplay between a frame of reference and data.

[4] See Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York 1965), esp. 358-84. For methodological orientations of this paper, we are also indebted to Karl Popper's discussion of theory and interpretation in his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York 1961).

[5] See, for example, William H. Riker's elegant work, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962); Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968), 770-87.

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sixteen logical possibilities exist for the position which a given actor may hold. These sixteen possibilities may be displayed in a four-by-four matrix as follows:



FIGURE 1

Within the matrix we can block off groups which hold politically similar views. If we postulate that *A* and *B* are progressive measures, we might get the political groupings exemplified above. Group 1 would be the Leftists, Group 2 the Left Centrists, and so on. If the situation is such that those favoring *A* and *B* are not able to realize their goals by outvoting or overpowering the Rightists and Centrists, they have two options: either to form a coalition with the Centrists to accomplish at least some of their goals, or to destroy some of their opposition, for example by starting an anti-Rightist movement. The Rightists have similar alternatives. The Centrists, if they act as a group, have more options. They may ally themselves with either side, extracting compromises as the price of their support, or they may ally with one side on one issue and with the other side on another, extracting concessions from both, *or* they may ally with one side to destroy the other, and then turn and destroy their former ally, thus playing Right and Left against one another; finally, they may play a mediating and balancing role, possibly attempting to build a Centrist coalition. Those in the center of the matrix thus have the widest range of alternatives, and can be the most flexible.

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In applying this framework of analysis to the events of the Cultural Revolution, this paper seeks to (1) identify, analyze, and interpret the variables (that is, ideological and policy issues) which are basic to the dynamics of the revolution; (2) identify the major political actors and their bases of power in the matrix generated by these variables; (3) integrate the interpretation with the available facts; and (4) assess the revolution itself.

II

In the broadest sense the Cultural Revolution represents a relentless search for a redefinition of the dynamics of Chinese society by elements of the CCP leadership, especially Mao Tse-tung. The scope of this redefinition will be examined briefly, and an attempt will be made to select variables which reflect the positions of the major political actors with respect to this redefinition.

By 1956 the Party had not only consolidated its basis of paramount power, but also completed the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. In Marxian terms this laid the groundwork for a Socialist harmony within which the pivotal position of the party apparatus was assumed. This assumption of harmony and unity under the direction of the Party was written into the 1956 Constitution of the CCP.

This Constitution states that membership in the Party is "open to any Chinese citizen who works and does not exploit the labour of others." The responsibility of every member to "safeguard the Party's policy and decisions" and "strictly observe the Party Constitution" is stressed. The document advises revolutionary vigilance only once—in stating that party members must be "constantly on the alert against the intrigues of the enemy."[6] There is thus considerable emphasis on organization-building and relatively little on revolutionary vigilance. The absence of class restrictions on membership and mention of struggle or class struggle reflects the assumed unity and harmony in Chinese society.

The Eighth National Congress, which approved this Constitution, also approved a major reallocation of power. In 1945 the Chairman of the Central Committee (Mao) was also Chairman of the Central Secretariat and of the Central Politburo. In 1956 Teng Hsiao-ping was placed in charge of the Secretariat, and a seven-man Standing Committee of the Politburo replaced the 1945–1956 Secretariat. This Standing Committee

[6] "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (September 1956)," reproduced in Winberg Chai, ed., *Essential Works of Chinese Communism* (New York 1969), 297.

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consisted of: the Chairman (Mao), five Vice-Chairmen (Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yun, Lin Piao) and the General Secretary (Teng Hsiao-ping). This group of leaders remained in power until the Cultural Revolution. In practice, this amounted to a first line of government, dominated by Liu and Teng, which handled day-to-day affairs, and a second line, headed by Mao, which took a broader view of the course of the Chinese Revolution.[7] Evidence suggests that Mao accepted this arrangement voluntarily.[8] These first and second lines amounted to a device for ensuring a peaceful transfer of power and authority at Mao's death; Liu Shao-ch'i was to succeed Mao.

The failure of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, however, triggered a modification in the 1956 line. Unable to mobilize the urban elite effectively, the leadership turned to rural mass mobilization. Similarly, in the economic sphere, emphasis was shifted from a series of five-year plans under central direction, to a mass-based, decentralized developmental movement. While this latter strategy remained basically consistent with the 1956 line, it differed from the earlier strategy on several points: the correct relation of the elites to the masses, of the city to the country, and of leaders to the led. The two strategies seem to have come into conflict at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, held in November and December, 1958. Evidence indicates a struggle over the commune system, with Mao balancing the factions, and even accepting a certain modification in the commune system.[9] In addition, the Sixth Plenum accepted Mao's "proposal" not to be a candidate for the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Wall posters put up during the Cultural Revolution have reported that Mao said in October, 1966, "I was extremely discontented with the decision, but I could do nothing about it." Liu Shao-ch'i became the Chairman of the PRC.

The purge of Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in August, 1959, provides further evidence of the emergence of two conflicting policy lines: the Red line, favoring rural mass mobilization, and the Expert line, favoring urban elite mobilization. P'eng, who had criticized the commune system and the

[7] Strictly speaking, this division of functional lines was formalized in 1958, not in 1956. Lin Piao was elected as a Vice-Chairman in May, 1958. It should also be pointed out that by 1965, Chu Teh and Ch'en Yun had ceased to be major actors. Instead, such figures as P'eng Chen, Li Fu-Ch'un, and Ch'en I were more important.

[8] Hsiao (fn. 1), 392. In October, 1966, Mao said, "When I retreated into the second line by not conducting the daily work and by letting others execute it, my purpose was to cultivate their prestige so that when I have to see God, the country can avoid great chaos." *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, 395.

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application of "Red and Expert" policies to the army,[10] was denounced as a "right opportunist" and sent to work in a rural commune. As the purge was isolated, however, the Central Committee was probably not seriously divided over the issue.[11] At least an outward balance between the two lines was maintained.

The collapse of the Great Leap Forward, however, upset this balance, and marked the beginning of a new stage in the attempts to solve the basic problems of the Chinese Revolution. A very flexible approach to developmental processes was adopted, and the period of retrenchment following the Great Leap was characterized by decentralization with emphasis upon agriculture. The failure of the Great Leap, however, posed more problems than just where the emphasis should be placed in developmental patterns.

At a Central Committee Work Conference in January, 1962, Liu, Teng, and other first-line leaders are said to have severely criticized Mao's economic policies. Liu reportedly claimed that 70 per cent of the disaster of the Great Leap resulted from man-made failures, rather than from bad weather as the official line asserted. This constituted an implicit criticism of the view of development underlying the Great Leap, namely that the cities and country, elite and masses, and Redness and Expertise must be coordinated.[12] Furthermore, Liu supposedly stated that unwillingness to admit errors was not appropriate to revolutionaries, thus implicitly proposing a major change in policy.[13]

These problems came to the fore at the Tenth Plenum meeting in 1962 where the beginning lines of a power struggle appeared. What is more important, a challenge to the assumption of unity in Chinese society (the 1956 line) came to the fore. In this plenum Mao abolished the distinction between the first and second lines of participation in daily affairs and initiated the Socialist Education Campaign.

This campaign marked the beginning of a renewed class struggle, with elements within the party organization and the urban elite being cast as enemies. Considerable evidence indicates that this elite was indulging in certain excesses, and that elite membership might become almost hereditary. Party officials were in the best positions to send their children to universities, to have them admitted to the Party, and to in-

[10] Franz Schurmann, "Party," in Franz Schurmann and O. Schell, eds., *Communist China* (New York 1967), 118.

[11] In retrospect, however, one is tempted to argue that it marked a beginning of the split within the CCP leadership.

[12] Explicitly, the criticism was not directed at the "walking on two legs" approach itself, but at the way the Great Leap was implemented.

[13] W.A.C. Adie, "China's 'Second Liberation' in Perspective," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, xxv (February 1969), 18.

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volve them in political affairs, three prerequisites for a successful career in Chinese society.[14] In this way, the party structure and urban elites seem to have opted for elite mobilization, or Expertise over Redness, as the proper technique for developing China. To Mao, committed as he was to equitable social organization,[15] this was tantamount to a renunciation of the revolution.

The organizational basis of the Socialist Education Campaign was the "three-in-one" leadership of the cadres, the experts, and the masses. This leadership, however, had to develop a new working style. To provide this, movements were launched to "learn from the People's Liberation Army," to "learn from Lei Feng," and to "learn from the Tach'ing oilfield." These groups or persons exemplified the proper blending of Redness *and* Expertise. In an attempt to re-integrate them with the masses, cadres and experts were sent to the countryside "to learn from the people," i.e., work on communes. But as conditions in China improved from the low point immediately following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, the campaign became routinized. The Party seems to have been the major obstacle to the unified mobilization as tendencies toward elitism, localism, and authoritarianism reappeared.[16] The cadres provided the link between the elite and the masses, and thus were all-important for coordination. The party organization, however, controlled the cadres, thus making an effective utilization of them difficult. To offset this, the movement to emulate the People's Liberation Army (PLA) staffed its political organization with transferred soldiers and made the organization responsible to the Military Affairs Commission headed by Lin Piao, thus bypassing Teng's Secretariat. This provides an early indication of the institutionalization of ideological differences within the leadership.

As the increasing routinization of the Socialist Education Campaign rendered it ineffective in revolutionizing the cadres, Mao began looking deeper into Chinese society for causes of this failure. An official revision of the Socialist Education Campaign of September, 1963, stated: "Experience . . . has revealed that cadres in basic level organizations who have committed serious mistakes are usually connected with certain

[14] Michel Oksenberg, "The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, XXXVI (October-December 1968), 61-92. See also Masahisa Suganuma, *Chūgoku bunka daikakumei* [China's Great Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1967), 41.

[15] See Franz Schurmann, "On Revolutionary Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIII, No. 1 (1969), 36-53; Noboru Koga, "Mō Takutō kakumei to Chūgokuteki kanryō shugi kokufuku no kadai" [Mao Tse-tung's Revolution and the Problem of Overcoming Chinese Bureaucratism], *Tōa bunka sōsho*, 1 (September 1968), 23-46.

[16] Schurmann (fn. 2), 544.

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cadres of high-level organization."[17] Thus, failure to revolutionize the cadres was attributed to the fact that the experimentation in the organizational form of the Socialist Education Campaign was under the control of the urban and party elites, who could not sustain both regularized organization and active ideological programs.[18] Only in the army did such a combination seem possible, and the increasing reliance on the PLA at the expense of the party apparatus attempted to tap this potential.

The successive modifications in the economic plans and the successive rectification campaigns culminating in the Socialist Education Movement represented a series of attempts to solve the basic problem of coordination of elite and masses in development and mobilization. The Red versus Expert controversy thus seems to have been at the heart of the debate. What was at issue here were the basic values of the elite.[19] The questions raised concerned the remuneration of Experts, to what extent they should be required to take part in political work, where their loyalties should lie, and how much of their energies should be bent to the needs of the people. After 1963 it became clear that past attempts to integrate the elite and the masses had failed, and that a new solution was in order.

In a sense, a limbo seems to have reigned over China during the period from the end of 1963 to the formal declaration of the Cultural Revolution. Below the surface, however, there are several indications of efforts by Mao and Chou En-lai to attack the problems. In 1964, for example, Mao accused the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles of revisionism. In December of 1964, Chou put forth the slogan "Cultural Revolution" in a report to the National People's Congress, stating that the "class enemy has reared his head." Chou called for a "radical transformation of any ideology, bourgeois, feudal, or other which is not consistent with the economic base and Socialist political system."[20] His statement entailed a rejection of the 1956 line; the contradictions in Chinese society were now considered to be antagonistic.

There is some evidence that Mao attempted to revitalize the Socialist

[17] Richard Baum and F. C. Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question," *Asian Survey*, VIII (March 1968), 329.

[18] John W. Lewis, "Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution," in Ho and Tsou (fn. 2), 468.

[19] For a general but good treatment of the Socialist Education Movement and the Red versus Expert debate, see Jack Gray and P. Cavendish, *Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution* (New York 1968); Suganuma (fn. 14), 124-70.

[20] Keesing's Research Report, *The Cultural Revolution in China: Its Origin and Course* (New York 1967), 7.

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Education Campaign. In January, 1965, at a work conference of the Politburo, Mao issued the directive, "Some Problems Currently Arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement," which stated: "The main point of this movement is to rectify those people in positions of authority within the Party who take the capitalist road."[21] Two things are noteworthy here: first, Mao characterized the contradictions in China as being between those who are taking the Socialist road and those taking the capitalist road, and are thus antagonistic; second, the solution to these contradictions was to be sought in the Socialist Education Campaign which aimed at rectifying the capitalist-roaders. Mao was in effect asking the Party, which controlled the Socialist Education Campaign, to rectify itself. Mao also reportedly demanded, at a Central Committee meeting in September, 1965, that the Party initiate "criticism of reactionary ideology," but he met strong opposition.[22] Thus, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, he was still attempting to draw the party organization back into the balance which it had upset.

Four major conclusions may be drawn. First, the fundamental domestic problem of China was how to achieve an integrated development through coordination of elite and mass mobilization. This problem recurred in different forms and was paired with different attempts to find solutions throughout the period considered above. Second, throughout this period the 1956 line, which assumed the essential unity of all groups in Chinese society, was disintegrating. By 1964 a redefinition of the class structure had begun to emerge. Third, the party bureaucracy and the urban elite posed the major obstacles to a uniform development, and repeated attempts to mobilize them to cleanse themselves, or to use them in conjunction with other groups like the army, had failed, forcing the conclusion that the party apparatus was counter-revolutionary. And fourth, it became clear that Mao was committed to achieving a more equitable social organization even during the period of China's development toward a new society.

The concurrent development of China's foreign policy also is important to an analysis of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast to domestic development, however, little direct evidence exists relating to the formulation of China's foreign policy. Consequently, the discussion of foreign policy must be short and will admittedly be controversial.

Despite the withdrawal of Soviet military aid in 1960, China maintained an aggressive foreign policy stance. The basic premise of this

[21] Baum and Teiwes (fn. 17), 333.
[22] Keesing's Research Report (fn. 20), 8.

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policy was stated by Liu Shao-ch'i in an address made in 1949: "The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China should be taken by the people of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and the people's democracy."[23]

The Western world interpreted this to mean that China would export revolution. Two of China's foreign policy goals—enhancement of Chinese influence and power in Asia, and influence throughout the Third World by diplomatic means, including economic, technical, and advisory assistance—put the Chinese in competition with the two major powers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union.[24]

This foreign policy stance was threatened by the Sino-Soviet split and the American escalation of the Vietnamese war.[25] The former, besides upsetting the military-related industries in China, placed the Chinese in more intense competition with the Russians for influence throughout the Third World. The American involvement in Vietnam posed an immediate threat to China's security. American policy was premised on the containment of Chinese aggression, and thus the intervention, though nominally against the North Vietnamese, was, in the eyes of many American policy-makers, a move necessary to remove Chinese influence and aggression. As this premise lacked any firm basis in fact, the Chinese viewed the American intervention as the first step in the process leading to a war against China. As a result, the Chinese have come to regard war with the United States as inevitable.[26]

> The aim of the United States is to enforce a watertight blockade on South Vietnam and render the South Vietnamese people isolated and bereft of help in their just struggle. . . . If it fails to achieve this aim—and it certainly will fail—it is possible that in accordance with the objective laws governing the development of aggressive wars, U.S. imperialism will go a step further and extend its war of aggression to the whole of Indo-China and to China. And indeed U.S. imperialism is now making preparations for this eventuality.[27]

The steady build-up of American troops and war materiel in Southeast Asia increased this threat. According to several sources, the Chinese indirectly contacted the Americans, promising not to intervene in Vietnam if the Americans would not attack China, invade North Vietnam,

[23] Robert C. North, *The Foreign Relations of China* (Belmont, Calif. 1969), 80.
[24] *Ibid.*, 74.
[25] See the sources cited in fn. 2.
[26] See, for instance, Chou En-lai's speech, "China Is Ready to Take up U.S. Challenge," *Peking Review* (December 24, 1965), 5-6, reprinted in Schurmann and Schell (fn. 10), 592-96.
[27] *Ibid.*, 593.

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or bomb the Red River dikes in North Vietnam. Washington reportedly replied that these areas would not be attacked,[28] but still continued to announce that our policy was directed at the containment of aggressive Communist China.

With the intensification of the Sino-Soviet split and increased American involvement in Vietnam, the situation grew more tense. Three options appeared to be open: first, to mobilize in preparation for war and eventual entry into the fighting; second, to adopt a strategy of reliance on ideological and organizational preparation for a defensive, protracted war with the Americans and to do as little as possible to provoke the attack; or third, to seek a rapprochement with the Soviets for protection against the United States. The second alternative merits further discussion. A protracted war of defense in depth would maximize the benefits to be derived from China's immense manpower while minimizing the liabilities resulting from her technological backwardness. This type of guerrilla war fought on Chinese soil would require a mobile, decentralized, highly spirited mass army. Such an army would require the support of local industry and agriculture, and thus would need the total support of the populace. Because of their vulnerability to American air power, the Chinese could not rely on centralized industry, military commands, or communications. These points are important because the evidence suggests that the Chinese were making preparations along these lines.[29]

To summarize, the two most important unresolved problems of the Chinese leadership have been how to achieve a uniform, equitable development and how to live with the Americans on their doorstep. These issues are taken here as variables for our interpretation of the Cultural Revolution. The argument in this section has attempted to show that these variables were deeply embedded in the social processes of Chinese society before the Cultural Revolution.

III

In this section, we will discuss the four major political actors of the Cultural Revolution—Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Mao

[28] See, for example, Paul Y. Hammond, *The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945* (New York 1969), 209.

[29] Of course it is possible that the Chinese preparations for a protracted war were really aimed at the Soviets. Harrison E. Salisbury, for instance, presents this argument in his *War Between Russia and China* (New York 1969), especially chap. 11. Our paper, however, gives no special attention to such an argument. This is partly explained by limitation of space, and partly by the belief that the data available when our research was largely completed (mid-1969) did not seem to support such claims as Salisbury's.

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Tse-tung—with respect to the two issues examined in Section II. The treatment of Chou is severely limited by the available data, though it is possible to determine his position on both issues. More evidence is available on Lin, enabling us to sketch his rising power and some of his decisions. Mao and Liu receive most of the attention, with the discussion centering upon their disagreements on policy.

The West views Chou En-lai as an extremely astute politician with a remarkable capacity for political survival. Though this is undoubtedly true, it is misleading to adduce from this that Chou is a mediator in the Cultural Revolution, attempting to stand between the various groups. Rather, evidence suggests that as early as 1964 Chou called for a cultural revolution to arm the people with Mao Tse-tung's thought and to destroy the class enemy.[30] Thus Chou may be placed in the camp of those favoring a combination of Redness *and* Expertise. According to W.A.C. Adie, Chou was one of a number of Chinese leaders who signed a statement, issued after a meeting with representatives of the Japanese Communist Party in March, 1966, calling for a rapprochement with the Soviets for "united action" on Vietnam.[31] This fixes Chou's position on foreign policy. Chou headed the state apparatus and thus held considerable power. It is difficult, however, to determine to what extent he was supported by that apparatus, since roughly half of the heads of the various ministries were purged during the Cultural Revolution.

Appointed as Defense Minister in 1959 to replace the purged P'eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao seemed to adopt Mao's style of balancing political groups. By 1969, as Defense Minister, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and *de facto* head of the powerful Military Affairs Commission (MAC) which had overall control and supervision of the armed services, Lin commanded wide-ranging power. In 1963, during the "emulate the PLA" campaign, a new system of political departments in industry, communications, trade and finance, education, and scientific research was created under the auspices of the MAC to compete with the party organization.[32] In 1965, when Ch'en Yun was demoted from first to second Vice-Premier of the State Council, Lin rose from second to first to take his place. Lin was undoubtedly a man

[30] See his statement to the people calling for the "proletarianization of intellectuals and the 'intellectualization' of proletariat" in the *People's Daily*, January 5, 1965. However, it is also true that Chou did attempt to defend such men as Chen Yi who seemed to favor the Expert over the Red.

[31] Adie (fn. 13), 21.

[32] Chu-yuan Cheng, "The Power Struggle in Red China," *Asian Survey*, IV (September 1966), 472.

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on the rise. By 1966, Lin and the PLA were in the mainstream of the attempt to reinvigorate the educational campaign. Lin's five-point program for putting politics first is well known, and may be viewed as an attempt further to politicize the PLA in preparation for a protracted war with the United States.

Lin's position on the foreign policy dilemma was made clear in September, 1965, in the famous essay, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" He wrote: "In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war and to be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance. . . . If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid—even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution—no victory can be won."[33] The implication is clear: China will not export revolution, nor will she commit herself materially to revolutions in other countries. From this statement and the preparations made in the PLA we may infer that Lin favored protracted war as the policy stance toward the United States. It is more difficult to determine where Lin stood on the Red versus Expert controversy, since his efforts were confined almost exclusively to the PLA. Thus Lin is best viewed as being uncommitted on this issue prior to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.[34]

The differences between the two remaining actors, Mao and Liu, were basic to the Cultural Revolution.[35] Although some scholars trace their basic differences as far back as the Yenan period, they will here be analyzed in terms of the immediate Red versus Expert controversy. This fundamental dispute is the ideological manifestation of a constellation of questions about social organization in China. Three of these questions are central to this analysis: the class struggle, the development of the national economy, and the correct attitude toward the intellectuals. The divergent perspectives of Mao and Liu led to basic differences over these questions.

From his experiences in modern China, Mao viewed all social processes in terms of struggle and conflict, with struggle essentially an individual, inner process, irrespective of one's class background. This is

[33] Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War!* (Peking 1965), 42-52, reprinted in Chai (fn. 6), 418.

[34] One might be tempted to contend that his frequently quoted concept of the "four firsts" clearly supports his stand in favor of Red, but we want to stress that the "four firsts" were directed at the military.

[35] See especially "Liu Shao-ch'i fan-tui Mao-chu-hsi chiao-yu lu-hsien wu-shih-li" [Fifty Examples of Liu Shao-ch'i's Opposition to Chairman Mao's Educational Line], *Chiao-yü ko-ming* (Peking, April 16, 1967), 1-4.

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not to imply that he was always content with such a voluntaristic (as opposed to deterministic) interpretation of class conflict. In his eyes, class struggle came to involve two distinct phenomena: the crystallization of a new class of party administrators, managers, and technicians who were showing signs of becoming a hereditary ruling class that perpetuated entrenched attitudes, and the emergence of a group of individuals in collectives—the middle peasants—who had the resources to profit in the private sector.[36] Mao attempted to integrate these two classes into Chinese society, first through a series of educational campaigns and then, when these failed, through class struggle.

Liu, on the other hand, held that the elimination of the capitalists, landlords, and rich peasants concluded the class struggle.[37] He denied that class antagonisms would continue into the stage of socialism. Class struggle would at that point be counterproductive, interfering with effective organization for national development.

The divergence over development is best analyzed in terms of two issues: the relation of town to country, and of mental to manual labor. The relation of town to country was really the relation of central organization for planning to local organization for planning and management. In particular, this involved the question of how technology should be introduced into the commune. Two alternatives existed: technical equipment and experts could be controlled and allocated by a control organization, or they could be decentralized and integrated into the commune. Mao clearly preferred the latter.[38] He made a number of attempts to integrate experts into the commune. The peasants were encouraged to develop their own "intermediate technology" by the systematic improvement of existing tools. Further, Mao proposed units in each *hsien* in which veteran farmers, scientific technicians, and skilled workers would work out the technological needs of the commune and attempt to devise the proper tools.[39] He emphasized a three-in-one cooperative leadership in industry—consisting of cadres, technical personnel, and workers—to achieve a leadership which was both Red and Expert.[40]

[36] Jack Gray, "The Economics of Maoism," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXV (February 1969), 51. See also Suganuma (fn. 14); Chikashi Kamibeppu, "Bunka daikakumei ni okeru nōson no kōzō henkaku" [The Structural Change of Farming Villages under the Great Cultural Revolution], *Tōa bunka sōsho*, I (September 1968), 123-44; *People's Daily*, August 28, November 24 and 27, 1967.

[37] Chu-yuan Cheng, "The Root of China's Cultural Revolution: The Feud Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i," *Orbis*, XI (Winter 1968), 1169-70.

[38] Gray (fn. 36), 45-46.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] "Running Enterprises in Line with Mao Tse-tung's Thinking," *Peking Review* (April 15, 1966), 11-15.

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Liu's position on the relation of town to country is also clear. In 1959 a ministry was established to deal with agricultural mechanization; it was diverted from its original purpose to that of developing a system of central manufacture of equipment within a system of state operations that was being evolved by P'eng Chen and Liu. Liu thereby shifted this ministry to the task of centralized development. In 1965, Liu and P'eng proposed that the ministries concerned with economic development be made into public trusts to operate independently of local governmental bodies and directly under the control of the State Economic Commission. Moreover, they proposed that the success of these operations be judged by their profitability.[41] Clearly Liu opted for central direction. From this, we may infer that Liu would use experts to staff centralized bureaucracies and would not attempt to integrate them into communes.

There exists, then, a very basic difference in values between the two men. Mao was committed to equitable social organization and was prepared to sacrifice other goals, such as rapid development of heavy industry, to achieve it. Liu, on the other hand, seemed prepared to sacrifice the goal of a more equitable social organization to that of technological development and industrialization.

The respective positions of the two men concerning the correct attitude toward intellectuals can be deduced from the values held by each. Mao maintained that intellectuals must learn from the people, that is, they must follow the mass line and serve the needs of the people by teaching and applying the *Thought* of Mao Tse-tung. All aspects of culture must serve the broad masses and be subordinate to politics. Liu, on the other hand, seems to have advocated that intellectuals in certain respects be considered above politics, and not subject to attack on political grounds.

Liu also was reportedly a signer of the statement, issued after the conference with representatives of the Japanese Communist Party, that advocated alliance with the Soviets for united action over Vietnam.[42] While Liu's stand can thus be easily determined, Mao's thinking on China's policy dilemma concerning Vietnam is difficult to ascertain. There seem to be no statements by him taking one position or another; therefore, the best conclusion would be to regard Mao as uncommitted

[41] Gray (fn. 36), 45; *Nung-yeh chi-hsieh chi-shu* [Agricultural Mechanization Technology], No. 6 (Peking 1967), 4-8.

[42] Of course it is possible that he advocated the united action primarily as a means to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

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on the issue, rather than as adhering to the popular contention that he favored war.[43]

This analysis thus finds Liu an advocate of the Expert position, Mao and Chou advocates of a balance of Red and Expert, and Lin aloof from the question (though not completely).[44] Both Liu and Chou seem committed to a policy of alliance with the Soviets as a defense against the Americans; Lin seems to prefer protracted war; Mao seems uncommitted on the issue. While these conclusions are drawn from somewhat sketchy data, they are treated as final for the purposes of our analysis and interpretation. The key men to watch are Mao and Lin, since they seem to have the more flexible stands and the greater number of alternatives. Interestingly, both seem firmly committed on one issue and not on another, making them natural partners in a coalition.

IV

This section will give a brief history of the Cultural Revolution. Mao will be cast in the role of synthesist, and an attempt will be made to delineate the various groups whose conflicting interests and goals he was balancing. Special attention will be paid to Mao's directives and ideological justifications of the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution developed out of several purges and a volatile situation in the universities of China. In the spring of 1966, Wu Han, Teng To and Liao Mo-sha were criticized for writing and defending revisionist literature. Since these three men were important functionaries in the Peking party apparatus, that apparatus became implicated, and P'eng Chen, its head, was purged. Party organizations concerned with education, communications, and propaganda and culture were implicated in turn, leading to the purges of Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Propaganda Department.

The effects of these purges were enormous. In August, 1966, the Central Committee convened its Eleventh Plenum to consider possible actions. In addition to the regular and alternate members of the com-

[43] This is not to say that Mao has never strongly supported the Vietnamese. For example, Mao was quoted as saying to the Vietnamese that "if it is necessary in your struggle against the United States . . . , the Vietnamese people may rest completely assured of the strongest possible rear support gratis for a final victory from 700 million Chinese." See "Cheng Shih-ching tung-chih tan Yueh-nam hsing-shih" [Comrade Cheng Shih-ching's Talk on the Vietnamese Situation], in Kung-ko-lien *Hung-ch'i tung-hsin* tzu-liao tsu, ed., *Tzu-liao chuan-chi* [Special Issues of Documentary Material], No. 1 (Peking, July 1968), 8.

[44] See fn. 33.

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mittee, this plenum included representatives from regional bureaus; provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees; members of the newly formed Cultural Revolution Group (CRG); and representatives of revolutionary students and teachers in Peking.[45] In official eyes the session was "enlarged," but many Western observers considered it packed.

There are no details on the composition of the group from the regional bureaus and provinces attending the Eleventh Plenum, though it is safe to assume that some military men were included. In 1965 a "Group of Five" had been placed in charge of the Cultural Revolution, but by the spring of 1966 four of these five had been purged: P'eng Chen, the head of the group, Lu Ting-yi, Chou Yang and Wu-Leng-hsi (editor of *People's Daily*). Only Kang Sheng survived. The CRG was formed to replace this body; its most important members were: Ch'en Po-ta, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao. The thirteen other members were later dismissed for disloyalty to Mao, or for plotting against Chou or the PLA—a fact which argues strongly against the hypothesis that the Cultural Revolution was carried out in accordance with a master plan. The CRG constituted a Leftist element in the Cultural Revolution, and representatives from it attended the Eleventh Plenum, probably adding a radical tone to the proceedings.

The communiqué of the Eleventh Plenum proclaimed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and named Lin as Mao's successor. More specifically, it announced three important decisions. With regard to domestic affairs, it stated that Mao had "made a correct analysis of the situation at that time [Tenth Plenum, 1962] and once again stressed the theory of contradictions, classes, and class struggle in Socialist society."[46] The plenary session held that the key to success in the Cultural Revolution was faith in the masses, and counseled: "Be pupils of the masses before becoming their teachers. Dare to make revolution and be good at making revolution. *Don't be afraid of disturbances.* Oppose the taking of the bourgeois stand, the shielding of Rightists, attacks on the Left and repression of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Oppose the creation of a lot of restrictions to tie the hands of the masses."[47] Thus, the communiqué acknowledged the existence of classes in China (thereby rejecting the 1956 line), expressed its con-

[45] "Chinese Government Statement," *Peking Review* (July 8, 1966), 19-20.
[46] For the text of the communiqué see K. H. Fan, ed., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents* (New York 1968), 173-82 (esp. 174).
[47] *Ibid.*, 176; emphasis added.

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fidence in the leadership of Mao, and urged that the masses be aroused to the revolution.

Concerning international affairs, the plenary session held that "the revolutionary movement of the peoples of all countries . . . is surging vigorously forward," with "the general trend of imperialism heading for total collapse."[48] The session gave its firm support to the Vietnamese people "in fighting to the end until final victory is achieved in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation."[49] The Soviet Union was condemned for revisionism and accused of allying with the United States in a counterrevolutionary Holy Alliance. Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" was cited as a scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis of important questions concerning the world revolution. Thus, the Eleventh Plenum was not an aggressive attempt to bring China to the brink of war with the United States; it did not, except in a minor way, proffer support for the Vietnamese, or search for rapprochement with the Soviets. The communiqué ended by declaring: "We must heighten our vigilance a hundredfold and guard against surprise attacks from U.S. imperialism and its accomplices. Should they dare to impose war on us, the 700 million Chinese people under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China will certainly break the backs of the aggressors and wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, totally, and completely."[50] This session thus embraced the doctrine of protracted war as a defense against the United States.

The third major decision of the Eleventh Plenum approved the famous sixteen-point "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." This document outlined the goals, strategy, and tactics of the Cultural Revolution. The main goal of the movement was "to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, [and] to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie."[51] Subsidiary goals included, first, changing the schools which had been dominated by bourgeois academic authorities and applying Mao's policy of education which was aimed at serving proletarian politics and combining education with productive labor; second, voicing organized criticism of reactionary views in philosophy, history, political economy, education, art and literature, and natural science; and third, forming Cultural Revolutionary Groups, Committees and Congresses by gen-

[48] *Ibid.*, 177. [49] *Ibid.*, 179. [50] *Ibid.*, 182.
[51] For the text of the Decision, see *ibid.*, 162-73 (esp. 163).

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eral election, to serve as a permanent bridge between the Party and the masses.

The overall strategy of the Cultural Revolution was explained in the document. It stressed that in this movement the masses must liberate themselves through learning to distinguish between right and wrong. They must not be hindered in this process. The masses, armed with Mao's *Thought*, were to be led by the persons in charge of party organizations who encouraged them to expose "monsters" and criticize the leadership, and by the very good and good cadres. The objects of criticism had to be chosen carefully: the class line was to be applied to distinguish reactionary Rightists from the Center and Left, and contradictions among the people had to be distinguished from those between the people and their enemies. Those criticized were to be given every chance for self-criticism, and to rehabilitate themselves. Force and coercion was not to be used, and even proven Rightists were to be dealt with on the merits of their case at a later stage of the movement.

The limits of the Cultural Revolution were also carefully defined. The movement was to concentrate on cultural and educational units and the leading organs of the Party and government in the large and medium-sized cities. Scientists, technicians and working staff were not to be attacked, but were to be encouraged to change their world outlook gradually. Most important, the Cultural Revolution was not to interfere with production. These limits were frequently reiterated throughout the movement. In a speech to the Red Guards in Peking in September, 1966, Chou En-lai made them more precise: Red Guards were not to go to factories, enterprises, party, governmental, and public organizations of the county level and below, or to rural communes.[52]

From the sixteen points, which seem to have been followed with relatively few exceptions, a fairly accurate picture of the Cultural Revolution can be derived. The emphasis falls not upon a thorough purging of the bourgeoisie, but upon the education of the masses.[53] The masses were to be armed with Mao's *Thought*, and by means of criticizing the bourgeoisie, to learn to apply theory through criticizing those in power, thus liberating themselves through education. At the inception of the movement, *Liberation Army Daily* declared, "The era of Mao Tse-tung is the era in which the workers, peasants, and soldiers master revolu-

[52] "Chairman Mao Once More Receives a Million Young Revolutionary Fighters," *Peking Review* (September 23, 1966), 6. However, during the high tides of the Cultural Revolution, such as December 1966 to January 1967, July 1967, and March 1968, these limits were relaxed.

[53] "We Are Critics of the Old World," *The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China*, III (Peking 1966), 18-21.

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tionary theory."[54] The movement thus sought to use the aroused masses to cleanse the party and state apparatus.

As the movement grew, power struggles and fighting broke out in some cities. By the winter of 1966–67 the situation in Shanghai, Canton, and Peking had been reduced to chaos; revolutionary groups fought to replace the local party structure with institutions modelled after the Paris Commune.

Four steps were taken to cool the situation down. First, the PLA was ordered to support the revolutionary Left,[55] and "to safeguard state property and . . . dispatch troops to protect all those units which may be in need of protection."[56] Second, cadres were urged to integrate with the masses to ensure discipline in the movement.[57] Third, efforts were made to encourage production. The Central Committee ordered cadres to organize spring planting,[58] and workers to be disciplined, to uphold the eight-hour workday and to respect state property. The PLA was to help in production.[59] Fourth, classes, closed at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to free millions of young people for work in the revolution, were ordered to re-open.[60] The effect of these decisions was to integrate the PLA, cadres, and revolutionaries, and to dampen the movement in the cities.

During the spring of 1967, the attack was renewed under the leadership of discontented students, unskilled workers, and other underprivileged groups, in an attempt to expose the supporters of Liu Shao-ch'i. A barrage of criticism in the press implicated Liu for supporting revisionist literature, associated him with various attempts to undermine the success of the revolution, and accused him of being a Khrushchev, plotting the overthrow of socialism.[61] Later in the movement, Liu's revisionist line was further explained and repudiated. Liu, it was claimed, held six revisionist theories: that class struggle had ended in China; that party members were to be docile tools in the hands of the leadership; that the masses were backward and not creative; that one

[54] "Never Forget the Class Struggle," *The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China*, I (Peking 1966), 37-52.

[55] Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," *China Quarterly*, XXXIV (April-June 1968), 11.

[56] "Practice Economy in Carrying Out Revolution: Respect State Property," *Peking Review* (February 3, 1967), 15.

[57] "Cadres Must be Treated Correctly," *Peking Review* (March 3, 1967), 5-9.

[58] "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* (February 24, 1967), 6.

[59] "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* (March 24, 1967), 5-6.

[60] "Re-open Classes and Make Revolution in Primary and Secondary Schools," *Peking Review* (March 10, 1967), 13-15.

[61] "Cadres Must be Treated Correctly" (fn. 57).

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must join the Party in order to be an official; that there should be peace within the Party; and that private and public interests should be merged in the organization of the state.[62] In addition, the *Red Guard Forum* accused Liu of urging that organizational principles take precedence over everything.[63] Both Liu and Teng were absent from a rally held in Peking on May 5, 1967, indicating they had fallen some time before that date (probably the latter part of 1966).

Some problems arose during this phase of the revolution due to factionalism and a tendency towards anarchism. The Maoists intervened to maintain order—first, by forcing the extreme Leftist factions to agree not to fight one another, and second, by arming selected Red Guard units to protect property and maintain order.[64] These, and incidents such as the Wuhan conflict in the summer of 1967, represent a few instances of the well-known direct intervention by the top level of the Party. Attempts to integrate the revolutionary groups, cadres, and the army were continued.[65]

By the middle of September, a major consolidation movement was in progress, announcing its objectives to be those of "fighting self-interest" (that of the Red Guards) and "repudiating revisionism." It urged that revolutionary alliances be achieved "*on the basis of systems*"; that is, technical and administrative hierarchies were to be reestablished, and revolutionary organizations that crossed occupational and geographic lines were to be broken up.[66] The press hailed the establishment of Revolutionary Committees in all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. The "three-in-one" leadership of the Cultural Revolution was imposing order, campaigning against the extreme Left, and consolidating its power.

In the spring of 1968, after some disturbances by disgruntled students and young revolutionaries, criticism of the extreme Left was moderated, and some attempts were made to incorporate such groups into the great alliances. The consolidation movement continued under a series of directives from Mao. The first such directive, issued on March 15, stated that the army should give military and political training in the schools.[67]

[62] "Thoroughly Repudiate Liu Shao-chi's Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Line on Party Building," *Peking Review* (December 20, 1968), 10-15.

[63] "Bury the Slave Mentality Advocation by China's Khrushchev," *Peking Review* (April 14, 1967), 12-15.

[64] Bridgham (fn. 55), 26.

[65] *Ibid.*; "An Extremely Important Matter of Guiding Principle," *Peking Review* (September 1, 1967), 7.

[66] Chalmers Johnson, "The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective," *Asian Survey*, VIII (January 1968), 1-15 (esp. 13-15).

[67] "A Directive from Chairman Mao Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Peking Review* (March 15, 1968), 5.

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And, in a later directive on education, Mao added "it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education [and] put proletarian politics in command. . . . Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study."[68] Thus, the universities, one of the major areas at which the Cultural Revolution had directed itself in the sixteen points, were to serve the proletariat and the peasantry instead of the bourgeoisie, and to provide training schools for the PLA.

The consolidation of leadership in the provinces and localities also continued, with special emphasis upon the rationalizing and simplifying of administrative structures. Mao directed that "revolutionary committees after forming the three-in-one leadership of the revolutionary cadres, army and revolutionary masses should exercise unified leadership, do away with redundant or overlapping administrative structures, have 'better troops and simpler administration' and organize a revolutionized leading group that is linked to the masses."[69] The major step in consolidation was the admission of new members to the Party. Mao said, "A proletarian party must . . . get rid of the stale and take in the fresh for only thus can it be full of vitality."[70]

The final step in the consolidation was the convention of the Ninth Party Congress and the election of the Ninth Central Committee in April, 1969. Two important documents were issued after this meeting: a report by Lin Piao, and a new Constitution of the CCP. The declared goal of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the restoration of capitalism in China. A crucial section in Lin's report, placing the Cultural Revolution in the historical stream of Marxism-Leninism, quotes Lenin in identifying three sources of the impulse to restore capitalism and the bourgeoisie.[71]

The first was that the bourgeoise arises spontaneously from small production, particularly from small-scale farming on private plots (i.e., middle peasants). During the period of retrenchment following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, a quasi-capitalist economic policy allowed these middle peasants to rise unimpeded by the regime. Although the Cultural Revolution took place primarily in the cities, some action either was, or would be, taken to curtail the rise of the middle peasants.

A second source of capitalist restoration was found in the growing

[68] "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive," *Peking Review* (August 2, 1968), 3.
[69] "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive," *Peking Review* (April 5, 1968), 2.
[70] "Absorb Fresh Blood from the Proletariat," *Peking Review* (October 25, 1968), 4-7.
[71] "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* (April 30, 1969), 16-35.

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class of party and government employees, or the "new bourgeoise." Evidence indicates that such a class was rising in China, exercising its prerogatives in an often luxurious manner, and showing signs of becoming almost hereditary. Purges of party and government officials, admission of new members to the Party, and the revolutionizing of the universities seem to have cut short this rise.

The third source of capitalist restoration was the "capitalist encirclement," threatening intervention at any time. Lin clearly advocated a defensive protracted war to cope with this threat. He stated bluntly, "We have always held that the internal affairs of each country should be settled by its own people," implying that China would not provoke a war with the Americans. But he added, "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counter-attack," and concluded, "We must be prepared."[72]

The 1969 Constitution of the CCP extends membership in the Party to any Chinese worker, poor peasant, lower-middle peasant, revolutionary soldier, or other revolutionary element. The 1956 Constitution had opened membership to any Chinese citizen who did not exploit the labor of others. A new class analysis, clearly rejecting the 1956 line, was thus written into the new Constitution. This Constitution also dropped the sections of the 1956 Constitution which stated that members must place the interests of the Party and the state above their own interests, and strengthen party solidarity and consolidation, thus reducing the priority of organizational principles. Instead, it expresses that members must "be able at uniting with the great majority" to ensure that the leadership of the Party and state remains in the hands of Marxist revolutionaries and does not fall into the hands of "careerists, conspirators, and double-dealers."[73]

Regarding the problem of China's policy toward the allegedly inevitable war with the United States, much of the evidence is indirect and subtle. Throughout 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai made a number of statements on Vietnam, and close examination of these statements reveals a discrepancy between those of Liu and those of Chou and Lin, with Liu taking a more aggressive stance.[74]

In a letter to Ho Chi Minh in February of 1966 Liu said: "The Chinese people always unswervingly stand together with the Vietnamese people and whole-heartedly support and assist them in their just struggle. To

[72] See fn. 70.

[73] "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* (April 30, 1969), 36-39.

[74] In this context, we found Donald S. Zagoria's *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York 1967) interesting.

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whatever extent U.S. imperialism may expand its war and *whatever may be the price* we have to pay, we 650 million Chinese will stand by the fraternal Vietnamese people in a *joint struggle* to thoroughly defeat the U.S. aggressor."[75] The phrase "joint struggle" is crucial here, implying ideological and material assistance at least, and possibly military intervention. In March, 1966, the Japanese Communist Party attempted to persuade the Chinese to cooperate with the Soviets for united action on Vietnam. A communiqué issued after this contact was signed by Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, P'eng Chen, and Liu Shao-ch'i.[76] Of this group, only Chou has not been purged.

In May, Chou issued a four-point statement on China's policy toward the United States. These four points were: China will not take the initiative in provoking war; China will help and support struggles against the United States; China is prepared for war should it come; the war will have no boundaries once it starts.[77] Chou's statement was milder than Liu's, but still promised support to peoples fighting the Americans.

On July 22 Liu issued a very bold statement. He declared, "The Chinese Government reaffirms that U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam *is aggression against China.* . . . The vast expanse of China's territory is the reliable rear area of the Vietnamese people."[78] This came close to being a pledge of military intervention, and it could even be argued that it was an invitation to the Americans to begin a war with China. These statements show a marked difference in degree between Lin and Chou. If the position stated in "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" is taken as a statement of Lin Piao's position at this time, an even sharper contrast is discernible between the position of Lin on the one hand and Chou and Liu on the other.

After the consolidation was in full swing in late 1967, a new line was articulated, similar in tone to that of Lin's position. Emphasis was placed on self-reliance and the inevitability of victory. This new line was most clearly put in a statement of the PRC (note, not of any individual in the government): "We are firmly convinced that however desperately U.S. imperialism may struggle, it can in no way obstruct the vic-

[75] "Chairman Liu Shao-chi Replies to President Ho Chi Minh," *Peking Review* (February 4, 1966), 6-8; emphasis added.

[76] Adie (fn. 13), 21. For Lo Jui-ching's strong statement calling for unity with the Soviets and a hard line on Vietnam through a united front, see his "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!," *Peking Review* (May 14, 1965), 7-15.

[77] "Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Towards U.S.," *Peking Review* (May 13, 1966), 5.

[78] "Statement of Chairman Liu Shao-chi," *Peking Review* (July 29, 1966), 9.

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torious advance of the Vietnamese people and that final victory will definitely belong to the heroic Vietnamese people."[79] The implication was that the Vietnamese needed little assistance. In contrast to the statements of Liu and Chou, this statement was very cautious, containing little provocation.

The major bone of contention between these positions was whether or not China ought to send military supplies or pledge military aid to the Vietnamese. In fact, the Chinese have done neither in any extensive or enthusiastic manner since 1966. The debate has nonetheless continued, and in a message to the NLF government on June 14, 1969, Chou En-lai also referred to China as a "reliable rear area" for the Vietnamese.[80] It would thus seem that differences of opinion still existed between Chou and Lin. Perhaps this accounts for the absence of any clear-cut, authoritative statements by Mao, who might have been attempting to play the role of balancer or synthesist in this dispute.

From this account a general picture of the Cultural Revolution may be formed. The Cultural Revolution, proclaimed by the Eleventh Plenum, was carried on by certain political leaders and social groups. While at times confused and chaotic, on the whole the movement seems to have stayed within the bounds defined by the sixteen points. The role of the leadership, namely Mao and Lin, was that of revolutionary guide and arbiter, with the main efforts of the central apparatus being directed toward forming the three-in-one revolutionary alliance. As has been shown, profound differences over ideological and policy matters rather than a naked power struggle were at the root of the revolution.

V

The data collected thus far can be conveniently displayed in a formal interpretative framework. In Section II, we argued that two ideological issues, namely, the Red versus Expert controversy and the problem of how best to respond to "American attack," were involved in, or raised by, the major political events in China from roughly 1960 to 1966. In Section III, we discussed the major political actors, fixing their positions with respect to these issues. And in Section IV, examining the events of the Cultural Revolution, we showed that many decisions and ideological pronouncements made during that period concerned these questions, either directly or indirectly. Thus, due to the pervasiveness and

[79] "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review* (March 8, 1968), 7.

[80] NCNA (New China News Agency), June 15, 1969. Cited in *China Quarterly*, XXXIX (July-September 1969), 164.

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importance of these issues, the interpretative framework offered here would appear to be an adequate interpretation of the Cultural Revolution as a political process.

By using the two issues as variables, each admitting four values, we obtain a four-by-four matrix displaying sixteen possible positions (see also Fig. 1). This matrix is then divided into sections. The distinction between *b′* and *–b′*, the two center positions on the question of China's foreign policy, is very difficult to draw empirically. It is included to make the matrix square; also, such a distinction can be made in a few cases.

The position marked off by the Southwest corner involves an ideological incompatibility. The Red position emphasizes ideological purity and Chinese nationalism, thus making it very improbable that anyone holding such a position would advocate an alliance with the Soviets for defense. This position will thus not be considered in the analysis, and will be crossed off the matrix. This is not to declare *a priori* that no one in China in fact held positions in the Southwest corner of the matrix, but that, because of the incompatibility of these positions, the Southwest corner is not significant for our analysis. The same can be said of the Northeast corner: an Expert would not, it would seem, advocate preparation for a technologically sophisticated war with the United States, for such a position ignores precisely what the Expert is supposed to know, namely, that China's low level of military technology, and lack of highly trained scientific and technical personnel, make adequate preparations for such a war nearly impossible. Again, the position is dismissed, not on empirical grounds, but as politically insignificant.

There remain, then, the Northwest corner, the Left; the Center; and the Southeast corner, the Right. The latter being by far the more important and powerful "enemy of the revolution," the clear majority of those purged were Rightists. Nonetheless, Leftists were both criticized and purged.

The analysis in this section will be in three parts: a consideration of the distribution of political actors and social groups over the matrix in 1966, again in 1969, and a discussion and analysis of the purges as a whole.

Power Configuration in 1966:[81] Most members of the Politburo in

[81] In preparation of the following three sub-sections, we have consulted diverse sources too numerous for a complete listing. In addition to the bibliographical information given in this paper, the following sources will be found useful for more data on those listed in the power configuration tables: Mineo Nakazima, ed., *Chūgoku bunka daikakumei* [China's Great Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1966); Union Research Institute, *Who's Who in Communist China* (Hong Kong 1966); Chung-

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

FIGURE 2

Note: the four quadrants are designated by the points of the compass: Northwest, Northeast, etc. The four elements in the center shall be referred to as the Center group.

Values of the Variables:

A: Red versus Expert

- a — The Red position, favoring mass over elite mobilization, radical class struggle, and destruction of non-Red expertise.
- a′ — The Red and Expert position, favoring Redness over Expertise.
- -a′ — The Expert and Red position, favoring Expertise over Redness.
- -a — The Expert position, favoring elite over mass mobilization, end of class struggle, and autonomy for intellectuals.

B: Foreign Policy toward the United States (especially in connection with the war in Vietnam)

- b — Preparation for technologically sophisticated war and maintenance of aggressive stance.
- b′ — Preparation for protracted warfare, cautious stance, development of technological means of warfare.
- -b′ — Preparation for protracted warfare, cautious stance, search for alliances and support.
- -b — Exploration of possible alliance with the Soviets for protection.

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1966 can be fitted into the framework. We can conjecture that the organizations those men led and the groups whose interests they represented would tend to fall into the same sector of the framework, but marshalling the evidence to support this conjecture is beyond the scope of this analysis. Table I is a list of Politburo members with each man's position in the matrix indicated as precisely as possible. There are two ways of placing a man, either by evidence from 1966 or before, or by inference from later events in the Cultural Revolution. Those fixed by the latter method are marked with an asterisk.

Excluding the three men who were inactive, 56 per cent were placed in the SE sector, 33 per cent in the Center, and 11 per cent in the NW sector (*ab'*). Those in the Center occupied a more diversified group of political positions. We may conjecture that the Rightists wielded more political power than the Centrists, as the Rightists headed the lion's share of the state and party apparatus.

Certain social groups may also be fitted into this framework. The peasants were not involved in the Cultural Revolution, and will therefore not be considered here. The workers, however, played an important role. Two types of workers exist in China: regular workers who enjoy a guaranteed annual wage and many social welfare benefits, and contract workers who hold short-term jobs and enjoy none of these benefits. Wage scales are determined by categories of industry and levels within each category. In 1956 the officially set ratio of the highest-paid to the lowest-paid worker was 3.2 to 1.[82] The existence of considerable social tensions between the regular and contract workers is understandable, and evidence indicates that such tensions surfaced during the Cultural Revolution. We would suspect the contract workers to lean to

kung jen-ming-lu pien-hsiu wei-yuan-hui, ed., *Chung-kung jen-ming-lu* [Who's Who in Communist China] (Taipei 1967); Asia Research Centre, *The Great Cultural Revolution in China* (Hong Kong 1967); *Chūgoku no kenryoku kōzō to bunka kakumei* [China's Power Structure and the Cultural Revolution] (n.p. 1967); Ting Wang, ed., *Chung-kung wen-hua ta-ko-ming tzu-liao hui-pien* [A Compendium of Material on the Great Cultural Revolution in Communist China], I, *Tou-cheng tan chuan pai* [Struggle Against the In-Power Faction] (Hong Kong 1967); Michael Oksenberg, "China: Forcing the Revolution to a New Stage," *Asian Survey*, VII (January 1967), 7; Huang Chen-hsia, ed., *Chung-kung chün-jen chih* [Mao's Generals] (Hong Kong 1968); Kikuzō Itō and Minoru Shibata, *Dokyumento: Bunkaku no sannen* [Document: The Three Years' Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1968); Stephen Pan and Raymond de Jaegher, *Peking's Red Guard* (New York 1968); Union Research Institute, *The Case of Peng Teh-huai* (Hong Kong 1968); Kōgo Tsuji, "Kyū-zen-daikai eno dōtei" [Journeys Toward the Ninth National (Party) Congress], and Katsuhiro Ōta, "Ryū Shōki hihan no shosokumen to sono shōten" [Sidelights on the Criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i and Their Focus], *Sekai* (June 1969), 145-52 and 153-62, respectively.

[82] Victor Funnell, "Social Stratification," *Problems of Communism*, XVII (March-April 1968), 16.

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TABLE I. POLITBURO MEMBERS AS OF JANUARY, 1966

	Official Titles in January, 1966	*Ideological & Policy Positions*	*Standing in the Cultural Revolution*
Mao Tse-tung	Chairman, CCP	Center	CCP Chairman
Liu Shao-ch'i	Chairman, PRC; Vice Chairman (VC); (Mao's successor)	SE (*-a–b*)	Purged
Chou En-lai	Premier; CCP VC	Center (*a′ -b′* or *a′ -b*)	Premiership retained; CCP VC dropped; member of the Standing Committee, new Political Bureau (PB)
Chu Teh	CCP VC; Chairman National People's Congress (NPC)	SE	NPC Chairman; CCP VC dropped; new PB membership retained. (virtually inactive)
Ch'en Yun	Vice Premier (VP); CCP VC	SE	VP retained; CCP VC dropped.
Lin Piao	VP; CCP VC	Center (*a′ b′* or *-a′ b′*)	VP; CCP VC; Mao's new successor
Teng Hsiao-ping	VP; CCP Secretary-General	SE (probably *-a–b*)	Purged
Tung Pi-wu	VC, PRC	Center	VC, PRC; member of the new PB
P'eng Chen	NPC VC; VP; Secretary CCP Secretariat; Mayor of Peking	SE (probably *-a–b*)	Purged
Ch'en Yi*	VP; Minister of Foreign Affairs	SE	VP; VC, the Military Commission (inactive)
Li Fu-chun*	VP; Chairman, State Planning Commission	SE	VP (inactive)
Ho Lung	VP; Chairman, State Physical & Sports Commission	SE	Purged
Li Hsien-nien*	VP; Minister of Public Finance	Center (probably *a′ -b′*)	VP; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs; member of the new PB
Li Ching-chuan	First Secretary, Secretariat, South-West Bureau, CCP Central Committee; First Political Commissar, PLA Ch'engtu Units	SE	Purged

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TABLE I. POLITBURO MEMBERS AS OF JANUARY, 1966 (*cont.*)

	Official Titles in January, 1966	*Ideological & Policy Positions*	*Standing in the Cultural Revolution*
Tan Cheng-lin	VP; Director, Office for Agriculture & Forestry, State Council	SE	Purged
Ulanfu	VP; First Secretary, Inner Mongolia Bureau, CCP Central Committee	SE	Purged
Lu Ting-yi*	Director, Department of Propaganda, CCP Central Committee	SE	Purged
Ch'en Po-ta	Editor-in-chief, *Hung-chi* (Red Flag)	NW (probably *ab'*)	Head, CRG, CCP Central Committee; member of the Standing Committee, PB
Kang Sheng	Secretary, Secretariat, CCP Central Committee; VC, NPC Standing Committee	NW (probably *ab'*)	Adviser, CRG; member of the Standing Committee, PB
Po I-po	VP; Director, Office of Industry & Communication; Director, State Economic Commission	SE	Purged
Liu Po-ch'eng	VC, National Defense Council; VC, NPC Standing Committee	Center	Member of the new PB

the Left, and there is some evidence of such workers in groups that were criticized as being extremely Leftist. On the other hand, the regular workers probably tended to the Right; again there is evidence of regular workers opposing and even attacking the Red Guards.

Students were subjected to varying pressures. Education is a prerequisite for any career success in China, but admission to universities is regulated by a highly competitive examination system. Naturally, the children of the urban elite stood the best chance of gaining admission to a university and thus embarking on a successful career. One of the major problems to which the Cultural Revolution addressed itself was how to educate the sons and daughters of the peasants and workers in such

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a system. To aggravate the problem, the number of young people (roughly, between the ages of five and twenty-four) in China was rising rapidly, from 225 million in 1953 to 350 million in 1968. As a result the schools became even more competitive, and the students were sorted into groups that regarded one another with disdain or hostility. These pressures explain the factionalism of the Red Guards. With the possible exception of the sons and daughters of the elite, students in China, like students in many other countries, seem to be idealistic and Leftist.

Although the "new bourgeoisie" was obviously Rightist, several problems that the bureaucrats faced deserve mention. The range of career choices open was extremely limited, intensely competitive, and very narrow. At a very early age, an individual was forced to choose between career goals within the government and party system and those outside it. And, once he had been admitted to one part of the bureaucracy, little chance existed of lateral transfer to another part. Once in, an individual had two choices: either to try to rise within the bureaucracy, or to attempt to build a position for himself. Needless to say, a vast number of bureaucrats chose the latter.[83] The result was an entrenched stagnant bureaucracy, incapable of the innovation and flexibility which the rapid change in Chinese society required.

The Cultural Revolution is best viewed as the interaction of these groups. The Left was comprised of Red Guards, revolutionary students, and poor workers under the leadership of elements of the CRG. Its power lay in the streets. The Center seems to have been a coalition gathered around the figure of Mao. There was by no means unanimity within the Center, as is evidenced by the changes in line and shifts in leadership during the Cultural Revolution. Although he did not hesitate on occasion to induce struggles as a revolutionary means, throughout this period Mao generally remained above the controversy and conflict, attempting to balance different factions and to consolidate all revolutionary groups into the great alliance. The power of the Center lay in its control of the press, the highest bodies of the Party, the military, its positional flexibility in coalition-making, and in Mao's charisma and his unswerving commitment to achieving fundamental structural changes in China. The Right was made up of bureaucrats and other officials within the party and state structures. Its control of local party organizations, administrative bureaucracies, and many parts of the national party structure defined its power. No evidence indicates that the Right was ever able to coordinate its actions in its own defense.

[83] Oksenberg (fn. 14), 66.

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Power Configuration in 1969: By the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, the Cultural Revolution had achieved its goal of a great alliance based on the three-in-one leadership combination.[84] The Central Committee was enlarged to 170 full members (it only had 97 in 1956) and 109 alternates (73 in 1956). Of these members, 40 per cent were active military men. There was a good showing of Experts, but there were only a few Red Guards or extreme Leftists.[85]

The new Standing Committee of the Politburo consisted of Mao, Lin, Chou, Ch'en Po-ta and Kang Sheng, all of whom were members of the previous Politburo—the first three from the Center of the matrix, and the latter two representing the Left.

Table II is a list of members of the new Politburo, with political affiliations. New members are marked by asterisks.

All those whose political positions can be fixed fall within the Center or Left. The CRG is represented by all five original members who were not purged, and one new member, Hsieh Fu-chih. At least three men from the government are included. If the CRG members are taken to be representatives of the mass organizations, the Politburo has indeed achieved the three-in-one leadership combination.

The composition of the Revolutionary Committees on the provincial level is also based upon the three-in-one leadership combination. Of the Chairmen, 45 per cent have military backgrounds, 21 per cent have a background as military commissars, and 10 per cent have party backgrounds. Of the First Vice-Chairmen, 55 per cent have military backgrounds, 21 per cent were military commissars, and 24 per cent were party men. Thus, the top provincial leadership is heavily dominated by the military. When we consider the backgrounds of all Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen, we find that 43 per cent were associated with the military, 26 per cent with the Party or government, and 31 per cent came from mass organizations. The basis of support for the leadership in the twenty-nine provincial-level units is given by Richard Baum as eight radical, twelve moderate, and seven conservative, with two provinces unknown.[86] Again the picture suggests a military-dominated three-in-one combination which is probably Centrist or Centrist-oriented.

The purges produced a change in the power configuration between

[84] For a brief survey and analysis of the Ninth Party Congress, see *Chōsa geppō* (A Special Issue on Recent Trends in Communist China) (August 1969), 2-33.

[85] *Ibid.*, 61-67.

[86] Richard Baum, "China: The Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey*, IX (January 1969), 6-7.

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TABLE II. POLITBURO MEMBERS AS OF 1969

	Ideological & Policy Positions	*New Standing*
Mao Tse-tung	Center	Chairman, CCP
Lin Piao	Center	Vice Chairman, CCP; Mao's successor; Vice Chairman, Military Commission, CCP (PLA)
Chou En-lai	Center	Premier
Yeh Chien-ying*	Right Center	Vice Chairman, Military Commission, CCP (PLA)
Liu Po-cheng	Right Center	Vice Chairman, Military Commission, CCP (PLA) (inactive)
Chiang Ching*	Left (or Left Center)	Mao's wife; Deputy Director, CRG
Chu Teh	Right Center	Chairman, National People's Congress
Hsu Shih-yu*	Center	Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman, Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee
Ch'en Po-ta	Left (or Left Center)	Director, CRG
Ch'en Hsi-lien*	Center	Commander, Shenyang Military Region, PLA; Chairman, Provincial Revolutionary Committee, Liaoning Province
Li Hsien-nien	Center	Acting Minister (?), Foreign Affairs
Li Tso-peng*	Right Center	First Political Commissar, PLA Navy Headquarters
Wu Fa-hsien*	Right Center	Commander, PLA Air Force
Chang Chun-chiao*	Left Center	Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee
Chiu Hui-tso*	Right Center	Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA
Yeh Chun*	Left Center	Lin's wife; member of the PLA Cultural Revolutionary Group
Yao Wen-yuan*	Left Center	Member, CRG
Kang Sheng	Left (or Left Center?)	Adviser, CRG
Huang Yung-sheng*	Right Center	Chief-of-Staff, PLA
Tung Pi-wu	Center	Vice Chairman, PRC
Hsieh Fu-chih*	Left Center	Chairman, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Vice Premier; Minister of Public Security

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TABLE II. POLITBURO MEMBERS AS OF 1969 (*cont.*)

	Ideological & Policy Positions	*New Standing*
Alternate Members:		
Chi Teng-kuei*	Center	Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee
Li Hsueh-feng*	Right Center	Chairman, Hopei Provincial Revolutionary Committee
Li Teh-sheng*	Center	Chairman, Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee
Wang Tung-hsing*	Left Center	Deputy Director, PLA Cultural Revolutionary Group; Commander, Central Garrison Force (Mao's bodyguard)

1966 and 1969 that was marked principally by the virtual absence of the Right in the latter year.

The Purges as a Whole:[87] The two basic policy issues on our matrix appear to have played an important part both in the early purges, before 1966, and in those during the Cultural Revolution itself. A list of the most important purges in Communist China will be found in Table III.

The early purges center on three issues: foreign policy, criticism of the communes and the Great Leap Forward, and literary revisionism. The latter two categories can be subsumed under the Red versus Expert controversy; thus the early purges substantiate the thesis that the Red versus Expert controversy and foreign policy were basic to the Cultural Revolution. Further, all of those purged, with the possible exception of Kao and Jao, shared the views of Liu Shao-ch'i, and could thus be considered Rightists.

When we examine the effects of the later purges on party organizations, we find that the Politburo has had 30 per cent of its total membership between 1959 and 1969 purged. P'eng Chen and P'eng Teh-huai, full members, and Lu Ting-yi and Chang Wen-tien, alternates, were dismissed by the Eighth and Eleventh Plenums. Since 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-ping, T'ao Chu, Ho Lung, Li Ching-ch'uan, Tan Chen-lin, all full members, and Ulanfu and Po I-po, both alternates, have been dismissed. Five members have been criticized: Chu Teh and Ch'en Yun for opposing Mao's leadership in the 1950's; Hsu Hsiang-

[87] For additional information on the individuals who were purged, see fn. 81.

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TABLE III. MAJOR PURGES: 1949–1968

Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih	1954; power struggle
P'eng Teh-huai (Minister of Defense)	1959; criticized the commune, the Great Leap, and the army's participation in production; proposed close relations with the Soviet Union.
Huang Ke-cheng (Chief-of-Staff, PLA)	1959; supported P'eng Teh-huai.
Chang Wen-tien (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs)	1959; supported P'eng Teh-huai.
Yang Hsien-chen (President, CCP High Party School)	1964; advocated class reconciliation.
Lo Jui-ching (Chief-of-Staff, PLA)	1965; power struggle with Lin Piao; advocated direct intervention in the Vietnamese war by a united anti-Fascist front.
Wu Han (Vice Mayor of Peking)	1966; advocated literary revisionism.
Liao Mo-sha (Secretary of the CCP Peking Committee)	1966; advocated literary revisionism.
Teng To (Secretary, CCP Peking Committee; former Editor-in-Chief, *People's Daily*)	1966; advocated literary revisionism.
P'eng Chen (Mayor of Peking)	1966; advocated the revisionist line.
Lu Ting-yi (Director, Department of Propaganda, CCP Central Committee)	1966; advocated revisionist lines in culture, education, literature, and art.
Chou Yang (Deputy Director, Department of Propaganda, CCP Central Committee)	1966; advocated revisionist lines in culture, education, literature, and art.
Lu Ping (President, Peking University)	1966; supported P'eng Chen and Liu Shao-ch'i.
Tien Han (Chairman, Union of Chinese Stage Artists)	1966; advocated revisionist lines in literature and art.
Liu Shao-ch'i (Chairman, PRC)	1966; charged with being China's Khrushchev, the head of the revisionist group.
Teng Hsiao-ping (Secretary-General, CCP)	1966; accused of being Liu's associate.
Tan Cheng-lin (Vice Premier)	1966; accused of being the leader of the "February Adverse Current" in attempt to restore the position of Liu and Teng.
Liu Lan-t'ao (First Secretary, Secretariat, North-West Bureau, CCP Central Committee)	1966; charged with being an anti-Party reactionary element.

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TABLE III. MAJOR PURGES: 1949–1968 (*cont.*)

Po I-po (Vice Premier; Director, State Economic Commission)	1966; accused of being the representative of Liu Shao-ch'i in economic affairs.
Ho Lung (Vice Premier; member of the Political Bureau)	1967; charged with being an anti-Party, counterrevolutionary revisionist element.
T'ao Chu (Member of the Political Bureau; head of the Propaganda Department, CCP Central Committee)	1967; accused of being a counterrevolutionary double-dealer.
Li Ching-ch'uan (First Secretary, Secretariat, South-West Bureau, CCP Central Committee; member of the Political Bureau)	1967; accused of being an agent of "China's Khrushchev" in Szechwan and the South-West region.
Hsiao Hua (Director, PLA General Political Department; Vice Chairman, Standing Committee, All-China Cultural Revolutionary Group)	1968; charged with being a counterrevolutionary double-dealer and the boss of Wang En-mao in Singkiang.
Yang Cheng-wu (Chief-of-Staff, PLA)	1968; committed "grave mistakes" in the Cultural Revolution.

chien for differences with Mao on the role of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution (he was removed as head of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group); Li Hsueh-feng for following the line of Liu; and Sung Jen-chiung for taking an ambivalent position toward the rebels of Liaoning.[88]

The Central Committee was severely shaken. Of its ninety-three full members, forty-eight were purged and nine criticized; since there were a few deaths, that leaves only thirty members in good standing. Of the seventy-six alternate members, forty-five were purged and nineteen suspended or criticized.[89]

The State Council is one of the most active bodies in China, with a very high continuity of personnel. One-half of those appointed in 1949 still hold official posts. Of the 366 Ministers and/or Vice-Ministers, 152 were criticized (30 of these have been rehabilitated) and 214 were not criticized at all. As to the Ministers who were affected, no pattern can be discerned. Only 5 of the 60 men appointed as Ministers between

[88] Data are from Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism*, XVIII (March-April 1969), 5.
[89] *Ibid.*, 6.

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January 1965 and March 1966 were transferred from a military assignment; the rest of the appointments were normal career advances.[90] The State Council, which is headed by Chou En-lai, has not been reformed on the basis of the three-in-one combination. Both it and the PLA maintained a high continuity of personnel.

Over one-half of the total membership of the Central Secretariat from 1966 to 1969 have been purged. Since October, 1966, this body has ceased to wield any real power, its functions having been taken over by the CRG.[91] Of the seventy-six secretaries and alternate secretaries of the CCP's six regional bureaus in 1966, thirty-seven have been purged, and seventeen criticized or suspended.[92] Even the CRG was not unaffected. Of its original eighteen members, thirteen have been purged: eight for acts of disloyalty to Mao, one for plotting to overthrow Chou En-lai, two for involvement in an "ultra-leftist" plot to discredit the leadership of the PLA, and one for covertly backing the plot against the PLA.[93]

Two generalizations may be made about those who were purged. First, they can be divided into four cliques on the basis of their background. One was the dominating clique of the "December Ninth Movement" of 1935, led by P'eng Chen. This clique consisted of some well-educated students who started an anti-Japanese movement in 1935 and later merged with the CCP. The second group consisted of the so-called "prison cadres" who were imprisoned by the Kuomintang in the 1930's and, when freed, joined the CCP. A third group, the "White Area cadres," those who worked in non-Communist areas before 1945, were heavily purged. Finally, there were those who had been in units of the Eighth Route Army, led by P'eng Te-huai and Ho Lung before 1945, or in the North China Bureau of the CCP during the anti-Japanese war, under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i and P'eng Chen.[94]

Second, according to Franz Schurmann, those purged were not just apolitical professionals; rather, they were men of foreign-policy convictions, with the power and influence to make their beliefs effective. His paper, "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Ideology and Organization," documents this claim to a certain extent.[95] Our data indicate that the Cultural Revolution was aimed mainly at men, and not at institutions. The men purged were powerful; they were probably members of exclusive cliques (which lends credence to the repeated

[90] Data are from Donald W. Klein, "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, xxxv (July-September 1968), 78-87.
[91] Chang (fn. 88). [92] *Ibid.*, 7. [93] Baum (fn. 86), 4.
[94] Chang (fn. 88), 8. [95] Schurmann (fn. 2), 542.

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accusations by the Maoists that the Rightists were plotting); and they had definite views on foreign and domestic policy. The vast majority of those purged were Rightists; this resulted in the virtual destruction of the Right as a political force between 1966 and 1969. These purges account for the shift of power from the Right to the Center as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

VI

Needless to say, more extensive and authentic evidence is required before the Cultural Revolution can be fully assessed. This limited study has attempted to demonstrate that the Cultural Revolution was an ideological struggle between power groups. The issue at stake, in its broadest terms, was whether the *Thought* of Mao was a viable ideology for the preservation and continuation of the Chinese Revolution, for achieving a "better" society. Since Mao's *Thought* had been the ideology of the revolution thus far, guiding the institutionalization of the revolution, no institutionalized means existed to resolve the conflict. Indeed, the Maoists viewed many institutions of the Chinese political system as obstructions to implementing the goals of Mao's *Thought*. Thus, a resolution of the ideological difference had to be sought by extra-institutional means. The simultaneous utilization of a mass movement and Mao's *Thought* was one such means of conflict resolution and of revolutionary institutional innovation. In a developing country like China, a rapidly expanding network of social mobilization "increases both the practicability and the need to utilize the personal symbol of the nation's ruler."[96]

The bulk of Western scholarship is either hostile to the Cultural Revolution or skeptical about its results, forecasting ominously that the future will have to atone for the mistakes of the present. Some scholars have even argued that the Cultural Revolution has resulted in a collapse of the Chinese political system.

Our study reaches a different conclusion. If we take, as the three goals of the Cultural Revolution, the overthrow of party functionaries who were taking the capitalist road, the integration of social groups in China to guarantee a uniform development or the balancing of Red and Expert, and the mobilization and integration of all elements in Chinese society in preparation for a protracted war, then the Cultural Revolution may be viewed as a success.

[96] Michel Oksenberg, "Comments [on John W. Lewis's chapter]," in Ho and Tsou (fn. 2), 499.

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The cost of this success is difficult to evaluate. Economic production was not significantly affected, but the disruption did take its toll.[97] The closing of schools for a few years will also exact its price in a country as short of trained and educated personnel as China. It is impossible to assess the political and human costs. In terms of a long-run trend, the best conclusion seems to be that, given the overriding importance of the revolutionary ends, the costs are not too great. As an astute student of Chinese politics has observed, effective bureaucracies and political parties do not necessarily constitute the prerequisite for continuous sociopolitical innovation and economic growth of any nation.[98] The roles of political leadership and attitudes in fostering such innovation and growth are crucial, and Mao's Cultural Revolution is concerned precisely with ennobling leadership and attitudes. After all, one of the indispensable functions of leadership in the context of political development is to help manage the crisis of conflict between the goals of maintaining legitimacy (i.e., routinization) and manipulating social change (i.e., innovation). When such a crisis is not resolutely attended to, trends toward political decay or mass alienation from a political institution emerge even in countries such as the United States.

[97] Cf. *Chōsa geppō* (fn. 84), 41-53; I Fan, *Wen-ko hsia ti chung-kung ching-chi* [Communist Chinese Economy under the Cultural Revolution] (Hong Kong 1968).

[98] See Oksenberg (fn. 96), 500. See also Koga (fn. 15); Chong-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," *Social Research*, XXXV (Spring 1968), 130-58. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968); Joseph P. LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963).

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DETERRENCE IN THE MIRV ERA

By BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH*

Introduction

IN one of the landmark contributions to the strategic literature of the late 1950's, Albert Wohlstetter advanced the disquieting thesis that the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory force (then consisting largely of overseas-based manned bombers and rather primitive, unhardened IRBM's) to a well-orchestrated Soviet surprise attack had come to suggest worrisome implications for continued U.S. security.[1] The credibility of a deterrent posture, he pointedly emphasized, presupposed the ability of the deterring power to convey to its opponent an absolute certainty that any attack, however massive, would be answered by an unacceptably devastating reprisal. In view of the appreciable possibility that a combined Soviet bomber and missile strike, clandestinely mounted and targeted against our retaliatory forces, might succeed in decimating those forces to a point of virtual uselessness, he went on to argue, the generally accepted notion that our deterrent capacity was a fact to be taken for granted had, in reality, become a dangerously fallacious assumption. Under the right conditions, he suggested, the Soviets could make an entirely rational decision to start a nuclear war and could stand a good chance of carrying it off with impunity.

That article, along with the elaborate RAND Corporation analysis upon which it was based,[2] had a revolutionary impact on the prevailing pattern of American strategic thought. Its assertion of the existence of a "delicate balance of terror" between the two superpowers inspired searching reassessments of the traditional assumptions underlying our defense policy and, in short order, led strategic analysts of diverse per-

* The views expressed in this article are solely my own and should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the official views of the Institute for Defense Analyses or of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. I would like to thank Fritz Ermarth, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Jervis, and Joshua Menkes for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Albert J. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34.

[2] A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffmann, R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases*, The RAND Corporation, R-266 (April 1954). A summary of this study may be found in E. S. Quade, "The Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases: A Case History," in E. S. Quade, ed., *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago 1964), 24-63. For an analysis of its impact on U.S. defense policy, see also Bruce L. R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Non-Profit Advisory Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), 195-240.

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suasions to conclude that the American deterrent posture was in need of some drastic revisions. The ultimate outcome of this conceptual ferment, needless to say, was the far-reaching decision to expand, disperse, and protect the American retaliatory force, a decision made during the latter years of the Eisenhower era and carried through under the aegis of the Kennedy Administration.[3]

By the mid-point of the 1960's, the attainment of an invulnerable deterrent posture by the United States and the gradual development of a similar posture by the Soviet Union had changed things a great deal. Despite the repeated political crises and conflicts which beset it at lesser thresholds, the U.S.-Soviet relationship had come to assume a remarkable degree of stability at the strategic level. The mainspring of that stability was the mechanism of mutual deterrence, created and maintained by the existence of credible second-strike nuclear forces in the strategic arsenals of each superpower. These forces, in the form of hardened land-based ICBM's and submarine-deployed medium-range missiles, conferred upon both countries the assured ability to ride out a premeditated nuclear first strike with enough residual arms to guarantee a crippling reprisal against the attacker. The paradoxical result was that each country, though totally vulnerable as never before, now assumed an unprecedented degree of security from its opponent's certitude that starting a general nuclear war would be consummately suicidal. As a consequence, nuclear weapons had become both self-negating and substantially devoid of political exploitability, setting new limits on each country's range of permissible action and imparting new "rules of the game" to the international system. East-West disagreements had become modulated by the superpowers' shared fear of nuclear war, and both countries acquired expectations that their adversary's behavior would remain rational and circumspect in the crisis arena.

The recent advent of ABM and MIRV[4] technology and the continued expansion of the Soviet ICBM force throughout the past half-decade, however, have aroused widespread fears among many American observers that a new "delicate balance of terror" may be about to materialize. At the same time, precisely how we should interpret these

[3] The Eisenhower phase of this policy shift is discussed in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York 1961), 88-122. On the Kennedy-McNamara phase, see William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York 1964), 47-101, and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969* (New York 1971), 165-96.

[4] MIRV is an acronym for "multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle," a system which has the effect of multiplying the number of warheads deliverable by a single booster to separate aiming points.

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developments, and what we should do to accommodate them, have remained subjects of considerable disagreement. Some individuals, particularly within the official American defense-policy community, have expressed deep-seated concern over what they consider to be an active Soviet drive for strategic "superiority." In its more alarmist variations, this argument maintains that the Soviet Union is once again moving dangerously close to achieving a nuclear first-strike capability against the United States, that Moscow's avowed interest in the ongoing strategic arms-limitation talks (SALT) may simply be a ruse to lull us into a false sense of security, and that if we fail to move quickly in deploying our own ABM's and MIRV's, our entire deterrent capacity may well become compromised.[5] Other commentators, predominantly among the academic, scientific, and "defense intellectual" communities, have propounded the opposite thesis: that Moscow merely seeks to equalize the East-West strategic balance, that the Soviets recognize the futility of seeking "superiority" in an era of mutual deterrence, and that the current prospect for arms control offers an unprecedented opportunity for both superpowers which must not be relinquished. Their central concern, unlike that of their conservative counterparts, is not that the Soviets may achieve a first-strike capability against the United States (something they consider impossible), but that a new round of Soviet-American arms competition would severely disrupt the stability of mutual deterrence which has heretofore protected *both* superpowers from a nuclear cataclysm.[6] They maintain, in other words, that a successful conclusion to SALT is not merely a diplomatic nicety which we can easily take or leave, but that it indeed constitutes a *sine qua non* for continued international security.

Despite their vast epistemological and normative differences, both of these arguments derive from a number of questionable common premises. Both assume that there are certain inherent qualities in MIRV's and ABM's which make them fundamentally different from existing weapons systems. Both maintain that the familiar parameters of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship would be drastically changed if either or both superpowers deployed such weapons in significant numbers.

[5] On this last count, Secretary of Defense Laird has gone so far as to assert that U.S. security is "literally at the edge of prudent risk." See Bernard Nossiter, "Laird Warns of Risks in Missile Delay," *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1970. For a somewhat more measured statement of concern over the integrity of our deterrent, see also Albert J. Wohlstetter, "The Case for Strategic Force Defense," in Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, eds., *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy* (New York 1969), 119-42.

[6] See, for example, Herbert F. York, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York 1970).

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And each harbors a more or less apocalyptic vision of the consequences which would flow from a failure to heed its counsel. In doing so, it may be argued, each tends both to exaggerate the strategic implications of ABM's and MIRV's, and to underestimate the extent to which deterrence stability can sustain technological "system shocks."

In practical terms, as we shall seek to demonstrate in the following discussion, this suggests (a) that the balance of terror is substantially less "delicate" than either school in the arms debate has been willing to allow; (b) that the United States need not be too concerned over a Soviet quest for "superiority"—in the unlikely event Moscow should indeed prove to have such a goal; (c) that, *mutatis mutandis*, we should not be misled by the false confidence that "superiority" in our favor would provide any political returns over and beyond those accruing from our existing nuclear forces; and (d) that, in so far as a new round of arms competition would not significantly destabilize the East-West nuclear balance, we must find other than strategic reasons to justify the case for arms-limitation measures.

The Durability of Mutual Deterrence

The asserted first-strike (or, alternatively, destabilizing) potential of ABM-MIRV deployment combinations stems from what deterrence theorists would term the "damage-limiting" or "war-fighting" potential of these weapons. Traditional forms of strategic weaponry—namely, hardened single-warhead ICBM's—are merely useful for deterring an attack. They do not possess enough accuracy, reliability, or (as presently deployed) numerical strength to destroy an opponent's similar force in a surprise attack. MIRV's and ABM's, however, tend to complicate matters a great deal. The important quality of MIRV systems is that they promise to multiply almost overnight each superpower's supply of targetable destructive power. Once installed on existing missiles, MIRV's will provide their possessors with at least a four-fold increase in the available number of deliverable warheads.[7] The theoretical military advantage which this development will immediately bestow upon the side that would contemplate striking first is readily deducible. With reasonable confidence in the aiming precision of its warheads, that side

[7] This "four-fold" figure is a rough deduction from available data on U.S. MIRV deployment plans. The land-based Minuteman III ICBM is to be fitted with a MIRV package containing three individual warheads. The MIRV being developed for the submarine-launched Poseidon medium-range missile will carry up to ten warheads. However, not all of the delivery vehicles are to be MIRVed, and not all of those which will be MIRVed are to have the maximum possible number of warheads.

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could well consider itself capable of almost completely disarming its opponent's land-based missile force by saturating it with a skillfully planned MIRV barrage. It might further hope, with an effective ABM system, to blunt a retaliatory strike by the few enemy missiles that escaped destruction in the initial blow. It would then have but a short step between adding these two calculations and discovering that a nuclear surprise attack against its adversary might just be an option to consider.

The possibility of *both* superpowers' acquiring such a capability is the underlying concern of arms control advocates, who perceive a threatened reemergence of mutual first-strike incentives similar to those which purportedly dominated the strategic balance of the late 1950's. The possibility of the Soviet Union's acquiring such a capability if the force posture of the United States remains static is the dominant nightmare of many American defense planners. This latter concern has been most clearly reflected in Secretary of Defense Laird's declared belief that, should the Soviets "go on with the development of MIRV's and install them in a new version of their SS-9 type ICBM," and "should they also greatly improve the accuracy of their small ICBM's, which the intelligence community considers possible, the serviceability of our Minuteman force as presently deployed would be virtually nil by the mid- to late-1970's."[8]

There is a deceptive simplicity to both of these arguments, however, which begs for qualifications. Admittedly, the interactions among alternative configurations of U.S.-Soviet ABM and MIRV postures can get to be an intricate business, and this is not the place to go into a detailed examination of targeting scenarios and weapons trade-offs.[9] We can safely suggest, however, that legitimate concerns over either a threat to our deterrent credibility or an impending U.S.-Soviet "delicate bal-

[8] Quoted in "Reflections on the Quarter," *Orbis*, XIII (Summer 1969), 401. This argument, incidentally, is highly suspect even on its own terms. The U.S. Minuteman force consists of 1000 missiles. The Pentagon's standard "worst-case" assumption is that 95 per cent of those missiles would be destroyed in a Soviet counterforce first strike using MIRVed SS-9s. If we accept that assumption as valid, then presumably 50 Minutemen would survive the attack. If we further accept the Pentagon's assumption that each of the surviving Minutemen would be 80 per cent reliable, then we could count on retaining a serviceable retaliatory force of 40 ICBM's (and of anywhere from 40 to 120 deliverable warheads)—hardly an overkill capability, but one large enough to wreak considerable destruction and, in any event, one clearly larger than Mr. Laird's statement would have us believe.

[9] See, however, Jerome B. Wiesner, "Some First-Strike Scenarios," in Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, eds., *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile* (New York 1969), 70-83. Wiesner persuasively argues that even following the worst conceivable Soviet first strike between now and 1980, the United States could still retaliate with upward of 2500 megatons.

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ance of terror" must be based on factors other than merely the asserted vulnerability of land-based ICBM forces to MIRV attack.[10]

The U.S. retaliatory capability consists of a good deal more than just the land-based Minuteman force. It also includes a sizeable number of manned bombers on continuous, quick-reaction alert status and a fleet of forty-one nuclear submarines, each of which carries sixteen medium-range Polaris missiles, and over half of which remain constantly on operational patrol.[11] Each of these additional force categories complicates the Soviet war-planning effort enormously. The B-52 bomber contingent has the capability of being launched on sufficiently short warning notice to stand a good chance of evading destruction on the ground by any incoming missile attack.[12] Moreover, as much as the missile age has appeared to relegate manned bombers to the status of outmoded relics, these aircraft still possess a respectable capability for penetrating Soviet air defenses and getting through to their assigned targets.[13] The Polaris submarine fleet, for its part, is virtually invulnerable to attack and will remain so until the Soviets can acquire a credible anti-submarine warfare capability. Since most defense planners consider such a development to lie far beyond the foreseeable tech-

[10] Leaving those other factors aside for the moment, it is not unreasonable to ask just how vulnerable such ICBM forces would stand to become in a MIRV environment. The greater the total number of warheads in any given MIRV package, the smaller each one of those warheads must become in terms of nuclear explosive yield. The smaller each warhead becomes, moreover, the greater its accuracy must be in order to provide reasonable assurance of being able to destroy a hardened target. Consequently, it is far from certain that MIRV's will automatically provide a disarming capability against enemy land-based missiles. They will have to be highly accurate and their delivery systems will have to be consistently reliable. For some useful charts and figures which show the full enormity of these requirements, see *Strategic Survey, 1969*, Institute for Strategic Studies (London 1970), 30-33.

[11] On this count, moreover, George Quester has pointed out the important and frequently overlooked fact that although improved warhead accuracies and the advent of MIRV systems indeed cast doubts on the long-term reliability of our land-based ICBM's as second-strike weapons, the same developments promise to increase the target coverage of our submarine-launched ballistic missile force by as much as a factor of ten. See his "Missiles in Cuba, 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (April 1971), 495-96.

[12] Some concern has been expressed that the Soviet FOBS, or "fractional orbital bombardment system," would dangerously reduce the reaction time available to the bomber force by combining a depressed-trajectory flight path with a back-door entry through the southern approach corridor to the United States where our early warning system is least concentrated. The planned introduction of over-the-horizon radar facilities and advanced missile-launch detection satellites into the U.S. early warning network, however, is expected to accommodate the FOBS threat adequately.

[13] We might note in passing that the Soviet Union's persistent statements of concern in the SALT talks over U.S. forward-deployed fighter-bombers in Europe and aboard aircraft carriers may be read, among other things, as authoritative confirmation of the continued deterrent effectiveness of manned aircraft.

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nological horizon, the Soviet Union's accommodation of the Polaris threat would have to depend solely on ABM's to sustain the brunt of retaliation. Given both the massiveness of which the retaliation would surely be capable, and the highly questionable ability of even the most extensive Soviet ABM system to cope with it, that would seem to be an almost insurmountable task.[14] Finally, even though the U.S. has consistently rejected the launch-on-warning option in its declaratory policy, the Soviets could never be absolutely assured that an eleventh-hour change of mind would not occur in the panic of a nuclear crisis, and their uncertainty on this score would, even aside from all the other factors, give them more than ample reason to think twice before committing themselves to a first strike.

To be sure, this analysis has reduced a complicated problem to some rather sweeping general propositions and, in the process, has necessarily by-passed many of the detailed, technical objections which might be raised. Its primary intent, however, has not been to address technical arguments on technical grounds.[15] Rather, it has been to point out both the profound political uncertainties which would have to be overcome before a meaningful first strike could rationally be considered, and the equally profound technical difficulties which would have to be overcome before such a consideration could even become strategically feasible. Defense Secretary Laird has been widely quoted as having said of the Soviets that "they are going for our missiles and they are going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about that."[16] In point of fact, there is a great deal of question about it—if not about whether they would prefer such a capability, then certainly about whether it lies within their universe of attainability.[17]

[14] In what one is strongly tempted to regard as a classic technological *reductio ad absurdum*, the Defense Department has gone on record with the argument that the Soviet Union could conceivably upgrade its extensive anti-aircraft missile network to ballistic-missile intercept capability, and that these Soviet air defense missiles would consequently have to be included in any ABM limitation agreement. In private conversations, various Soviet spokesmen have tended to view this argument as a transparent attempt on the part of the Pentagon to complicate the SALT talks unnecessarily. Indeed, it stretches credulity to accept the notion that the Soviets could impart to an obsolete weapon—one which has shown a remarkably poor performance record even against U.S. fighter aircraft in the Vietnam war—a capability which many experts doubt the considerably more sophisticated U.S. ABM could provide. The Pentagon concedes its case to be "hypothetical." See John W. Finney, "Dispute on Soviet Missiles Hampers U.S. Arms Stand," *New York Times*, January 11, 1970.

[15] For an informed and sophisticated survey of technical issues in the current arms debate, see B. T. Feld, T. Greenwood, G. W. Rathjens, and S. Weinberg, eds., *Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

[16] Quoted in Ralph E. Lapp, *Arms Beyond Doubt* (New York 1970), 58.

[17] The U.S. intelligence community, for example, has been anything but unanimous in its appraisal of the Soviet strategic threat. Using the same intelligence data

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The United States and the Soviet Union have long since reached a plateau in their strategic relationship. The terms "mutual deterrence," "qualitative parity," and "nuclear stalemate" all describe it appropriately. Until military technology can devise a truly effective and credible means of neutralizing an adversary's deterrent force, the persistence of residual second-strike capabilities in the possession of each superpower, the continued uncertainty of both regarding the probability of success a first strike would have, and the continued unwillingness of either to place its society's livelihood on the scale in an attempt to find out, will all tend to preserve stability as a "systemic" characteristic of the East-West nuclear balance. Let us now turn to some of the implications of this thesis for U.S. strategy and arms-control policy.

The "Superiority" Fallacy

The notion that the United States should maintain strategic "superiority" over the Soviet Union (or, in a somewhat muted variant, that we should at least aim to deny such superiority to the Soviets) has for years enjoyed an almost mystical fixation in American strategic folklore. This fixation may perhaps be partly explained simply by the natural psychological and chauvinistic satisfaction that Americans traditionally have drawn from being "stronger than," "better than," or "ahead of" their Communist adversary. For the most part, however, it seems to have derived from a genuine belief that superiority somehow confers political advantages on its possessor that a lesser strategic posture would be unable to provide. Indeed, it is quite amazing how quick strategic analysts have consistently been to assume that our "superiority" was the determining factor in various American foreign policy successes against the Soviet Union. Such assumptions, more often than not, have been advanced uncritically, and they deserve a closer examination.

In principle, nuclear weapons serve two functions. First of all, they deter a premeditated attack directly on one's own homeland. As we have just argued at some length, this is a rather undemanding function. The weapons do not have to do anything but merely exist in sufficient quantity and quality to guarantee an "assured destruction" retaliation against any conceivable first strike. And for this, relative numbers in the strategic balance are, by and large, unimportant. All one

available to Secretary Laird, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, made the unprecedented move, in spring of 1969, of allowing himself to become publicly identified with the view that Defense Department projections of a Soviet first-strike capability were exaggerated. See Peter Grose, "U.S. Intelligence Doubts Soviet First-Strike Goal," *New York Times*, June 18, 1969.

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needs for deterrence is "enough" strength, even if that strength is less, in quantitative terms, than that of the adversary.

Second, many observers have argued, nuclear weapons also underwrite their possessor's foreign policy objectives by threatening his adversary with undesirable sanctions should he attempt to interfere with those objectives. This function seeks to extract some "marginal strategic utility" from nuclear weapons, over and beyond their primary role of deterring an attack on one's homeland, by maximizing the adversary's fear that, in seeking limited objectives at his opponent's expense, he might subject himself to ultimate losses from massive retaliation or uncontrolled crisis escalation, either of whose consequences would be out of all proportion to the original values sought. Here, however, unlike the case of simple deterrence, the credibility and force-level requirements are much more exacting. The adversary must be really convinced that his own contemplated action would in fact trigger the threatened response, and that such a response could be carried off according to promise. During the early postwar years, when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, this sort of "marginal strategic utility" could possibly have been wielded with some degree of success. Under conditions of mutual deterrence, however—in which even a strategically inferior power could deliver a devastating second strike—any threat to resort to nuclear war that was implied by the political invocation of strategic superiority would quite probably be met with incredulity.[18] To be sure, there have been many occasions when the Soviet Union has backed away from crises when confronted with American

[18] A critic might protest that while this argument indeed holds for threats of cold-blooded nuclear attacks "out of the blue," it does not consider the possibility that a country could credibly threaten a pre-emptive nuclear strike against its adversary during an acute crisis in which its core values were at stake, and thereby reap bargaining advantages from its strategic nuclear forces which, under calmer conditions, would be unavailable. More specifically, he might accuse it of a "minimum deterrence" monism which overlooks the possible utility of those "Type II Deterrence" concepts advanced by Herman Kahn in *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1960), 126-60. In anticipation of such criticism, two points may be made. First, while the force-level requirements of Kahn's Type II Deterrence (i.e., the deterrence of provocative acts other than a direct Soviet attack on the U.S.) are substantially greater than those of mere deterrence against premeditated attacks "out of the blue," they do not necessarily in any way depend on strategic "superiority" over the adversary. It is theoretically possible for a state to have Type II Deterrence without being superior, and equally possible for it to have superiority but not Type II Deterrence. (Indeed, it is noteworthy that Kahn never even mentions superiority in his discussion of the preconditions for Type II Deterrence.) Second, Type II Deterrence requires a credible first-strike capability, something we have already seen to be unattainable under conditions of stable nuclear stalemate. Even Kahn admits—in *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York 1962), 113—that under such conditions "the use by a rational (or at least rational-appearing) decisionmaker of Type II Deterrence will not be feasible."

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diplomatic and military pressure. The question, however, is whether superiority or other factors were the deciding elements in our favor. Since our success in the Cuban missile crisis has most frequently been cited as proof of the value of superiority,[19] it might be helpful to seek an answer there.

In his nationwide television address inaugurating the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy did indeed state that "it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union."[20] He plainly did not, however, promise the Soviets a nuclear retaliation if they failed to remove the missiles from Cuba, a fact generally overlooked by the superiority advocates. On the contrary, he only threatened such retaliation in the event that the missiles were fired, and concern that the Soviets would actually use them militarily was hardly the major element in the crisis. For what it literally promised, Kennedy's threat was perhaps not altogether unbelievable. The important point, however, is that it was not addressed to the main objective of getting the Soviet missiles physically removed from Cuba. Moreover, had the threat of a direct U.S. nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in fact been resorted to as an instrument for inducing Soviet cooperativeness, it would most likely have been patently unconvincing to Khrushchev. However superior the American strategic capability may have been numerically, it could not have met the preconditions for a successful first strike. The Soviet Union, though quantitatively inferior, still possessed an appreciable counter-deterrent in the form of its "not-incredible"[21] second-strike capability, a fact which was no doubt hardly lost on President Kennedy. Why, then, did Khrushchev back down?

Aside from our numerical missile superiority over the Soviets, there were several other factors of relevance to the Cuban crisis. First of all,

[19] A report by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, for example, maintains that our Cuban victory constituted "a particularly vivid example of the political utility of military superiority based on advanced technology." *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge* (Washington, D.C. 1967), 6. See also Raymond L. Garthoff's assertion that as a result of Khrushchev's forced removal of the missiles from Cuba, "the American strategic superiority was doubly confirmed: his ploy proved his need for such . . . missiles, and its failure not only denied them but bore impressive witness to the American superiority that compelled him to capitulate." "Military Power in Soviet Policy," in John Erickson, ed., *The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy* (New York 1966), 255.

[20] Quoted in Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York 1966), 106.

[21] The qualification is an important one. Whether or not the Soviets in fact had a guaranteed retaliatory capability, the uncertainty on our part obliged us to act as though they did.

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the crisis was played out within an arm's reach of the United States and fully half a globe away from the Soviet Union. We had a preponderance of conventional power at the point of contact, and there was no guarantee that we would not use it to remove the missiles from Cuba forcibly in the event of a Soviet refusal to withdraw them peacefully. Second, we had a distinct margin of resolve working in our favor. U.S. policy had made it unambiguously evident that the presence of Soviet offensive weaponry in the Western hemisphere posed a direct threat to our vital interests, and Moscow—knowing from the outset that it was fishing in troubled waters—could not persuasively articulate an equally convincing counter-claim. Since it was the Soviets who had chosen to alter the status quo, it was they who had to bear the burden of responsibility. Third, the United States' imposition of a naval quarantine around Cuba, and its threat to launch an air strike against the missiles already on station there, left the onus of decision to escalate or back off on the Soviets. Any Soviet ship attempting to run the blockade would have had to face the possibility of being sunk by American naval forces, and while Khrushchev may have had good reasons for wanting the missiles in Cuba in the first place, he certainly was under no obligation to commit himself to the risk of armed conflict in order to keep them there.

It is among these factors, it seems, that the most plausible explanation of Moscow's retreat from Cuba is to be found. The United States reacted with a degree of alacrity totally unexpected by Khrushchev,[22] displayed consistently preeminent resolve throughout the crisis, and skillfully manipulated the risks in such a way that the Soviets had to double or fold.[23] Its strategy, moreover, was dominated not by a direct

[22] A fair case can be made that the Soviet missile gamble in Cuba was the product of a wholly rational decision, given the evidence and beliefs which Khrushchev had to go on. His expectation of success was no doubt heavily conditioned by a calculation that the United States, having been badly burned once in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs debacle, would not risk a similar failure by opposing his deployment of the missiles. It may also have been enhanced by a belief on his part, reinforced by his earlier confrontation with President Kennedy in Vienna, that the American President was, at bottom, a callow youth who could be easily manipulated by the more wily Soviet ruler. If Khrushchev had had any reason to believe otherwise, he probably would not have made his move at all. As it was, the American response was in all likelihood totally unexpected by him. Rather than ask the standard question of why the Soviets put their missiles in Cuba in the first place, we might usefully consider an alternative question: what did we do (or not do) that led them to believe they could get away with it? In this regard, Bernard Brodie has pointedly observed that "our having made a bad prediction does not itself justify our calling the Russians 'unpredictable.'" *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton 1966), 49.

[23] As Oran R. Young has aptly put it, "the United States succeeded in achieving 'escalation dominance' by placing the Soviets in a situation in which they could not improve their bargaining position by raising the level of conflict." *The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises* (Princeton 1968), 388.

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threat of "massive retaliation" but rather by a calculated management of uncertainty. Thomas Schelling has described the mechanics of such bargaining processes quite impressively. Rejecting the simplistic notion that "the two sides just measure up to each other and one bows before the other's superiority and acknowledges that he was only bluffing," he has pointed out the important (and often overlooked) fact that "if war tends to result from a process, a dynamic process in which both sides get more and more deeply involved, more and more expectant, more and more concerned not to be a slow second in case the war starts, it is not a 'credible first strike' that one threatens but just plain war."[24]

It was the specter of "just plain war" that essentially caused Khrushchev to reconsider, and that specter had little to do with the American preponderance of ICBM strength. For those who continue to exalt the American success in Cuba as "the classic example of strategic superiority snatching a partial victory from the jaws of political disaster,"[25] two additional points are worth mentioning. First, if the imputed political persuasiveness of U.S. superiority had been as compelling as they assume, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would have attempted the Cuban missile gamble in the first place, for fear of a preordained failure. Second, the actual behavior of the United States during the crisis suggested anything but confidence that our superiority would bring us through unscathed. The whole affair, on the contrary, was a bewildering encounter with the uncertainties of nuclear brinkmanship in which our own fears and doubts were quite probably no less than those of the Soviets. The self-congratulatory Monday-morning quarterbacking displayed by many American strategists in the aftermath of the crisis had little in common with President Kennedy's more judicious post-crisis reflection that while the Soviets "were in the wrong and . . . had to back down, . . . this doesn't mean at all that they would back down when they felt they were in the right and had vital interests involved."[26]

[24] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven 1966), 98-99.

[25] William R. Kintner, *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* (New York 1967), 222-23.

[26] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Greenwich, Conn. 1965), 759. Indeed, practically all of the published memoirs of the Kennedy era point out President Kennedy's uncertainty during the crisis and his humility in victory. On the first count, Robert F. Kennedy related the President's statement that "if anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move. I am not going to push the Russians an inch beyond what is necessary." *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York 1969), 127. On the second count, Theodore Sorensen observes that while many of the President's advisers felt—after the crisis had abated—that the U.S. victory would make Ken-

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It is precisely this factor of asymmetrical interests, commitments, and levels of resolve, rather than the mere presence of asymmetrical strategic nuclear forces, which seems to have been the controlling variable in nuclear-age crisis resolution. We came out ahead in the Cuban episode because we were able to demonstrate that our interest in getting the missiles removed was manifestly greater than the Soviet interest in keeping them there. Moreover, the event occurred close enough to home that we could quickly mobilize the required local preponderance of force to give our commitment credibility. Had the crisis been played out in an area closer to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, the odds would have been much less disproportionately balanced in our favor. To underscore this point, we need only recall that the Soviet Union succeeded in occupying Hungary in 1956 and in erecting the Berlin Wall in 1961 despite the fact that at both times it was strategically "inferior" to the United States in at least the same degree that supposedly determined its defeat in Cuba. During those crises, the East-West distribution of bargaining power was essentially reversed from that which prevailed during the Cuban missile affair and the Soviets clearly had more to lose than we had to gain. In none of the three cases, however, did the strategic nuclear balance play any significant role in shaping the outcome of events. In each, the winner prevailed, not because he was willing to go to nuclear war in defense of his interests (which, in fact, he probably was not), but because the loser was clearly unwilling to *risk* such a war in order to stay in the game. The lesson of these examples thus seems to be that the overall nature of the objective, rather than strategic "superiority," ultimately determines which protagonist will prevail in a crisis.[27] As Brent Scowcroft has put it, "the criticality of the issue at stake for each side in any crisis is a factor too often overlooked by those who advocate force 'superiority' as a panacea for the resolution of conflicts with the Soviet Union," and, though superior

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nedy look "ten feet tall" in the eyes of the rest of the world (including, presumably, those of the Soviets), the President realistically maintained: "That will wear off in about a week, and everybody will be back to thinking of their own interests." Kennedy was, in fact, so convinced that his success was a narrow and fortuitous one that he subsequently laid down a firm line against his administration's gloating over the victory. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York 1965), 808-09. The notion that "nothing succeeds like success" seems to have had a compelling influence on the proponents of superiority. By every account, however, the outcome of the missile crisis was a close one, and our eventual victory was hardly foreordained. What would they have said if we had failed?

[27] For further discussion on this point, see the excellent study by Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston 1971).

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military forces may occasionally "assist in bolstering resolve, . . . one should never imagine that they somehow constitute 'instant courage.' "[28]

A Non-Strategic Case for Arms Control

On balance, we come to several interim conclusions. In our earlier discussion of the durability of mutual deterrence, we argued that, given the foreseeable limits of future military technology, a credible first-strike capability (the only meaningful form of strategic "superiority") remains permanently denied to both superpowers. In analyzing the Cuban missile crisis, we also maintained that any sort of strategic advantage short of a first-strike capability offers virtually nothing in the way of direct coercive utility. Together, these arguments suggest both the fallaciousness of prescriptions for U.S. superiority and the groundlessness of fears that the Soviets may be seeking superiority. Paradoxically, however, they also suggest that there exists little compelling *strategic* reason for either of the superpowers to engage in arms control negotiations.[29] If it is true that asymmetries in the nuclear balance are irrelevant to the functioning of mutual deterrence, that superiority is worthless as an instrument of policy, and that the stability of deterrence is likely to remain intact whether an arms race ensues or not, then what difference should it make whether the SALT talks succeed or fail? Indeed, why should the "arms problem" be a cause for concern at all?

1. *The "rationalist" argument.* Perhaps the most compelling indictment against continued arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is that its ultimate offspring, for each country, would almost certainly be stillborn. In Lewis Carroll's *Through the*

[28] Brent Scowcroft, "Deterrence and Strategic Superiority," *Orbis*, XIII (Summer 1969), 450, 453. There is, it should be pointed out, a serious counter-argument to this view that holds that "if both sides believe . . . the side with more missiles has more useable military power and can prevail in more situations, then the number of missiles each side has does affect the outcome of political bargaining." Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton 1970), 231. In theory, this argument is hard to disagree with. In practice, however, it is only as good as its assumption is valid, and there is little evidence to suggest that such a constellation of beliefs has ever in fact existed in the East-West relationship. On the contrary, as we have seen, the United States has frequently been circumspect and the Soviet Union adventurous, even though the prevailing asymmetries of the nuclear balance would have suggested that the reverse should have been the case. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the notable ironies of the nuclear age that while both Washington and Moscow have often lauded superiority as a military force-posture goal, neither has ever behaved as though it really believed superiority significantly mattered in the resolution of international conflicts.

[29] Among the few analyses that have recognized and sought to deal with this paradox are Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Coercion*, Nomos XV (New York 1971), and Herbert Scoville, Jr., *Toward a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York 1970).

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Looking Glass, the Red Queen confronts Alice with a perplexing inversion of conventional logic that neatly captures the essence of this indictment. "Now here, you see," the Red Queen points out, "it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"[30] There could hardly be a more appropriate metaphor to describe the current pace of East-West strategic interaction. The technological dynamism displayed by this interaction has bordered on the bedazzling. Yet, like Alice's race on the treadmill of Wonderland, it seems to have been just as unyielding of tangible progress. As each superpower has sought new levels of security through new breeds of weaponry, it has invariably provoked its opponent—equally driven by the imperative of security—to counteract in kind. The resultant exercise in strategic one-upmanship has thus been essentially a competition in countervailing frustration, imparting high costs to both countries and, in the end, advantages to neither. Former Defense Secretary McNamara once likened it to a "mad momentum,"[31] and other observers have been equally moved to ask whether this seemingly mindless scramble for ABM's, MIRV's, and more advanced forms of strategic gadgetry is really a product of rational policy or merely the outgrowth of some blind technological determinism with a life of its own.[32]

The "rationalist" argument for arms control derives not so much from fear of the dangers of a new arms race as it does from the conviction that such an arms race cannot serve the security interests of either superpower. It holds that both the United States and the Soviet Union have already gained as much security as life in the deterrence arena will allow, that the point of diminishing returns from new weapons deployments has long since been passed, and that the SALT talks offer both countries every incentive and opportunity to get off the treadmill and relax.

2. *The economic argument.* A logical corollary to the "rationalist" argument holds that if new strategic weapons have nothing to offer, then it is patently wasteful to expend the gargantuan amounts of re-

[30] Lewis Carroll, *The Annotated Alice* (New York 1960), 210.

[31] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York 1968), 166.

[32] Indeed, an argument can be made that the hypervigilance induced by this "mad momentum" often forces each superpower into what amounts, in effect, to an arms race with itself. The paradigm of this phenomenon is the case where superpower *A* develops weapon *Y* to counteract weapon *X* which it has, and which it assumes superpower *B* eventually will also have. More often than not, the net result is to provoke the adversary into actually deploying the weapon which such anticipatory countermeasures are intended to check. For discussion on this point, see Robert L. Rothstein, "The Scorpions in the Bottle," *The Washington Monthly*, 1 (January 1970), 31.

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sources necessary to produce and maintain them. Modern weapons systems are enormously costly to create, develop, and deploy. While a turn-down in their production rate would hardly eliminate defense spending entirely, it would certainly allow for substantial savings which could possibly be re-directed to other sectors of society. It would probably be fair to assert that no two countries are in greater need of a radical shift in economic priorities than the United States and the Soviet Union. Arms control, while certainly no panacea in itself, would clearly seem to provide each country with a considerable share of the economic preconditions for a step in the right direction.

3. *Arms control and nuclear proliferation.* If the two superpowers had only one another to worry about, then the question of their international "image," leadership, and responsibility might hardly arise. There was a time, indeed, when East-West bipolarity was so all-pervasive that the two nuclear giants could blithely dismiss lesser states as merely minor irritants. The nuclear stalemate, however, has changed matters profoundly and irretrievably. Caught up in a deadlock of mutual deterrence, the Soviets and Americans alike have watched the political relevance of their strategic power decline steadily. Encumbered and frustrated by the essential unusability of their nuclear-missile strength, they have paradoxically also found themselves increasingly vulnerable to the pressures of other states whose interests have now come to demand accommodation.

Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union confront a revolutionary international system dominated by fluidity, incipient tension, and often virulent and explosive forms of assertive nationalism. Moreover, nuclear weapons technology has become virtually a free-market commodity, raising the disquieting possibility that world politics in the years ahead will be intensified by a profusion of lesser nuclear states, each crowding one another and the superpowers for a measure of international stature and influence.

Concern over such a possibility has been explicitly acknowledged by the superpowers in their eager acceptance of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Along with that concern, however, have come new responsibilities. The various nuclear "threshold" countries have made it abundantly clear that a precondition to their acceptance of nonproliferation must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the superpowers to modulate their own nuclear arms race. In signing the nonproliferation treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union rhetorically acceded to that precondition, and are now obliged to follow through with it by

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action.[33] To do otherwise—preaching the virtues of nonproliferation while at the same time more firmly securing their own nuclear duopoly —would be to convey an image of transparent double-dealing, which could only serve to aggravate the probability of eventual nuclear-weapons acquisition by the present "threshold" powers.

4. *Arms control as a medium of superpower dialogue.* Another possible contribution of arms control negotiations (and one often overlooked in many Western strategic writings) would be, simply, the opportunity afforded to each of the two superpowers to get to know one another better.[34] Not nearly enough attention has been paid, either in scholarly analyses or in official government circles, to the persistent mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings which have continually plagued Soviet-American relations.[35] More often than not, these misperceptions and misunderstandings have been substantially due to distorted images generated by insufficient information. "Intelligence gaps" on the part of both countries (particularly regarding one another's strategic intentions) have been characteristic obstacles to effective policy-making, enhancing fears of the worst, and fuelling continued arms increases by each side. American Sovietologists in particular have labored under immense difficulties in trying to winnow out the mainstream of Soviet thinking, policies, and concerns from the limited clues provided by the available documentary evidence.

Much of this groping in the dark would stand to be significantly reduced in the course of a serious U.S.-Soviet arms-control dialogue. The perceptual, political, and strategic problems which would have to be addressed in such a dialogue could not long sustain an exchange of generalities. Weapons interactions, implications, and trade-offs in the contemporary strategic milieu are highly intricate technical matters which, sooner or later, would require specific and precise examination by both negotiating partners. In the process, each side would almost cer-

[33] For elaboration on the relationship between the proliferation issue and SALT, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," *Orbis*, XIV (Summer 1970), 298-325.

[34] Discussion of this possibility and its potential value may be found in Jerome H. Kahan, "Strategies for SALT," *World Politics*, XXIII (January 1971), 171-79. See also Jeremy Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations Through Dialogue* (New York 1968).

[35] See, however, Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXI, No. 1 (1967), 16-39; Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 454-79; and Anatol Rapoport, *The Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy* (New York 1971). See also Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (New York 1971).

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tainly come to learn a great deal about the fears, calculations, and motivations which inform its adversary's security policies.

5. *Arms control and tension reduction.* Finally, it seems self-evident that a negotiated arms-limitation agreement would provide a welcome degree of psychic relief from the breathtaking pace of nuclear weapons competition which has heretofore dominated the nuclear age. Notwithstanding our contention that, in terms of the technical mechanics of mutual deterrence, a continued U.S.-Soviet arms race would most likely not be seriously destabilizing, we must remember that political leaders are not necessarily "rational strategic men." They view the world darkly, like most ordinary people, through the filter of their own subjective values and fears. To them, a reasoned argument that deterrence was in good shape might be difficult to accept calmly in the context of a reality in which their opponents were building ever-increasing levels of nuclear destructive power. Perceptions of security, at bottom, are rooted in obscure cognitive processes rather than in the austere and logical deductive schemes of strategic theoreticians. Consequently, it is altogether probable that political decision-makers would find a rapid pace of strategic arms development and deployment on the part of their avowed enemy quite unnerving, even though the objective technical evidence and the rules of "strategic logic" would suggest that there was plainly nothing to fear. In the narrow sense that an arms race would tend to maximize each side's inner feeling of insecurity and to heighten its perceived need to be "vigilant," therefore, it could legitimately be argued that such an arms race would be "destabilizing." Arms control, by eliminating the sources of such perceived insecurity, would go a long way toward providing for a more liveable world. Disagreements, conflicts, and even occasional crises would doubtlessly persist, but they could be considerably less enervating if the superpowers were able to act upon them with the measured confidence which a nuclear *modus vivendi* would permit.

Conclusion

The history of the nuclear age has traditionally been dominated by an almost dialectical process of technological change and conceptual readjustment. Repeatedly over the past two decades, developments in weaponry by the two superpowers have produced qualitative shifts in the nature of their strategic relationship, adding new limits and corollaries to the international "rules of the game," and forcing each country, in consequence, to recast its old strategic doctrines and policy formulas in order to accommodate these changing imperatives. The result has

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been a marked periodicity in the U.S.-Soviet arms competition, driven by the relentless advance of military technology and characterized by a progression of evolutionary phases, revolutionary "turning points," and concomitant "agonizing reappraisals" on the part of both superpowers.[36]

Moscow's initial acquisition of an air-deliverable nuclear capability in the early 1950's marked the beginning of this pattern, irretrievably eliminating our brief atomic monopoly and invalidating in one stroke all the enshrined military verities of a simpler past. The enormous destructive potential of atomic weaponry and the new certainty that "a major unrestricted war would begin with a disaster . . . of absolutely unprecedented and therefore unimaginable proportions" for both superpowers led a distinguished American strategist to reflect the changed temper of the time by calling for a "comprehensive pursuit of the new ideas and procedures necessary to carry us through the next two or three dangerous decades."[37]

This "comprehensive pursuit" soon became beset by the task of accommodating the perceived insecurities of the "delicate balance of terror," a second quantum stage in the nuclear relationship introduced by Moscow's attainment of sufficient strategic capabilities to place our vulnerable retaliatory forces in possible danger of being destroyed by a surprise first strike. Sparked by this concern over the security of our deterrent, American defense policy-makers moved to harden and disperse the strategic arsenal of the United States during the early 1960's so as to provide for a guaranteed nuclear second-strike capability. The Soviet Union followed suit shortly thereafter with a similar hardening and dispersal program of its own, and the nuclear era entered upon its third and present phase of stable mutual deterrence.

The heightened activity of recent American and Soviet weapons-development programs has led many American strategists to conclude that the East-West nuclear equation is once again on the verge of a qualitative shift. While these strategists, as we have seen, are polarized in their respective attitudes regarding the proper response we should take, they share a common belief that the present trend in the nuclear arms race seriously threatens to endanger our continued security if we let it go on unattended.

Contrary to this widespread belief, our central contention here has been that the "dialectic" of the Soviet-American strategic relationship

[36] For a detailed account of these developments, see George Quester, *Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years* (New York 1970).

[37] Bernard Brodie, "Strategy Hits a Dead End," *Harper's*, ccxi (October 1955), 33, 37.

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has become firmly immobilized—at least for the foreseeable future—by the durability of mutual deterrence, and that, while new weapons deployments by either or both superpowers may induce numerical fluctuations in the strategic balance, neither the stability of that balance nor the security it provides will be significantly affected in the process.

If we view the arms race in this light, it should follow that the dominant cause of the ongoing American arms debate has been not so much a legitimate concern over the dangers of technological change as a fundamental crisis of traditional strategic ideas. The United States today stands at a crossroads of choice between serious pursuit of an arms-limitation dialogue with the Soviets and continued deployment of strategic weaponry. That the choice remains unmade is clear testimony both to the magnetic appeal held out by the prospect of arms control and to the simultaneous reluctance on the part of U.S. policy-makers to make the radical conceptual departure which that prospect requires. The psychological underpinnings of this reluctance are, of course, readily understandable. It is easy enough for intellectuals and analysts to advance sweeping proposals for change: they are far from the wellspring of political power and are accountable only to the moral canons of their calling. Presidents and policy-makers, on the other hand, must be more circumspect because of the responsibilities they shoulder for the well-being of their constituents. Consequently, there is a strong tendency on their part to adhere to the familiar pattern of the status quo rather than to experiment with new policies that bear a high uncertainty of outcome.

Yet, occasions emerge periodically in which conventional wisdom becomes inappropriate to prevailing realities. Under such conditions, adherence to the outmoded dogmas of the past can only have a corrosive effect on the health of the nation. We have long since reached a point in the evolution of the nuclear age where traditional strategic theories have outlived their applicability. Mutual deterrence has deprived nuclear weapons of any coercive utility, rendered strategic "superiority" both a worthless instrument of foreign policy and a false guarantee of national security, and, in the process, made numerical comparisons of forces altogether useless as means for measuring relative strategic power.

Until recently, American policy-makers had no need to face up to these facts, both because there was no tangible prospect for arms control available to provoke a choice among alternatives, and because doubts about the adequacy of American security could be assuaged by seeking confidence in the belief that our numerical missile superiority held the key to nuclear deterrence. Today's crisis in traditional strategic thought

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stems from our traumatic loss of that superiority and from our confusion over whether we ought to try and recapture it. It is not by any means a novel sort of crisis in American political history. Alluding to the profound moral indecision which preceded our entry into World War I, the American essayist Randolph Bourne described such "crises of confidence" with remarkable incisiveness and perceptivity. "Mental conflicts," he observed more than a half-century ago, "end either in a new and higher synthesis . . . or else in a reversion to more primitive ideas which have been outgrown but to which we drop when jolted out of our attained position."[38] The preeminent question of contemporary American strategic life is whether we shall seek the "new and higher synthesis" of accommodation to nuclear parity and acceptance of arms control—perhaps taking on some small but necessary risks in the process—or whether we shall fall back on the "primitive ideas" of security through nuclear superiority and thus submit to the arms race which would inevitably result.

In the course of this essay, we have tried systematically to lay out a case in favor of arms control, a case dominated not by apocalyptic warnings of the dire consequences which would flow from a failure to accept it, but by a more modulated suggestion that it would merely defy common sense to do otherwise. It clearly follows from our argument that if we really wish to achieve a negotiated arms-limitation accord with the Soviets, we must openly abandon our pursuit of "superiority" and assimilate into our image of strategic reality the recognition that East-West nuclear equality can be the only basis for fruitful arms-control discussions. A promising step in this direction seems to have been made by President Nixon's articulation of the concept of "sufficiency" as the proper premise upon which U.S. strategic policy should be developed.[39] Unlike "superiority," "sufficiency" is a term with enough semantic ambiguity to allow the United States the satisfaction that its security is protected and, at the same time, to avoid bruising the *amour-propre* of the Soviet Union. It is a relatively value-free slogan that both superpowers can easily live with.

We cannot, however, have our cake and eat it too. On the very heels of President Nixon's embrace of the "sufficiency" construct, Secretary Laird was quoted as having inserted the qualification that the use of the term should in no way be taken to suggest that we have given up

[38] Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915–1919* (New York 1964), 10.

[39] For a useful background discussion on the genealogy of the "sufficiency" concept, see I. F. Stone, "Nixon and the Arms Race: How Much is 'Sufficiency'?" *The New York Review of Books*, XII (March 27, 1969), 6-18.

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"the idea of superiority."[40] At the risk of lecturing the Secretary of Defense on the delicate art of strategic communication, we must plainly note that this sort of approach will simply not be good enough. Superiority, by any other name, will remain superiority in the eyes of the Soviets, and our continued pursuit of it will only drive them to a vigorous counteraction in kind. Indeed, the rearguard effort of many American defense policy-makers to beat the superiority drum while others in the government are trying to smooth a path through the SALT negotiations brings to mind Santayana's remark about fanatics who redouble their efforts as they lose sight of their goals.

A rational defense policy must meet the imperatives of national security, but it must not do so at the unnecessary sacrifice of other important social values. A continued drive by the United States to outmatch the Soviets in numbers of nuclear missile weapons would be doubly injurious: along with the economic deprivation it would impose upon other sectors of society and the hypertension it would perpetuate in the American strategic "psyche," it would also, in the end, contribute nothing to its primary goal of enhancing the military protection of the country. Arms control, on the other hand, has a great deal to offer on all counts and deserves a place of particular priority in the hierarchy of U.S. objectives. If, for any reason, the Soviet Union should change its position in the future and combine accelerated strategic arms build-ups with a militant and aggressive foreign policy, the primacy of political expediency over strategic logic would make it impossible to justify total American inaction. For the moment, however, our first imperative should be to continue exploring the possibility of an arms-limitation accord which might well eliminate the causes of such reflexiveness altogether. The price of that possibility is our acceptance of the Soviet Union as an equal in the exclusive community of superpowers. It is a price which we can safely afford to pay, and one which we owe to the next generation of American policy-makers who would inherit the consequences of our failure to do so.

[40] Quoted in Michael E. Sherman, "Nixon and Arms Control," *International Journal*, XXIV (Spring 1969), 335. A similarly Kafkaesque example of this sort of rhetorical sleight-of-hand may be found in Hanson Baldwin's statement that while "the first and absolute requirement for any grand strategy tomorrow is 'sufficiency' in strategic weapons, . . . 'sufficiency,' in this context, must mean a clear-cut and visible U.S. qualitative and quantitative superiority. Equivocation on this issue risks the life of the nation." *Strategy for Tomorrow* (New York 1970), 295. In the face of such blatant cases of disregard for the meaning of words, one is almost tempted, out of despair, to agree with the candid and undoubtedly revealing remark made by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard when pressed by reporters for a definition of sufficiency: "It means," said Packard, "that it's a good word to use in a speech. Beyond that, it doesn't mean a God-damned thing." "Arms Sufficiency Defined," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1969.

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Research Note

THE "CORRELATES OF WAR" PROJECT:

Interim Report and Rationale

By J. DAVID SINGER*

UNDER what conditions do international conflicts erupt into war? What is it that permits many of them to end in non-violent outcomes? What makes some wars short and others long? How do wars end? What kinds of nations "initiate" most wars? Do the initiators usually "win"? Are the frequency and magnitude of war a consequence of the state of the international system? Or is it the level of development of the relevant nations? Or the kinds of relationships among the nations which comprise the system? Or might it be that war arises out of the "aggressive" behavior of specific governments?

Despite the strongest motivations, a great many case studies, and an endless amount of speculation, we still have very little hard knowledge on these and other questions related to international war. While our relative ignorance is unfortunate, it is not particularly surprising; almost all social science inquiry has been inhibited not only by the complexities of the problem, but by taboos of one sort or another, and international politics is no exception. In the past few decades, however, led by the pioneering efforts of Bloch, Sorokin, Wright, and Richardson, scholars have at last begun a systematic assault on these most challenging—and humanly important—theoretical questions.[1] Inspired by these earlier studies, and persuaded that rigorous research on the problem is indeed feasible, we began in the early 1960's a modest set of experiments in quantitative history. Eventually, this developed into the "Correlates of War" project.

A number of critical questions arise when one thinks of applicable research on the "causes" of war, which is our major preoccupation here. Are we indeed likely to find any regularities, or will it turn out that no

* I am indebted to Melvin Small, Karl Deutsch, Stuart Bremer, James Ray, and John Stuckey for their comments on an earlier draft, and to the National Science Foundation for support under Grant Number 03178.

[1] See Jean de Bloch, *The Future of War* (Boston 1903); Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York 1937); Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago 1942); and Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago 1960), and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Chicago 1960). In the Appendix, we list most of the completed papers which have emanated from the "Correlates of War" Project.

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two wars are even comparable in their origins and consequences? Are there any similarities between wars of the past and those of the future? And if we do discover that certain combinations of events and conditions are regularly associated with war, to what extent are they within our control to modify? Even if they *are* susceptible to human intervention, what is the likelihood that our interventions will be timely and appropriate?[2] While some of these questions are legitimate objects of scientific inquiry, and others will be answered by painful experience, a few of them are—for the moment, at least—largely articles of faith.

Thus, we begin with the assumption that there are indeed regularities in the origins of different types of war, and that they are discoverable. Second, we assume that those regularities are as relevant to the future as to the past, but that knowledge of them will itself constitute a crucial new condition. Third, we assume that the knowledge generated by this and related social science research will also help in showing us how to apply and utilize whatever discoveries are made.

Research Strategy and Rationale

How does one go about investigating the "causes of war" question? There is, of course, an abundance of literature on the conditions and events which lead toward, or away from, different types of war, but little of it is accompanied by evidence. Nor is there even any strong convergence within these largely speculative inquiries. The diversity —as well as the redundancy—of explanatory models is staggering, and the grounds for choosing among them are quite insufficient. To put it another way, our current knowledge (including that generated by this project to date) persuades us that there is a germ of truth in many of the speculative and hortatory efforts, but that none of these efforts will stand the test of evidence by themselves.[3] The question, then, is: which events and conditions, in which combinations, account for how much of the variance in which types of war?

AN INTEGRATIVE TAXONOMY

Given the diversity and non-comparability—but intuitive plausibility —of the proffered orientations to the causes of war question, it seems

[2] For differing viewpoints on this question, see Anatol Rapoport, "Can Peace Research be Applied?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIV (June 1970), 277-86, and Singer, "Knowledge, Practice, and the Social Sciences in International Politics," in *A Design for International Relations Research*, Monograph No. 10 of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia 1970), 137-49.

[3] Many of the approaches, and one possible mode of evaluating them, are discussed in Singer, "Modern International War: From Conjecture to Explanation," in Albert

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reasonable to look for a scheme which permits us to integrate their separate concepts and propositions, and then put a good many sub-models to the empirical test within such a framework. While we fully appreciate the counter-arguments in favor of committing ourselves to a single comprehensive model and then putting *that* model to the test, we are increasingly persuaded that such a strategy would be quite premature, and that it is more efficient, scientifically, to eliminate first those sub-models that are inconsistent with the empirical evidence.[4] Thus, we follow a more experimental and incremental strategy, built around the sequential testing of more modest sub-models. These vary widely, in the classes of predictor variables used and in the types of analyses employed; the latter range from the examination of frequency distributions and associated tests for non-randomness, up through bivariate and multivariate analyses using nominal and ordinal as well as interval and ratio data, multiple and stepwise regression analyses, and techniques which permit certain types of "causal inference." From such analytical sub-models, the natural next step would be their conversion to computerized, dynamic form. Then, by representing the most promising and powerful of these limited models as sub-routines of an ultimately integrated large-scale computer model, we can move to parameter estimation and sensitivity testing in a particularly effective fashion. We will return to these issues later; first we shall summarize our general taxonomy and define some key terms.

If we are to systematically compare and test a variety of plausible, but far from compatible, models and sub-models on the "causes" of war, it is essential that we work within a definitional-relational framework which a) contains only minimal biases for or against the theoretical formulations we are examining, and b) is sufficiently abstract to embrace them all. Over the past decade or so, successive efforts to build such a "general systems" taxonomy have begun to show real promise, and while we find little scientific *theory* in that literature, we do see in it a powerful set of organizing concepts, appropriate to the sort of "historical experiment" which is described here. Our version of that taxonomy is built around three classes of variables: the attributes of social entities, the bonds and relationships between and among them, and the behavior which they manifest.

Lepawsky and others, eds., *The Search for World Order: Essays in Honor of Quincy Wright* (New York 1971), 47-71; see also Luther Bernard, *War and its Causes* (New York 1944).

[4] These and related points are discussed in Singer, "Theorists and Empiricists: The Two-Culture Problem in International Politics," in James N. Rosenau and others, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York 1971), 80-95.

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At each level of analysis, from the total system down to the single individual, one may look at the attributes of the relevant social entities, their similarities and differences, relations between and among them, and their behavior and interaction. Their attributes may be physical (including geography, demography, and technology), structural (reflecting organization, institutions, blocs, hierarchies, etc.), or cultural (reflecting such psychological phenomena as predictions, perceptions, and preferences concerning the past as well as the future). And their relationships, interactions, and behavior may be—if such differentiation is indeed possible or desirable—diplomatic, military, political, economic, and so forth.

Several definitional distinctions are in order at the outset. First, the attributes of the "system" at any one level of analysis constitute the ecological constraints (and incentives) within which the entities at lower levels of analysis behave, interact, and form relationships. In addition, by observing the relationships which are found between and among the entities at a lower level of analysis, we can infer certain of the structural attributes of the system above it. Also, we distinguish between *relationships* (i.e., bonds and links, or conditions of inter-nation association) and *interactions* (i.e., sequences of linked behavioral events). In addition, we differentiate between a series of behavioral events on the part of two or more nations, and an interaction sequence; until we have demonstrated that each nation's behavior is to some extent a response to the behavior of the other, we may not have observed an interaction, but only a string of discrete national behaviors.

Several points of an epistemological nature also need to be made explicit.[5] First, our taxonomy requires that behavior not be classified according to the *consequences* which were either intended by those who committed the act, or observed by others. A given type of act may have a variety of consequences (intended or otherwise), and different types of acts may have identical consequences. Thus, we distinguish between what a national government *does*, and what events or conditions did (or were expected to) *result* from what it does. Similarly, we distinguish

[5] The following argument is more fully covered in Russell Leng and J. David Singer, "Toward a Multi-Theoretical Typology of International Behavior" (Ann Arbor 1970, mimeo), and is influenced by such prior efforts as Charles McClelland, "The Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948–1963," in Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York 1968); Walter Corson, *Conflict and Cooperation in East-West Relations: A Manual and Codebook* (Ann Arbor 1970); Charles Hermann, "Validation Problems in Games and Simulations with Special Reference to Models of International Politics," *Behavioral Science*, XII (May 1967), 216-31; Edward Azar, "Analysis of International Events," *Peace Research Reviews*, IV (November 1970); and Lincoln Moses and others, "Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action," *Science*, CLVI (May 1967), 1054-59.

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between such an act and the factors which appear to *account for it*. Not only is it often difficult to ascertain which events or conditions led to a given type of behavior, but as before, different factors can all lead to the same type of act. Moreover, there are two rather distinct ways in which we can speak of accounting for, or "explaining," a given act. In one, we say that a given act was undertaken *in order to* accomplish some objective. In the other, we say that the act was undertaken *as a consequence of* certain prior conditions obtaining within or without the actor. While the first reflects the "pull" toward a future state, and the second reflects the "push" from a previous state of affairs, we normally use the phrase "because of" in both cases.[6] Neither the pull nor the push by itself provides sufficient ground to speak of either causality or explanation, and while one or the other may be more potent in producing social behavior, we not only distinguish between them, but suggest that we remain some distance from an explanation until we have ascertained their combined and/or interaction effects.

A third way in which one may speak of the cause of a given act is the teleological; often found in the "systems analysis" types of models, the notion is that an actor or a system behaves in a certain way in order to fulfill a particular "function." This may be, on occasion, a provocative metaphor, but to suggest that individuals or groups exist in order to fulfill some foreordained function that is necessary to the survival or performance of the larger system strikes us as a rather superstitious premise.[7] It is one thing to conclude that nations behave *as if* they had some purposive role or function in the international system (as in a teleo*nomic* model), and quite another to begin with the teleo*logic* assumption that they do indeed have such a purpose. Nations, like other social systems, develop and behave in response to a multiplicity of stimuli and objectives, and since many of these push and pull in differing directions, it is prudent to assume that we are dealing more with a resultant of forces than with a distinct organic purpose. As with the ecological predictors, this taxonomy of behavioral predictors requires a minimum of *a priori* theoretical assumptions, and permits us to consider and test several competing models and sub-models. While they will generally be of the multiple-loop, feedback variety found in the general

[6] This distinction is similar to that found in Richard C. Snyder and others, *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York 1962), 144.

[7] One possible line of reasoning, borrowed from biology, is that if certain types of acts were *not* functional, they—or their perpetrators—would tend to disappear from the system. This not only draws too close an analogy between biological and social systems, but overlooks the extent to which *dys*functional behavior is found even in the most integrated biological ones. See, *inter alia*, Ralph Gerard, "Concepts of Biology," *Behavioral Science*, III (April 1958), 92-215.

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systems literature, they differ appreciably in their theoretical emphases, and our objective is to systematically test and disconfirm several such models, each of which may be, in itself, quite plausible.[8]

The taxonomy is designed, then, to permit the articulation and testing of a disparate set of sub-models which can be easily expanded and contracted in terms of both the number of variables and the levels of analysis embraced. As the array of contenders diminishes, via empirical test, the remaining ones can be integrated in such a way that all of the sub-model "pieces" may be joined together into one or more integrated and coherent "whole" or "wholes."

ECOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL EMPHASES

The specification of general classes of predictor variables is, however, not sufficient. Nor can we be satisfied with an even-handed approach to the possible contending models and sub-models. *Some* theoretical judgments must be made prior to, or early in, the empirical research, even though the present state of our knowledge on the origins of war suggests that we keep these to a minimum. Without a few such judgments, we have little theoretical justification for deciding on research priorities. One working assumption we *do* make is that research priority must be given to the ecological over the behavioral variables.[9]

Our reasons are three. First, we think that the social science evidence, while slight, points to the dominance of ecological over behavioral phenomena in explaining the outcome of conflict, which is our primary concern here. We recognize that the behavior of nations will, of course, influence the structure and culture of the system (and even its physical attributes), but assume that the reverse influence of the system upon that behavior will be even greater. Second, behavior and interaction cannot be fully understood and interpreted in an ecological vacuum; at the minimum, we must be able to "control for" such environmental conditions in analyzing the impact of interaction sequence patterns on the outcome of that sequence. The third reason, which flows from the hoped-for applicability, is that if men and their governments are to bring knowledge to bear on the management of conflict and the reduction or elimination of war, it is important to know not only which variables are most *potent*. It is equally important to know which are most susceptible to relatively short-run human intervention, and under

[8] The comprehensive one toward which we now lean is found in Singer, "Escalation and Control in International Conflict: A Simple Feedback Model," *General Systems*, XV (1970), 163-73.

[9] Perhaps the most useful statement is in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton 1965).

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what particular ecological conditions such conscious intervention will be most efficacious.

THE SEQUENCE OF ANALYSES[10]

Enough has now been said about our assumptions, definitions, and general taxonomy to expand on our opening comments regarding the sequence in which we intend to run our several types of analyses. Despite some attractive arguments to the contrary, we are moving rather cautiously from the simple to the complex, in order to avoid the pitfalls of ill-founded theorizing and premature closure; the case might be different if we were dealing with a less complex problem. As indicated already, we find no evidence of sufficient strength to persuade us that any one overall model or particular set of variables will carry us to the desired goal. Thus, we begin with the simplest of bivariate techniques, examining the relationship between each of our predictor variables and war, as they all fluctuate over time. These include visual scatter plots, contingency table analyses, rank order and product-moment correlations, and simple regression analyses. Further, most of these—depending on our prior findings—are run for several different empirical domains. These extend, in the spatial sense, from the total international system down through the more restricted inter-state, central, and major power sub-systems. Temporally, they embrace the entire 150 years under study, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as separate periods, on down to briefer spans whose cutting points are determined both by the hunches of the diplomatic historians (such as 1848, 1871, 1920, 1945) and by the findings themselves. The objective is to uncover patterns peculiar to specific settings, which might be concealed by the gross relationships obtaining for the entire spatial-temporal domain.

A further complication, even at the bivariate analysis stage, is that we have usually developed several different indicators of the same general concept. Thus, we measure the "amount" of alliance in the system in a given year by a gross indicator called "alliance aggregation," but then go on to compute it separately for defense pacts, neutrality agreements, and ententes as well. Then, there is a more refined, and perhaps more valid, measure called the "alliance commitment index," reflecting the mean number of alliance commitments (of each class as well as for all

[10] Among the general treatments of data analysis problems, we have found the following particularly suggestive and practical: Hayward Alker, "Statistics and Politics: The Need for Causal Data Analysis," in S. M. Lipset, ed., *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York, 1969); Hubert Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill 1961); Edgar Borgatta, ed., *Sociological Methodology* (San Francisco 1969); and Carl Christ, *Econometric Models and Methods* (New York 1966). We do, however, find the literature on analysis of longitudinal series rather incomplete.

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classes combined) per system member. Whereas this measure automatically normalizes for system size, alliance aggregation must be converted into an annual percentage figure in order to permit meaningful cross-temporal comparisons.

Finally, and further testifying to the paucity of solid knowledge on the origins of war, we experiment with a range of time lags and time spreads.[11] The lags, or number of days, months, or years between the observation of the predictor variables at hand and the observation of war, will range from the minimum to the maximum that is plausible, and then some, just to be sure that a strong but unlikely association has not been overlooked. Similarly, certain events and conditions are such that their measurement over a brief time span might produce a fair amount of "noise" in the form of short-run perturbations. One example might be vertical mobility in the system, measured by changes in the nations' diplomatic scores. We therefore run our analyses using observation spreads which can range from one to twenty years.

Accompanying these numerous preliminary analyses of association, of course, are the standard descriptive analyses in which we look at frequency distributions, secular trends, periodicities, and so forth. These are not only suggestive in their own right, but alert us to the statistical problems associated with auto-correlation, multi-collinearity, distribution assumptions, the need for transformations, and the like. Again, the better we "know" our data, the more intelligently we can design and interpret our analyses of them. Once satisfied that we understand each particular data series and the ways in which it correlates with fluctuations in the incidence of war, we are free to go on to multivariate types of analyses.[12]

These are of several types. In the present phase of the project, few of our analyses permit much in the way of causal inference, since the predictor variables are usually all of the same type. That is, we may test a constituent model which predicts that fluctuations in the incidence of war will follow from such sub-sets of structural conditions as alliance aggregation, bipolarity, and lateral mobility, or from capability concentrations and vertical mobility, with appropriate time lags. But mere

[11] The manipulation of the chronological cutting points and the time lags, leads, and spreads is facilitated—during the analyses themselves—by use of the Time Series Program developed by Daniel Fox at the University of Michigan Statistical Research Laboratory.

[12] One other good reason for attending to bivariate analyses is that the bulk of the knowledge (and folklore) in the field of world politics is articulated in bivariate form. Once converted into operational language, many such propositions can be put to the empirical test, and then combined with others for multivariate types of analyses.

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goodness of fit between the data and such models—since they embrace no behavioral variables—falls short of providing any *explanation* of the results. Until we can find the behavioral—and perhaps the psychological—links between system structure and war, we may have "accounted for" a great deal of the variance in the outcome, but we still have something less than a satisfactory explanation.[13] In the next phase of the project, however, as we build a richer data base, it will be possible to approximate models which are closer to being "causal" in the explanatory as well as the statistical sense. There, we will combine indicators of system attributes, dyadic relationships, national attributes, and national behavior, for example, and will be able to say something about the putatively causal sequence which links them to each other and to war. A major objective in both of these types of analysis is not only to build and test increasingly complex constituent models, but to ascertain the relative potency of different variables and combinations thereof.

FROM STATIC TO DYNAMIC ANALYSES

Our ultimate objective, as noted, is to build a solid and comprehensive theory of modern international war, and while we recognize the virtues of alternative strategies, we have chosen to go fairly far down the inductive road *before* committing ourselves to one particular theoretical paradigm. The bivariate, multivariate, stepwise, and dependence analyses should permit us to select from among the many different, but more or less equally plausible, theoretical formulations.

Even though it will probably take another two or three years before the evidence is sufficiently strong to justify commitment to—and later refinement of—one or another of the contending general models, it is not too early to begin looking toward that decision. Within the next year or so, an increasing number of static analyses will have been completed, making it possible to move toward more dynamic and more in-

[13] While we must, of necessity, exclude the decision-making process from the investigation in the immediate future, we reiterate its importance to any *complete* theory. Our hope is that others will want to examine those processes (or through-put) in the context of the ecological (input) and behavioral (output) data and findings which emerge from this particular project. Some suggestive approaches are found in Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement* (Princeton 1957); Ole Holsti and others, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (fn. 5); Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York 1968); and James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966); our plan is to use a decisional model which explicitly embraces both the rational problem-solving and the social interaction approaches.

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tegrated models.[14] Of the several strategies which present themselves, the *computer simulation* route looks particularly promising. As indicated above, to advance from the descriptive to the more explanatory types of model, we need to embrace behavioral and psychological, as well as ecological, variables. But we also need to incorporate the sort of dynamic mechanism which permits the conversion of the intermittent, discrete observations of our variables into constantly fluctuating ones, so that we can observe or estimate their values at any moment in the flow of time. In addition, we must incorporate the equations which best reflect the interactions among the differentially changing predictor variables, and between those and our war, or outcome, measures.

After those conditions have been satisfied, it becomes possible to examine the dynamics of the conflict process, and to ascertain which patterns of constancy and change (linear and otherwise) give the best fit vis-à-vis the referent world observations. Further, it becomes possible to do the sort of sensitivity analysis which tells us what parameters need what kind of modification to bring the models in line with the empirically observed historical phenomena. Those which hold up best in the statistical analyses will be converted into computerized sub-routines or modules, each reflecting a cluster of ecological variables at several levels of analysis. The behavioral and interactional variables, on the other hand, are more interdependent and therefore less separable from one another, suggesting that we may want to build only a single such module.[15]

The ecological sub-routines or modules, while differing in the variables which they embrace, will have certain clear similarities. One is a uniform set of computer instructions that permits any of the modules

[14] While time lags and leads are explicitly introduced into the above analyses, and they are clearly longitudinal rather than cross-sectional, they are not dynamic in the full sense.

[15] An early treatment is in Harold Guetzkow and others, *Simulation in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs 1963). While "man-machine" simulations such as those have been rather widely used, the "all-machine" simulation is still quite rare in this field. Among the latter are Jeffrey Milstein and William Mitchell, "Computer Simulation of International Processes: The Vietnam War and the Pre-World War I Naval Race," *Peace Research Society Papers* XII (1969), 117-36; Oliver Benson, "Simulation of International Relations and Diplomacy," in Harold Borko, ed., *Computer Applications in the Behavioral Sciences* (Englewood Cliffs 1962); and Stuart Bremer, "National and International Systems: A Computer Simulation" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University 1970). Unpublished, but of interest as a pioneering effort is the seven-volume TEMPER project, Raytheon Corporation (Bedford 1965-66). For a critique of the man-machine approach, see Singer, "Data-Making in International Relations," *Behavioral Science*, X (January 1965), 68-80; an excellent overview is in Hayward Alker, "Computer Simulations, Conceptual Frameworks, and Coalition Behavior," in Groennings and others, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970).

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to be combined with, or replaced by, any of the others when it comes to integrating them into increasingly larger and more complex models later on in the project. Another is the explicit inclusion of feedback loops, so that war will serve as a predictor as well as an outcome variable, reflecting our belief that the amount and type of war which *ends* in a given time period will exercise an appreciable subsequent impact on the international system's attributes and on the bonds and links between and among the nations which constitute the system. Thus, we will be modelling a dynamic feedback sequence in which ecology and behavior predict to war, and war predicts to ecology and behavior.

But we are using "feedback" in several other senses as well. First, there are those cybernetic models which ascertain or posit the goals of given actors and then measure the extent to which movement toward or away from such goals predicts to a given type of behavior. These will, of course, be of concern to us at the *national* level as we try to discover both the goals and the types of behavior which differentiate the more war-prone from the less war-prone nations over time, controlling for varying clusters of ecological variables. Second, when we shift to the *dyadic* level of analysis, some simple cybernetic models will permit us to expand on the above inquiry, and search for the interaction patterns which are most regularly associated with war. Is it true, for instance, that more of the variance in the nations' conflict behavior will be accounted for by the rapidity, magnitude, and type of feedback they give to each other than by their pre-conflict relationships or their attribute similarities? In the same vein, if there is a certain normal range of interaction intensity, does any appreciable movement above or below that range lead to restorative efforts such as to remain within the range? If so, does the feedback mechanism show a high or low sensitivity? Is the range wide or narrow, and how long does it take for the self-correcting interactions to set in? And, more critically, how well do the differences in these cybernetic patterns distinguish between those conflicts which terminate in war and those which do not?

Third, at the *systemic* level, are there clearly discernible relationships between the trends and fluctuations of system structure (for example) and the incidence of war? Do we find—again using cybernetic in its most elementary sense—that, as the system moves toward a certain configuration (such as high bipolarity), the propensity is toward war unless timely measures of a self-correcting nature are taken by those who comprise the system? The assumption here is that the international system and its several sub-systems do indeed have certain built-in tendencies toward specific states of affairs, and that appreciable devia-

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tions from those "preferred" configurations will, unless corrected in time, lead to more radical "regulatory" events, of which war is a prime example. Finally, when the national, dyadic, and systemic levels are *combined* in dynamic models, the cybernetic approach again looks quite promising. As before, the focus will be on the extent to which changes in the magnitude of certain predictor variables within a given time frame will impinge upon the rate and direction of change in other predictors, generating those self-correcting and self-amplifying feedback processes which move the system toward, or away from, the threshold of war. This brings us back, then, to the problem of integrating the various dynamic models into a more comprehensive overall theory.

INTEGRATING THE COMPUTERIZED SUB-MODELS

Once we have constructed, tested, modified, and refined most of the sub-models, and are rather confident in our understanding of their dynamics as they affect the onset (and termination) of war, the problem of integrating them must be faced. By following the strategy of making them virtually identical in their programs, and thus interchangeable and combinable, we avoid many of the problems usually encountered in computer simulations.[16]

But the inevitable difficulty of integrating them into a theoretically coherent scheme cannot be removed by methodological foresight alone. Here, then, is where the decision to employ a general systems paradigm will probably be further vindicated. Whereas no two paradigms reflecting divergent theoretical orientations—and built around incompatible vocabularies—can normally be combined and integrated, ours can be. Thanks to the coherent and operational taxonomy within which all of our variables are embedded, that problem should be more manageable than if we adopted, tested, and attempted to reconcile the differing theoretical models expressed in their original language.[17]

To sum up, then, our strategy is to convert a large range of hypotheses —representing diverse theoretical predispositions at several levels of analysis—into a common language within our general systems taxonomy. These hypotheses reflect diplomatic, economic, geographic, demographic, military, and psychological orientations and are being applied

[16] This is essentially the strategy used in the Brookings Institution simulation of the contemporary economy of the United States; sub-models of various economic processes were developed more or less independently of one another, and then assembled within a common framework.

[17] See Karl Deutsch, "On Theories, Taxonomies, and Models as Communication Codes for Organizing Information," *Behavioral Science*, XI (January 1966), 1-16.

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to different types of wars in varying spatial and temporal settings. The first step will continue to be the testing of bivariate hypotheses; after systematic scrutiny, those surviving are combined into a number of multivariate models. These will be articulated in both the interactive and non-interactive mode, and then tested via a combination of regression and dependence analyses. Having narrowed down the field of contending models through these static analyses (but with explicit feedback loops built into them), we will move to dynamic modelling through the computer simulation strategy. Ultimately, if there are indeed any underlying regularities behind the onset of war, and if we have selected our variables and built our models and sub-models intelligently, we should achieve increasingly close approximations to an integrated and coherent theory of the causes of international war.

So much, then, for the general strategy we employ in our search for the "causes" of war, and the range of considerations underlying that strategy. What results emerge from its application? First, we summarize the data sets which have been, or are being, generated, and then we go on to a terse report of some findings to date.

Data Acquisition and Index Construction

We begin with the outcome variable, reflecting the incidence of international war, and then move on to the ecological and behavioral variables from which we make our predictions. In so doing, we must emphasize our preoccupation with index construction, and the associated task of operationalizing the vague constructs which characterize our field. In other disciplines, from astronomy to zoology, a great deal of effort goes into such "instrumentation": the techniques and tools by which we locate, identify, and isolate the phenomena of interest. Research in those fields moved quite slowly until these phenomena—and the traces they leave—were observed, amplified, and measured; it only began to accelerate when such instrumentation was developed. Political events and conditions are perhaps even less susceptible to accurate observation and measurement than physical and biological phenomena, and it is therefore necessary to give considerably greater attention to the development and refinement of the techniques by which such measurement might be accomplished.

THE OUTCOME VARIABLE: WAR

In keeping with the dictum that one cannot account for a given range of phenomena until one has recognized and described them, our first task was to ascertain the amount of international war which occurred

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throughout the system since the Congress of Vienna. And despite the important advances made by Wright, Richardson, and Sorokin, the job really had not been done completely; our effort is thus an extension of their data-gathering efforts.[18] In order to generate these outcome variable indicators, it was necessary to: a) compile a list of all wars that could possibly be considered as "inter-national"; b) identify all political entities which qualified as members of the inter-state system in every year; c) eliminate those wars that did not involve at least one system member; d) eliminate those that were civil, or internal, wars; e) classify the remaining wars (N=93) as inter-state (50), imperial (18), or colonial (25), according to the political status of the participants; f) ascertain the effective opening and closing dates of the wars (and nation entries and departures) in order to compute nation-months, or *magnitude*; g) search for, collate, and appraise all available estimates of casualties in order to arrive at the best estimate of battle-connected deaths, or *severity*, eliminating those in which the system members sustained fewer than 1,000; h) compute various ratio-based indicators of *intensity*; and i) convert the measures of each war to annual indicators, reflecting the amount of war which began, was under way, or was terminated during a given year.[19]

PREDICTOR VARIABLES: ECOLOGICAL

Once the dependent variable data were compiled and codified, we set to work on acquiring the data by which our predictor (independent and intervening) variables might be measured, and certain ecological sub-models put to the test. These are of three basic types, constituting the milieu within which international conflicts unfold. First, there are the attributes of the international system and its more limited sub-systems: the inter-state, the central, and the major power sub-systems. Second, there are the pairwise (or larger) relationships among all the nations in these systemic settings. Third, there are the attributes of the

[18] These pioneers built, in turn, on a few of the more restricted operational studies, including Gaston Bodart, *Losses of Life in Modern Wars* (Oxford 1916), and S. Dumas and K. Vedel-Peterson, *Losses of Life Caused by War* (Oxford 1923). Two other sources to which we referred were Boris T. Urlanis, *Wars and the Population of Europe* (Moscow 1960) and Institut Français de Polemologie, "Periodicité et Intensité des Actions de Guerre de 1200 à 1945," *Guerre et Paix* II (Paris 1968), 20-32; but neither do an adequate job specifying or applying a set of consistent and explicit criteria. On the ways in which some purely imaginary war "data" became legitimized in the literature, see Brownlee Haydon, *The Great Statistics of Wars Hoax* (Santa Monica 1962).

[19] The results are reported in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York, in press). The volume includes fifteen chapters, dealing with prior research and our basic data-generation procedures, as well as the systemic, national, and dyadic war incidence data.

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national states themselves. For all three sets we are, of course, as interested in trends, fluctuations, and rates of change as we are in their values at a given point in time.

Since these acquisitions of data are very costly in time and energy, none are begun until we are persuaded of their relevance to our theoretical biases and hunches, as well as to the major themes in the literature. That is, we are as interested in settling certain controversies that have been aired—but not tested—in the journals and texts as we are in examining the evidence for and against our own hypotheses. This requires that we not only acquire or generate the critical data base, but that we first convert the traditional propositions and counter-propositions into operational form, using verbal, mathematical, and graphic representations. In addition, we rarely begin work on a data series until we are also reasonably confident that a) the theoretical payoffs will be appreciable; b) a very large fraction of the data sources can be located; and c) the resulting indices will have multiple applications. In this latter vein, we ask not only whether, individually, they will tell us something about the system, its component nations, and its smaller clusters simultaneously, but whether they can be combined into multi-dimensional measures as well. The objective is to get maximum theoretical mileage, for ourselves and for other researchers, from each particular series. Bearing these desiderata in mind, we have completed (or nearly so) the following attribute series for the entire inter-state system since the Congress of Vienna.

The first data set is on *diplomatic representation*; it tells us which nations had diplomatic missions in which other nations' capitals every fifth year. In addition to providing the information necessary to define the shifting composition of the international (and the more restricted inter-state) system, this series produces several other sets of measures. One is the diplomatic importance attributed to each national state by all the other members of the system; by means of a sort of continuing plebiscite, one may trace the rise and decline of each in the international hierarchy. When converted into matrix form, these data also provide the base for certain dyadic and systemic measures. At the dyadic level, we can identify which nations are diplomatically linked to which others across time, and at the systemic level, a variety of techniques for clique detection tells us how many clusters of what degree of bondedness exist at a given point in time.[20]

[20] The criteria, procedures, and some results are in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815–1940," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 236-82; see also Stuart Bremer, "A Sociometric Analysis of Diplomatic Bonds, 1817–1940" (Ann Arbor 1971).

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The second data set reflects the traditional preoccupation with alliances as a major factor in world politics, and includes all defense pacts, neutrality and non-aggression treaties, and ententes entered into by two or more state members of the system. Those data permit us to measure the amount of alliance aggregation and involvement in the system year by year, and give us about twelve different indices of existing alliance levels, as well as their creation and dissolution. They also permit the creation of a computerized data matrix showing which nations are allied with others (directly and indirectly) at the dyadic and systemic levels, and by which type of alliance bond. Beyond such pairwise and clustering indices, this matrix also tells us what each nation's individual alliance involvements were at any time.[21]

The third set of data also reflects the creation, existence, and dissolution of institutionalized bonds in the inter-state system: international inter-governmental organizations, or IGO's. Again, by applying explicit coding criteria to carefully selected sources from diverse nations and epochs, we are able to produce a series showing which IGO's were established in which years by which states, when they ceased to function, and what their memberships were during their existence. As in the case of the alliance data, the computerized file in matrix format permits us to derive several different measures at the systemic, dyadic, and national levels of analysis, and to get at a variety of static and rate-of-change phenomena.[22]

A fourth, and particularly difficult, set of data is that concerning international trade. To our chagrin, we found that neither the economists nor the historians have yet produced more than a few very limited sub-sets, covering a short (and usually, recent) time span, or a handful of nations. Particularly vexatious is the lack of comparability across nations and across time, with inconsistent modes of valuation, shifting currency conversion rates, and fluctuating purchasing-power indices constituting major obstacles.[23] However, with the advice of colleagues,

[21] A portion of the raw and derived measures, along with the coding criteria, rationale, and some simple analyses will be found in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitative Description," *Journal of Peace Research*, III (No. 1, 1966), 1-32. Since our original plan was to limit the project to the period ending with World War II, the later decision to extend it through 1965 necessitated the acquisition of additional data; the complete series, plus some revised indices, is thus reported in Small and Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: An Extension of the Basic Data," *Journal of Peace Research* VI (No. 3, 1969), 257-82.

[22] The raw data, coding procedures, etc. are reported in Michael Wallace and J. David Singer, "Inter-Governmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964: A Quantitative Description," *International Organization*, XXIV (Spring 1970), 239-87.

[23] See Oskar Morgenstern, *On the Accuracy of Economic Observations* (Princeton 1963); and Roy Allen and J. Edward Ely, *International Trade Statistics* (New York 1953). For converting trade, and other data matrices, into indices reflecting the extent

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and the use of existing sub-sets of trade data as guidelines, we are well into this particular operation. A number of awkward compromises with quality are inevitable, but the theoretical usefulness of a fairly full trade matrix is sufficiently promising to justify these concessions. With less than half of the data in, and little in the way of quality control yet accomplished, it is premature either to report our results or to use these estimates in analyses.

Before turning to the non-structural (i.e., physical and cultural) attributes of the international system and its sub-systems, a brief word on the possible combinations of the above series is in order. One of the families of sub-model we have begun to examine is that revolving around the concept of "entropy," defined as the absence of order, pattern, or regularity in the international system. Among the simpler indices of this condition are the system's *deviation from order* in the way the nations either cluster into groups or "arrange themselves" in hierarchies. Such clustering and rank stratification can be ascertained for each of the general dimensions reflected in the above data sets: a) by diplomatic representation groupings and diplomatic "importance" rankings; b) by alliance bond groupings and alliance involvement rankings; c) by shared IGO membership groupings and IGO participation rankings; and d) by trade partnership groupings and trade activity rankings. With any one of these four data sets—as well as others whose acquisition is planned—one may ascertain the degree of entropy by measuring (for example) polarity, clarity of the individual clusters, overlap among them, and other indicators of high-to-low order configurations. Perhaps more importantly, one may ascertain the similarity of the several *different* configurations; the more isomorphic and identical the separate patterns, the less entropic the system. Similarly, the higher the rank-order correlations among the several stratifications, the less inconsistent they are, and the less entropic the system will be in that particular sector.[24]

Note that all of the above reflect the structural attributes of the system and its sub-systems, and that the physical and cultural characteristics

to which a given relationship is stronger or weaker than predicted by the null model, we utilize the "relative acceptance" measure of I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, XXVIII (July 1960), 551-72; a further refinement is in Richard Chadwick, "Steps toward a Probabilistic Systems Theory of Political Behavior," Munich: International Political Science Association (1970).

[24] One may also ascertain the deviation between clusterings based on geographical contiguity and those based on similarities of national attributes, as well as on the above associational dimensions; see Bruce Russett, *International Regions in the International System* (Chicago 1967). Suggestive in regard to the hierarchical focus is Lancelot Whyte and others, *Hierarchical Structures* (New York 1969).

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have received little attention so far. This priority reflects our suspicion that the structure of the system is more potent than its cultural, and perhaps even its physical, attributes. But it also suggests the importance of focusing on variables that show marked fluctuations over time (which most of these structural attributes do), rather than those which show fairly steady secular trends (as do most cultural norms, technological innovation and diffusion, demographic growth, etc.), or remain fairly constant (as does geography or climate). If war is a fluctuating phenomenon, one seeks to account for it by examining those conditions and events which fluctuate in some temporal association with it, and not those which hold steady or rise in a continuous fashion. On the other hand, certain "steady" phenomena may, directly or by means of their rates of change, produce threshold effects, or act upon and amplify the more erratic phenomena.[25]

We are not, however, indifferent to these other classes of predictors. Thus, as we move ahead on additional structural variables, we also plan to begin measuring certain cultural and physical attributes of the system and its nation-members. One of the latter is a simple geographical index; using airline, steamship, and other measures of distance between nations, we can compute such spatial indices of the system as the mean and range of inter-nation distances, as well as the geographical "center" of the system, year by year.[26] These data also lead to an index of *each nation's* geographic centrality, as well as all *pairwise* distances. For the purpose of dyadic analysis, we supplement the crude distance measures with an index reflecting the contiguity of each nation-pair and the nature of the topography at, or between, its boundaries. While we are interested in discovering the relationship between such geographical variables and war at the systemic, dyadic, and national levels of analysis, we also require such data in order to control for spatial factors in testing many of our other sub-models.[27]

Other *physical* (or material) attributes of the system which we hope to measure are those reflecting weapons technology, industrialization, and communication-transport facilities. In each, one objective is to compare the *efficacy* or efficiency of these different technological capabilities from decade to decade; another is to tap the *diffusion* of a given capa-

[25] A major part of the structural data will eventually appear in Singer, Wallace, and Bremer, *A Structural History of the International System.*

[26] One of the indices is that developed in Nils Petter Gleditsch, "The International Airline Network: A Test of the Zipf and Stouffer Hypotheses," *Peace Research Society Papers*, XI (1969), 123-53.

[27] Some preliminary results are in Nils Petter Gleditsch and J. David Singer, "Spatial Predictors of National War-Proneness, 1816–1965" (Oslo: Peace Research Institute, 1970).

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bility level throughout the system at a given time, comparing one period to another, and measuring the rate of growth and its acquisition by the separate nations. Such indices will permit us to test a number of sub-models with regard to the impact of innovation and diffusion on the war-proneness of the system and the separate nations, and will also help us to ascertain, for example, whether the quantitative relationship between "clock time" and "diplomatic time" has remained constant over the 150 years under study.

As to the *cultural* attributes of the system, our main concern is with the trends (and fluctuations) in elite and popular beliefs regarding what is just, appropriate, or likely in world politics.[28] To some extent, the intensity and distribution of such preferences and perceptions will influence the conflict behavior of governments, and we seek to ascertain the extent of that influence. Among the sources of such cultural data will be international agreements and conventions, the opinions and decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, resolutions of international organizations, elite media, and perhaps behavior patterns themselves.[29]

Shifting now from those ecological predictors which reflect the attributes of the *system* to those reflecting the attributes of the separate *nations*, we again use the physical, structural, and cultural distinctions. Here, of course, we are somewhat richer in research precedents; whereas there have been almost no prior efforts to measure and describe the changing international system in operational terms, national societies have been examined and compared quite rigorously for some time. On the other hand, most such efforts are restricted to a selected group of nations or a relatively brief time span, and our need is to compare all those which are members of the inter-state system for the past century and a half.[30] One sub-set of national attribute data which will be of

[28] Culture is used here in the more restricted and operational sense, as found, for example, in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), and not in the all-inclusive fashion found in much of the anthropological literature.

[29] The lack of attention to such variables to date, then, in no way reflects a disinterest in their role; to the contrary, see Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Content Analysis of Elite Articulations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (December 1964), 424-85; Singer, with Paul Ray, "Decision-Making in Conflict: From Interpersonal to International Relations," *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, XXX (September 1966), 300-312; and Singer, "Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 127-56. One of the few efforts to measure the impact of international events upon attitudes, and vice versa, is in Karl W. Deutsch and Richard Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert Kelman, ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York 1966).

[30] Among the available and useful compilations and discussions are: Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge 1963); Bruce Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964); Charles Taylor, *Aggregate Data Analysis: Political and Social Indicators in Cross-National Re-*

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prime concern to the student of international politics is that which might help us measure the power base, or military-industrial capabilities, of nations. The dimensions we employ for this purpose are: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, size of armed forces, and military expenditures.[31]

In addition to the above capability attributes, we have nearly finished gathering the data for all inter-state system members on about thirty demographic, industrial, and financial indices.[32] These relatively "hard" and ready-made data are being supplemented, in turn, by some "softer" indices based on a coding of national political histories and the like. Among these are governmental types on the autocratic-democratic continuum, and regime stability, military participation ratio, ethnolinguistic composition and homogeneity, elite cohort ages (to tap recency of war experience among decision-makers), and ethnic-territorial congruence.[33]

Beyond these more conventional indices of national attributes, there are those implied in our earlier discussion of such *system* attributes as diplomatic, alliance, IGO, and trade bonds, permitting us to describe nations not only in terms of their *internal attributes*, but in terms of their *external relationships*.

While *dyadic* and other small cluster relationships may be thought of

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search (Paris 1968); Banks, *Cross-Polity Time Series Data* (Cambridge 1971); and Taylor and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, II (New Haven 1971). Moreover, several suggestive analyses have already appeared, among which are: Raymond Cattell and Richard Gorsuch, "The Definition and Measurement of National Morale and Morality," *Journal of Social Psychology* LXVII (December 1965), 77-96; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations, 1958–1960," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (March 1966), 41-64; Michael Haas, "Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900–1960," in Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (fn. 5); Rudolph Rummel, "The Relationship between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in *ibid.*; and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, V (No. 1, 1968), 56-69. Particularly relevant is the early work of Richardson's, examining the relationship between certain national attributes and their war-proneness; see Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (fn. 1).

[31] These data are very nearly complete now for our "central system" nations and will constitute a major part of a forthcoming volume on *The Power of Nations: Comparative Capabilities since Waterloo*, along with a portion of the relational data (i.e., diplomatic importance, etc.) and indices of military performance.

[32] While data for such a useful concept as GNP are not available for many nations prior to World War I, and national income estimates have only been reconstructed for a handful of nineteenth-century nations, we are developing a possible substitute. Under the rubric of a "GNP equivalent" index, we hope to discover which of the available variables combine in which particular fashion to give the best fit to GNP and/or national income for those nation types and years for which such an index *is* available.

[33] These data, along with the standard coding rules, will eventually appear in a series of papers, and will be available through the ICPR archive.

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as falling at the level of analysis between systemic attributes and national ones, we mention them last because of the similarity of the raw data from which they, as well as the systemic and national measures, are derived. As has already been indicated, many of the systemic structure variables rest on the observation of pairwise bonds, as do many of the variables we use to compare and scale the separate nations. And even as we describe and rank nations on the basis of the number and types of their relationships with one another, we compare and rank them on the basis of their essentially internal attributes. Both types of dyadic relationships (i.e., bonds and attribute similarities) are critical to the research design. That is, a fair amount of evidence and a great deal of intelligent speculation point to the dyad and triad as a particularly promising unit of analysis in world politics, and our concern is to see whether a number of sub-models built around such relationships and similarities have much predictive power.[34]

PREDICTOR VARIABLES: BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION

Concurrent with the satisfactory progress on the acquisition and analysis of our ecological data, we have begun work on the even more elusive behavioral data. Our intention is to develop a coding scheme and apply it to a wide variety of chronologies, historical monographs, and archival materials, so as to: a) generate operational descriptions of the conflict sequences which preceded each of the fifty inter-state wars, and b) compare them to a "matched sample" of conflicts which did *not* terminate in war. But, in addition to the difficulties of observation and measurement of such an enterprise, there are sufficient terminological difficulties to merit a brief definitional summary.[35]

In order to be consistent with general usage and still get the specificity required, we use the term "competition" to embrace the entire range of relationships that can obtain between and among salient nations whose interests are less than fully compatible, and whose behavior is at least partially intended to thwart the adversary. Within that broad rubric, our distinctions run as follows. First, when two or more nations cross an as-yet-undefined threshold in their mix of competitive and cooperative interactions, we classify their relationship as one of *contention*; if it continues for some finite number of years, we speak of *rivalry*.

[34] See Wright (fn. 1), and Rummel (fn. 30), 36.

[35] In addition to the coding typologies to which we alluded earlier, there are several important precedents in the way of such operational narratives, including the efforts reported in Singer, *Quantitative International Politics* (fn. 5), and the follow-up studies of McClelland and North. The former project focuses on the 1960's, while the latter examines the 1870–1914 period in considerable detail; see Robert North and Nazli Choucri, *Nations in Conflict: Prelude to World War I* (1971, forthcoming).

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And although many rivalries peter out as incompatibilities are resolved, or are replaced by more salient ones, some continue to escalate until a "lock-in" effect takes hold, and we cross the next threshold into *conflict*.[36] That class of relationships, the one which concerns us here, manifests not only a heavy imbalance of competitive to cooperative acts, but is one in which the competitive acts also exceed some absolute threshold of magnitude and time-density. Many such conflicts, whether they lead to war or not, will escalate further until they become *crises*. Beyond conflict and crisis is, of course, war itself, and that relationship (as already specified), may also vary appreciably in magnitude, severity, and intensity.

Our focus here, then, is on the interactions which occur between and among nations whose relationships are at or above the conflict threshold, and on comparing the patterns which ultimately led to war with those of another 50 conflicts which found a *non*-war outcome. That matching will, of course, be far from perfect, given the finite set of ecological configurations which have existed during the past century and a half.[37] While the probability of war may hinge largely on the strategies and moves taken by the protagonists, and may be largely *in*sensitive to ecological conditions, our suspicion now is that we will *not* find the behavioral variables to be very potent. Rather, we suspect that within a given background context, there will be an impressive uniformity in the behavior of the protagonists, and that, consequently, there will be strong regularities in the association between the ecology itself and the outcome of these conflicts. To put it another way, we must treat the conflict behavior patterns not only as *predictors* of war in a dynamic process model, but also as *outcomes* of the ecological configurations. For the moment, though, we resist any tendency to over-interpret the non-behavioral findings.

The typology used in coding the conflict sequence represents, as we noted earlier, an explicit rejection of the contemporary "systems analysis" orientation, and is designed to give us an operational and relatively *a*-theoretical description of events. The typology, in addition to embracing a broad spectrum of diplomatic, military, and economic acts, is in

[36] Of considerable value here are the formal models—and empirical findings—of the game theory literature. For its mix of the theoretical and the empirical, most suggestive is Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor 1965); later results will appear in Rapoport and Melvin Guyer, *The Two-Person Game: Models and Evidence* (Ann Arbor, forthcoming).

[37] On the other hand, when we move on to the computer simulations—and can experiment on a variety of "worlds" which did not exist, but *could* have—the absence of such highly comparable settings will be less critical.

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the form of a hierarchical "choice tree." Each act is coded into a discrete operational category, and each such category falls—with others at its level of specificity—under a slightly broader one, and so on up the ladder of increasing generality. One objective here is to find out how rich in detail our knowledge of the conflict sequence needs to be before we can discover a solid and recurrent pattern. Thus, it may turn out that under certain ecological conditions, we need merely know the ratio between "military" and "diplomatic" moves during the first half of the sequence to be able to predict (or "post-dict") its outcome. Or it may be that the frequency with which the protagonists shift from an accelerating to a decelerating diplomatic communication pace during a given phase will account for most of the variance in the outcome. The hierarchical typology permits us to code and retain information at the more detailed level in the event that we—or other users—may require such specificity. Very little information is "thrown away," in our narrative; it is easily aggregated as our theoretical requirements and strategies of model testing shift.[38]

Some Preliminary Findings

Space limitations preclude a full listing of the findings to date or a discussion of the specific theoretical context in which the several analyses are undertaken, but a general sense of these results can be conveyed.

First, as to the incidence of international war itself, we find no increase in the *frequency* of inter-state war, but extra-systemic wars did show an increase in the nineteenth, and a decrease in the twentieth, century. And despite the World Wars, there is only a modest increase in the severity and magnitude of war over the entire span; even this almost disappears when we control for the number of people or states in the system. While there is no regularity in the intervals from onset or termination to the next onset, the amount of war *under way* does show a strong periodicity in the twenty-to-forty-year range. Most inter-state war has been fought in Europe by European nations; England, France, Turkey, and Russia being the most war-prone. While the few traditional enmities are apparent, there is a general randomness in the choice of allies and enemies.

[38] Although it is considered desirable to run pre-tests on cases that will not fall into the final population of cases, this is only partially possible here, inasmuch as our study embraces *all* conflicts which resulted in war during the 150 years under examination. But since we will examine only a *sample* of the non-war conflicts in the final analysis, this rule can be applied to that class of cases. These efforts are largely the responsibility of Russell Leng of Middlebury College, who spent two terms with the "Correlates of War" project as a post-doctoral fellow; see Leng and Singer (fn. 5), 30.

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The initiators emerged victorious in thirty-four of the fifty inter-state wars, experiencing fifteen defeats and one stalemate. As to fatalities, the victors suffered fewer than the vanquished in thirty-six cases; the Spanish-Chilean, Greco-Turkish, Second Balkan, and second World War being the more dramatic exceptions. Nor is there any clear battle death threshold at which the defeated tend to surrender; in twenty-three of the wars they did lose more than 0.1 per cent of their population, but in many others they capitulated before losing even 0.01 per cent.[39] Also interesting is the timing of wars, especially in the European sub-systems. When intra-European war levels are high, those involving extra-continental adversaries are low, and vice versa.

Turning to the system structure (and inter-nation bond) indices and their association with war, their separate effects are quite disparate. The amount of inter-governmental organization in the system has no visible effect on the incidence of war, although decreases in the IGO growth rate do precede (anticipate?) war, and sharp upsurges follow war.[40] As for IGO partners, they will experience a mild decline in shared memberships if destined to fight alongside each other in the subsequent five to ten years, and a sharp decline if they are to become enemies. And whereas former allies show a mild postwar decline in shared IGO memberships, former enemies show a clear increase.[41]

Alliance levels do, however, show a discernible bivariate association, with the correlations being negative in the nineteenth century and positive in the twentieth. Similarly, the more alliance bonds a nation has, the more war it experiences in the next several years during either century. Quite consistent with this is the fact that alliance partners show a fairly high likelihood of honoring their commitments.[42] While the network of alliance bonds is frequently altered by the formation of new alliances and the addition or deletion of members, various clustering

[39] All of the above are taken from Singer and Small (fn. 19), 33. A highly condensed summary is in Small and Singer, "Patterns in International Warfare, 1816–1965," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, cccxci (September 1970), 145-55.

[40] See J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Inter-Governmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1965: Some Bivariate Relationships," *International Organization*, xxiv (Summer 1970), 520-47; for a critique of our interpretations see Samuel Bleicher, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace: A Comment on the Abuse of Methodology," *International Organization*, xxv (Summer 1971).

[41] See Kjell Skjelsbaek "Shared IGO Memberships and Dyadic War, 1865–1964," (Ann Arbor 1971, mimeo).

[42] The extended analyses and interpretations are reported in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War Involvement, 1815–1945," *Peace Research Society Papers*, v (1966), 109-140, and *ibid.*, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945," in Singer, *Quantitative International Politics* (fn. 5); for an alternative interpretation of our findings, see Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research*, iv (No. 3, 1967).

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routines have found only a very few dramatic changes throughout the one hundred and fifty years of the study. The basic alliance patterns at the system level seem very resistant to change, and this same constancy seems to hold in regard to IGO and diplomatic clusters as well.

Shifting from certain system properties to the nature of their distribution, we find that a high concentration in the major powers' capabilities leads to more war in the nineteenth century, but to less in the twentieth. Changes toward or away from such concentration have these same effects, whereas the rate of capability redistribution has the opposite effect. Combining these indices of capability distribution and redistribution, one of the additive models accounts for 73 per cent of the variance in nineteenth-century war and 35 per cent of it in the twentieth century;[43] although major powers do account for a disproportionate share of all war activity, analysis to date reveals no strong relationship between a given war-proneness and its power rank, share of resources, or changes therein.

Combining capability and diplomatic importance distributions, we find that the greater the discrepancy between these two rank listings, the more war the system will experience. When merged with rates of change in these rankings, the composite model accounted for 72 per cent of the variance in the amount of war begun in each half-decade.[44]

As to the effects of population, population density, and rates of change therein, we have some tentative results for the nations comprising the European system. The more populous nations are clearly more war-prone when compared to others on the Continent, but they are no more likely than their smaller neighbors to get involved in extra-continental war. On the other hand, there appears to be no significant association between a nation's growth rate in population or density and its war-proneness; dyadic differences have not yet been analyzed.[45] Another general pattern is that most inter-state wars are between nations which are not only close together geographically, but quite similar on most other attribute dimensions—casting some doubt on the old "have/have not" interpretation; for extra-systemic wars, of course, the distances and dissimilarities are considerable.[46]

[43] See Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability, Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1816–1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, in press). Worth noting is the narrow range within which concentration remains, and the extent to which it increases (like IGO) after major wars, but then drops back toward the mean.

[44] See Michael Wallace, *Status Inconsistency, Vertical Mobility, and International War, 1825–1964* (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1970).

[45] The preliminary data and analyses are reported in Singer, Bremer, and Luterbacher, "Crowding and Combat in Animal and Human Societies: The European State System, 1816–1965," in Somit and others, eds., *Biology and Politics* (Chicago 1972).

[46] See, *inter alia*, Gleditsch and Singer (fn. 27), 35.

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SUMMARY OF DATA ACQUISITION, PREPARATION, AND ANALYSIS IN "CORRELATES OF WAR" PROJECT AS OF AUGUST, 1971

	Pre-tests	*Coders' Manual*	*% of Data Gathered: Approx. 50*	*Approx. 75*	*Nearly 100*	*Machine-Readable*	*Aggreg. and Dis-aggreg.*	*Indices Constructed*	*In Computer File*	*Data Published/In Press*	*Analyses Run (Some)*	*Analyses Written*	*Analyses Pub./In Press*
Composition of System(s)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			
Wars Identified and Measured	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Systemic War Incidence	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pairwise War Experience	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
National War Experience	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Systemic Attributes													
Territ. & Demog. Hist.	x	x	x	x	x								
Diplomatic Representation	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Alliance Configurations	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
IGO Configurations	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Trade Configurations	x		x										
Capability Distributions	x	x	x			x		x	x	x	x	x	x
Dyadic Relationships													
Diplomatic Bonds	x	x	x	x	x	x							
Geographic Proximity	x	x	x	x	x	x							
Alliance Bonds	x	x	x	x	x	x							
Shared IGO Memberships	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x					
Trade Bonds	x		x										
National Attributes													
Total Population	x	x	x	x		x		x			x	x	
Urban Population	x	x	x	x		x		x			x	x	
Iron-Steel Production	x	x	x			x		x			x	x	
Energy Consumption	x	x	x	x		x		x			x	x	
Armed Forces Size	x	x	x			x		x			x	x	
Military Expenditures	x	x	x			x		x			x	x	
Diplomatic Participation	x	x	x	x	x	x							
Spatial Centrality	x	x	x	x				x					
Ethnic Composition	x	x	x	x	x								
Regime Type and Stability	x		x										
Industrialization	x	x	x										
Internal Development	x	x	x										
National Income, etc.	x	x	x										
Conflict Interactions	x	x											

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SUMMARY

Although we have been at work on this project for about seven years and have published a good many data and analysis papers, no coherent overview has been available. Despite its brevity, we hope that this statement—along with the information in the summary matrix—will shed some light on our research strategy and on the normative, epistemological, and theoretical premises which guide the enterprise. This report should help, not only to put our more specialized papers into context for those interested in the process and its outcome, but should serve also as a response to the two major types of criticism elicited by the project. In undertaking so extensive a program of research, we explicitly deny that enough is already known to rid the world of war, if only we had the will. And in committing ourselves to the systematic examination of empirical evidence, we demonstrate our doubt that the causes of war will be discovered from an armchair.

APPENDIX

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Review Articles

SECURING AUTHORITY:

The View from the Top

By RAYMOND F. HOPKINS*

Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, 316 pp. $8.50.
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*. Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1970, 174 pp. $6.95.
W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, 275 pp. $10.00.

ALTHOUGH the literature on political development has been remarkably insightful, hopes for a science of "nation-building" have not been realized. While numerous works have described the effects of traditional patterns, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and rapid mobilization, and have investigated factors such as culture, bureaucracy, ideology, and parties, we have learned very little about how to alter favorably the political conditions these have fostered.[1] Political scientists, more often than not, have documented obstacles to, and failures in, political change desired by leaders in new states, rather than explored strategies whereby such change might be realized.

The three books under review here move toward filling this gap. In a manner reminiscent of Machiavelli, they focus upon strategies of leadership for maintaining or building authority.[2] Political scientists, argue Ilchman and Uphoff, have developed macro-theories useful for explanations and descriptions, but not suited for policy evaluation. They propose an approach that treats government policies as independent variables which can be assessed as to the productivity of their conse-

* I am grateful to Ruth Collier, Harry Harding, Donald Rothchild, and Kenneth Prewitt who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article, and to the International Development Research Center at Indiana University who supported my research and study in 1971.

[1] See, for instance, Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge 1966, rev. ed.); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); and Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967), as well as numerous country studies.

[2] Both Ilchman/Uphoff and Wriggins note the similarity of their analytical posture to that of Machiavelli.

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quences. In a similar but more homely fashion, Wriggins' approach is to explore the policy perspective of the president or prime minister, as he puts it, by looking "out his window to see his problems as he sees them" (p. 5); Leites and Wolf focus more narrowly on the contest for supremacy between an established authority and a rebellious group. All three raise the question of how authority is built. As Wriggins states the case, this is the fundamental task, the imperative for a ruler. Each examines constraints and pressures under which established leaders may find themselves, and then analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of alternative strategies of resource allocation.

I. A Model of Executive Strategy

Although Ilchman's and Uphoff's *The Political Economy of Change* is the most ambitious and comprehensive of the works, all three have a number of the characteristics of a general model of executive strategy in common. I shall elaborate this composite model briefly, discuss some problems it raises for analysis, and then explore the role of legitimacy and support for establishing authority.

Ilchman and Uphoff present a conceptual framework for political analysis based on an extended analogy from economics. In presenting their model, the authors use terms drawn from macroeconomic theory, such as investment, productivity, interest, sector, and inflation. "Political economy" involves exchanges between a regime and its sectors that determine the increase or decrease in political resources available to a regime and its populace over time. Following the analogy from economics, then, a regime may accumulate resources by saving or investing them, and may secure needed resources, such as taxes, from business, labor, and other "sectors," in exchange for regime resources such as authority, status, or the abstention from coercion. The focus on the economics of authority and upon "choice" leads to considerations of the costs and benefits of a particular strategy. The authors claim that policies derived from their analytical framework will prove more useful than those derived from studies cast within the framework of political culture or socialization, since the latter frequently are unable to forecast the costs and benefits in the various decisions facing "statesmen."

Wriggins' *The Ruler's Imperative*, in contrast to the Ilchman/Uphoff volume, is written in a readable and jargon-free style useful for introductory courses. Wriggins lists eight strategies for "aggregating power" commonly used by a ruler "to rally support for himself so that he can stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability . . . [to] get things done" (p. 5). These range from the appeal of personality to the

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strengthening of a party. Such strategies used by leaders in "emerging Africa and Asia" are delimited partly by the weak authority and fragmented social systems of these societies. Wriggins' discussion of this political context and the goals of the leadership in new states is a succinct summary of conventional wisdom. He describes a variety of "social or organizational groups" including the bureaucracy, land owners, and trade unions, whose support or opposition may be critical for the success of a leader, but he ignores class conflicts and the inter-generational transfer of wealth that may act as constraints on political action.

His eight strategies are described in terms of their costs and benefits, but only in the most general fashion. Relationships of one strategy to another are glossed over, and the strategies lack the qualities of a typology such as mutual exclusiveness or exhaustiveness. As a result, in his concluding chapter on strategic mixes, Wriggins can do little more than list some of the assets and liabilities of each strategy. His propositions about their employment have the unfalsifiable quality of an astrologer's advice. For instance, he states that a leader will project his personality because doing so is easy, ambiguous (and therefore capable of wide appeal), and expected (for African and Asian states are charisma-hungry). On the other hand, Wriggins states that a wise leader will not over-use this strategy; it can be risky, since the emotions it evokes are volatile and the diminution of its returns set in fairly rapidly.

The study of rebellion and authority by Leites and Wolf focuses upon the strategies used to maintain or challenge authority. In pursuing their goal to move "the discussion of insurgent conflict toward the level that has been attained in the better discussions of nuclear conflict" (p. v) they attempt to increase their rigor and precision by using the vocabulary of economic analysis. They advocate a "systems" approach that examines the supply and demand of inputs needed by authorities and rebellions, in preference to the conventional "hearts and minds" theory of insurgency which holds that insurgents have their principal basis of support in the affections of the populace.

Leites and Wolf illustrate rather than test their propositions by using examples drawn largely from third-world conflicts such as those in Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Their main point is that rebellions are not dependent upon popular support, but rather upon securing the resources, both internally and from abroad, that are needed to maintain and expand their operations. A small leadership cadre with adequate resources can, even if it is unpopular and few share its ideology, expand its extractive capability and secure compliance. Caught in a struggle for control of the authority structure, the

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populace may be more motivated by profit-maximization or by damage-limiting goals than by abstract loyalty.

The model of executive authority that can be extracted from these books contains categories of variables that are roughly equivalent: rulers (or the executive), ruled, resources, and goals. Table 1 summarizes these. Executives pursue goals, the primary one being the maintenance of authority, by investing and spending resources in various combinations of strategies including the buying or coercing of support. Leites and Wolf do not disaggregate variables to the extent the others do because their focus is narrower. Ilchman and Uphoff distinguish another category of variables, "political infrastructure," which includes parties, elections bureaucracy, and information systems. Since the others discuss these phenomena as strategies, this distinction may be unnecessary.[3]

Within this general framework a variety of partial analyses can be undertaken, including the struggle between an authority and a rebellious group, such as that discussed throughout by Leites and Wolf (and by Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 44-45). In competing for power, exchanges between a sector (or a coalition of sectors) and those in authority often attempt to destroy each other's resources rather than to increase them. However, the same general cost/benefit frame of analysis can be used for investigating these non-productive cases.

What benefits can we expect to derive from the analytical posture of the approaches outlined in the three books, and what costs might be entailed? Some benefits seem clear—notably the role that their common emphasis upon executive leadership can play in making more productive and satisfying political choices. By evaluating the consequences of various strategies and tactics with respect to values, resources, and relevant groups, more efficient ways to achieve goals might be charted and insights might be obtained into the problem of establishing authority, as viewed from the top.[4]

In using this approach, however, one encounters certain limitations, difficult choices, and ambiguities that need to be considered in weighing its merits. I shall not comment on all of these, but rather shall focus on six of them: (1) the conservative nature of the ruler's viewpoint, (2)

[3] Moreover, infrastructure for them is only an analytical distinction from that of resources; consequently, conceptual overlaps and confusion are possible. "The fact that the line between resource and infrastructure cannot always be discerned should not cause undue concern, since the distinction is ultimately an analytical one" (p. 73). Some of the items they label infrastructure might be considered part of the regime, e.g., legislatures and police; others might be included among sectors, e.g., political parties; still others might be counted as resources, e.g., ideology.

[4] Leites and Wolf, for instance, have numerous suggestions about how authorities might more effectively counter insurgencies.

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TABLE I[5]

	Ilchman/Uphoff	*Wriggins*	*Leites/Wolf*
Rulers	Regime	Leader	Authority
Ruled	Sectors feudal land owners middle peasantry money lenders landless laborers teachers regionalists merchants military civil servants, etc. Anti-statesmen	Groups bureaucracy military traditional attachments landowners students/intellectuals businessmen trade unions media elite	Population in rebellion regular populace
Resources	Goods and Services Status Information Force Legitimacy Authority	None listed explicitly, though a variety are mentioned in discussing strategies, e.g., jobs, police, skilled personnel, social recognition, etc.	People Food Material Information Efficiency leadership discipline
Goals	Stay in power: present and future Cope with and induce social and economic change Build up political infrastructure	Legitimacy Independence National unity Social transformation Economic development Association in wider political body	Maintain and harden authority Counter rebellions Strengthen productive capacity

the question of short- versus long-term analyses, (3) the types of resources, (4) the question of disaggregation, (5) internal and external exchanges, and (6) confusion between costs and ethics.

Taking the viewpoint of those in authority has an inherent conservative bias since their *sine qua non* is preservation of their position of

[5] Categories of ruled are discussed in Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 40, and Wriggins, pp. 60-88; resources are described in Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 58-91, and Leites and Wolf, pp. 32-42.

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power. This need not be deplored, but it should be recognized. Any policy-oriented inquiry probably must begin with this assumption as a constraint in assessing alternatives. The result is that more "radical" social analyses and emphases on change are less likely to emerge, while law and order will usually be considered an important value. Leadership strategies tend to be regime-building rather than nation-building. Thus, in exchanges with the populace, a high priority is placed on consequences for the regime rather than for the society. Although in many instances these may not conflict, some policies drawn up with the clear purpose of strengthening the coalition that most strongly supports the government may create social discontent by fostering a bourgeoisie that is loyal but is disliked by the populace, or by antagonizing groups outside the core coalition. (Menderes did this to the previously favored urban and modern sector of the population in Turkey when he adopted policies popular among peasants.)

Wriggins is less self-conscious about, and less conscious of, this regime bias than the others, perhaps because he has more explicitly assumed the perspective of the political leader. The other authors deny that a bias exists in their analysis. Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their study is as relevant "to the choices made by revolutionaries as it is to those made by authorities" (p. 29), and Leites and Wolf maintain that they have tried to consider both the viewpoints of rebellion and of authority. But both admit that their presentations may not be balanced. Leites and Wolf, for example, state "sometimes the posture of the authority and, specifically, of U.S. policy in relation to authority, is adopted more completely than perfect balance would warrant" (p. vii). Any apparent preference for established authority is attributed to the exigencies of presentation rather than inherent bias.[6] Yet in spite of these explicit assertions, the tone and emphasis of the authors' analyses make it difficult to accept their statement. Ilchman and Uphoff label a group seeking to gain authority as "the anti-statesmen"—not a particularly neutral term. Furthermore, they make no distinction between those in authority roles and the role structure itself. Thus the anti-statesman, whether competing in an election or a revolution, is a pure antagonist of authority (p. 186), and possibilities for a change of personnel are presented in a harsh and overdrawn fashion. Lyndon Johnson, among others, has been accused of equating attacks upon himself with attacks upon the Presidency; surely this confusion should not be encouraged in a sophisticated framework for analysis. That it is, is due to Ilchman's

[6] Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their "restricted focus on the statesman's choices has been a matter of exposition rather than a matter of ethics" (p. 282).

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and Uphoff's simplifying assumption that all authority belongs to the regime, their treatment of a regime as monolithic rather than as composed of factions or disaggregate entities such as a legislature or contentious groups within a cabinet, and their equation of regime structure with individual role occupants (an equation that Wriggins also usually makes).

Similarly, Leites and Wolf focus on the rebellious tactics of violence and coercion rather than on the strategies of Gandhi, Lenin, or Nyerere who effectively used a withdrawal of legitimacy. When a change requires structural alterations first, those in authority frequently oppose it, although it may be desirable from some other perspectives. Moreover, their equation of campus rebellions with those in Vietnam and elsewhere, and their emphasis on rebel tactics of lawlessness and terror make the reader feel that Leites and Wolf have little sympathy with rebels, in spite of their profession of equal empathy. Even where leaders are consciously attempting to bring about structural transformation, as in China and Tanzania, the goals of maintaining power and social redefinition may conflict, although in such cases maintaining authority may be a requisite for serious change.

The second major consideration that emerges from these analyses is the trade-off between long-term and short-term strategies. In spite of Keynes' well-known dictum about the long run, the arguments for pursuing short-term rather than long-term policies are not fully convincing. As we begin to recognize that the effects of political and social policies may accumulate relatively unnoticed until they suddenly become visible upon crossing a threshold, or that lags may occur in the effects of any policy so that short-term positive outcomes may eventually be outweighed by long-term losses, the need to consider both short- and long-term effects becomes clear.

Wriggins counsels against strategies that have rapidly diminishing returns after a short period; but Ilchman/Uphoff and Leites/Wolf explicitly favor short-term policies. The strategies a leader may pursue are frequently interchangeable and, as Wriggins argues, the shorter his time-perspective and the more focused his goal toward simply staying in power, the more indifferent he will probably be toward the strategies he uses; any of them will help secure this short-term, albeit fundamental, goal. However, in the case of leaders who have long-run purposes, strategies must be examined more critically, and the costs and benefits weighed more carefully, with respect to their consequences over a number of years.

Ilchman and Uphoff take the opposite view, arguing that a short-

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term perspective is more realistic, less risky, and likely to yield quicker returns (pp. 260-272). Probably Leites and Wolf emphasize short-term strategies because of their focus on conflict situations where long-term considerations are frequently irrelevant. In situations where legitimacy is weak initially, such a short time perspective may be appropriate. But the manipulative tactics that are encouraged by such a perspective tend to depreciate in effectiveness. The popularity of leaders who enjoy the privileges of a former, foreign elite can dissipate quickly; those intimidated by threats of coercion may find that their tolerance for violence increases over time, so that their compliance can be secured only by increasing demonstrations of repressive force. Thus, coercion and the appeal of a popular or charismatic personality tend to have short-run benefits, but they have dangerous potentials for the long run. On the other hand, building a party can bolster authority over longer periods —even through successive changes in the legitimizing ideology of the political system.[7]

A third feature of the model which raises questions for analysis is the nature of resources. Some resources are said to be relatively constant, so that competition over their allocation resembles a zero-sum game. Status, power, and information all are considered to decline in value if they are widely shared (Wriggins, p. 29; Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 60-70, 100, 178). This interpretation emphasizes the distributive rather than the productive quality of resources and the resultant intense competition. Other resources, in contrast, such as goods or services, are seen as expandable rather than "relational." But is it empirically true that one can gain status or authority only at the expense of another? I think not. "Relational resources" may be increased by expanding the number of positions of status or authority, by enlarging their scope, or by increasing their value (which frequently results when wider participation expands demand). Although the norms in various societies can more or less keep resources constant, only a narrow definition fostered by a zero-sum mentality requires certain resources to be merely "relational."[8]

Another question concerning resources is what should be included as a resource. Wriggins, for instance, emphasizes the importance of individuals as a factor in developing strategies and managing resources. He states that "to generalize without close appraisal of the personal

[7] See Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York 1970), especially Moore's essay, 48-60.

[8] For example, Jack Potter and others, eds., *Peasant Society* (Boston 1967), especially the essay by George Foster on the notion of the "Limited Good," which describes how economic goods are treated as a zero-sum resource in some societies, 300-323.

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characteristics of specific leaders invites easy error" (p. 12). The value hierarchies of "statesmen" are considered important by Ilchman and Uphoff in determining "rational" strategies, and Leites and Wolf note the value that insurgencies derive from the frequent austerity of their leadership and from its ability to use calculated and discriminating violence, but neither recommend analyzing the differences that individuals can make upon strategies that are being pursued. From a macro-perspective the impact of an individual personality may not be large enough to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. Nevertheless, it seems likely that in situations where precedents are lacking, not only the preferences of a leader or set of leaders will be important in shaping policy, but also their individual skills. Ilchman and Uphoff write, "a statesman (or anti-statesman) does not win conflicts over authority and policy solely on the basis of his resource position. His skill at resource management counts as well" (p. 161). Personal skills of leaders, whether those of a Hitler-like propagandist or an intelligent social analyst, might also be counted as resources within the model.

The number and complexity of disaggregations is the fourth problem in a model of executive strategy. Since reality is complex, a large number of distinctions can be made. But the more distinctions one includes in the model, the more difficult it is to measure and relate the resulting variables. Leites and Wolf make few distinctions, separating out as actors only a populace caught between the two extreme competitors of authority and rebellion. Although a number of sub-populations having different responses could be distinguished, these disaggregations are not necessary for their purposes.

On the other hand, Wriggins, and especially Ilchman and Uphoff, propose a multitude of distinctions and variables. Since Wriggins' presentation is less formal, aimed primarily at description, a good bit of underbrush must be cleared away before his work can be used with quantitative data. Ilchman and Uphoff's heavily theoretical presentation is complicated by their elaborate disaggregations. "Currencies" such as support and allegiance are distinguished from resources, sectors are overlapping and extensive in number, and similar processes are given different labels. For instance, mobilizing a sector—that is, increasing its awareness, importance, and influence—and building an infrastructure may be analyzed in identical terms. As a result, their verbal distinctions far exceed their capacity to measure or test. We are told that the absence of empirical data and measures is due largely to their desire to publish a manageable theoretical book (see pp. 74, 273), and that empirical work that would operationalize their model, and measure its variables,

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is under way and will soon be forthcoming. However, until such operationalized tests of their model prove me wrong, I suspect that many of their variables may be too disaggregated, too complex, and too ambiguous to be measured. As a result, we have more a verbal paradigm than a model. If Ilchman and Uphoff had attempted to build a formal model, as is done, for instance, in computer simulations, I am sure their complex distinctions would have been abandoned in favor of fewer, more critical disaggregations. In such a model it is important to keep disaggregations at a minimum, choosing a strategy that maximizes the explanatory capacity of a manageable number of variables. It is possible to represent a number of complex relationships and to evaluate the implications of various policies in a fairly simple twelve-equation model of politics and economics, as the work of Brunner and Brewer has shown.[9] In constructing a model, critical simplifications help organize complexity more usefully than adding refinements and disaggregations. Perhaps the general framework and the complex verbal components of *The Political Economy of Change* can serve best to clarify choices in building models, especially those that explore a single policy area or set of exchanges.

The relation between internal and external transactions is the fifth important point raised in these volumes. Leites and Wolf stress the important role that "exogenous" inputs such as foreign support and supplies play in a rebellion. Wriggins cites foreign policy as one major strategy tool for leaders. However, he warns of the disadvantages of foreign inputs. "Resources from abroad . . . may subject the regime to accusations of failing to protect national integrity and independence" (p. 257). Ilchman and Uphoff include "external governments" as "sectors" and agree with Wriggins that these may donate resources, including legitimacy, to a regime (p. 47; Wriggins p. 228).

Although they recognize the importance of foreign inputs, all three books ignore serious and, among third-world states, highly salient questions of foreign transfers, namely imperialism and neo-colonialism. In a number of third-world states, conservative oligarchies are assisted in retaining power by external transactions with both governmental and non-governmental agencies, while foreign corporations maintain control over large areas of economic decision-making. Such control can be pervasive and difficult to avoid.[10]

[9] See Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, *Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Development* (New York 1971).

[10] Even in a "radical" state such as Tanzania, the price and sales of one of its important export items, pyrethrum, are determined by one firm in London. The Tanganyika Extract Company (TECO) limits output, yet controls all purchases. In 1968,

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A model focusing on political leadership could clarify and pinpoint many of the fuzzy areas in theories about imperialism in its many forms, and provide a useful framework for gathering data to test these theories. However, a study that documented the exchanges between a regime and foreign agencies, no matter how valuable a guide to policy it might be, would be encouraged by few governments. Since data for such a study would be difficult to amass without the encouragement and cooperation of policy-makers, such an inquiry is unlikely.

This observation relates to the last question concerning the analytical model that the authors have in common, namely the role of ethics and choice in policy analysis. Some policy inquiries may require a costing of strategies that would result in serious deprivations for some groups currently rewarded by authority. Most "statesmen" are not receptive to policy inquiries that run counter to their own predispositions or involve severe deprivations for a group within their coalition. What role can a social scientist play in a regime whose goals and values foreclose consideration of certain relevant policy alternatives, or whose values would be deplored by most social scientists?

This question of ethics in policy choices is the final problem to which Ilchman and Uphoff address themselves. If we assume that alternatives should be weighed on a cost/benefit basis, how are alternative strategies to be evaluated? For what benefits is one willing to use massive violence to pursue a successful rebellion, or a counter-insurgency operation? To what end could Leites and Wolf justify building the intelligence systems they describe, which resemble those used by South Africa and Nazi Germany, to monitor and crush opposition? Whose values does one use in determining the "cost" of various alternatives?

Aside from the underlying goal of maintaining authority, two of the books ignore the relationship between strategy and substantive goals. Wriggins fails to relate his eight strategies or tactics to his list of goals. Leites and Wolf simply exclude goals other than survival, except to note the extra burden such responsibilities can impose on authorities. Ilchman and Uphoff, on the other hand, tackle the problem theoretically, claiming that with their model "it should be possible to impute the costs and consequences of policy choices, *after* which ethical and intelligent judgments could then be made" (pp. 282-83, italics added). An intelligent analysis of consequences, they argue, improves ethical considerations by clarifying costs and benefits of choices. Such a posi-

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as a result, the local market value of pyrethrum flowers declined by 45 per cent. I am indebted to Idrian Resnick, economist in the Tanzanian Ministry of Development Planning, for pointing this out.

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tion ignores the fact that the operation of calculating costs and benefits involves basic normative or ethical considerations. One cannot postpone these until after cost has been determined, since normative assumptions are made in constructing measures for pricing and predicting consequences of policies. Realizing this, we could begin to add some of the classical political values—such as equality, freedom, and justice, which are notably absent from the analysis in all three volumes—to the measures of exchange in the model.[11]

II. Legitimacy, Support, and Authority

Perhaps the central element underlying the permanent establishment of authority is legitimacy. Political legitimacy refers to the degree to which the exercise of political authority, by individuals through a set of institutions, is regarded as right or appropriate.[12] What clearly distinguishes authority from coercion and force on the one hand, and "leadership" on the other, is legitimacy.[13]

All three volumes recognize the importance of legitimacy, although only Ilchman and Uphoff explicitly discuss it at length. According to Wriggins, legitimacy is the first goal sought by new leaders who, "having legitimacy . . . are assured of their authority" (p. 39). A principal concern of Leites' and Wolf's study is "how to maintain and strengthen" authority, which they define as the "legal and legitimized right and capacity to command" (p. 4).

In rapidly changing societies, especially ones with new regimes, legitimacy is frequently weak or eroded. On this point all three books agree. As a result, authority tends to be vulnerable. On the other hand, a large portion of the population is usually politically distant from the central regime, and, compared to states which have completed social mobilization,[14] fewer exchanges occur between center and periphery. For a regime's "legitimacy must be acknowledged not just by citizens, but, more importantly, also by those who control other valued re-

[11] These concerns need not be excluded from the rigorous analysis imposed by the discipline of "political economy." See, for instance, the article by Thomas Gale Moore, "An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXVII (July/August 1969), 532-42. Curiously, articles from this journal are nowhere cited by Ilchman and Uphoff.

[12] For a discussion of legitimacy, see Dolf Sternberger, "Legitimacy" in David Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (New York 1968), 244-48; and David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), 348-72.

[13] Robert L. Peabody, "Authority," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I (fn. 12), 473-76.

[14] This term is used by Karl Deutsch to describe the effects of literacy, urbanization, industrialization, and other aspects of modernity upon society. See K. W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 493-514.

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sources."[15] Thus, the legitimation of authority is critical in the mobilized sector of a society, while the residual or more traditional sector remains apart and largely passive, accepting the "modern" government for whatever traditional symbols it retains and simply because it is there.[16]

Legitimacy is an attribute ascribed by individuals and groups to the governing process in which they live.[17] Moreover, it is a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable, fluctuating over time. It is composed of hundreds of evaluations made by individuals and groups regarding the actions of the authority structure, both past and future. Principles held by individuals concerning the policies, personnel, and procedures that are right or appropriate for a regime may be based on a mixture of influences, such as religion or precedent, that are seldom explicit, consistent, or easily articulated. Such principles can check a regime's prerogatives and limit the alternatives it can pursue since, if a regime wishes to retain legitimacy, its policies and procedures must be largely in accord with the normative expectations of the populace.

To be sure, legitimacy is difficult to measure. Ilchman and Uphoff suggest it might be measured as the amount of compliance and support that a regime enjoys after the effects of coercion and other inducements have been accounted for. Similarly, Fred Riggs notes that "we find people—citizens, bureaucrats, and others—who show a willingness to follow instructions . . . [when neither immediate reward, coercion, expertise, or solidarity] motives are present. This willingness involves legitimacy."[18] Operational tests to calibrate this residual willingness to comply would require enormous skill and imagination, since legitimacy and compliance may be only weakly related, especially when the sanctions commanded by a regime to enforce its rule are numerous and effective. Moreover, a focus on compliance behavior as a manifest consequence of legitimacy directs our attention away from the phenomenon of legitimacy itself, and muddles the concept. Essentially, the political legitimacy of a regime is found and best measured in the attitudes of a population toward its regime. Compliance behavior and attitudes of support should be treated as distinct, although interdependent, variables.[19]

[15] Peabody (fn. 13).

[16] See Fred Riggs, "Administration and a Changing World Environment," *Public Administration Review*, XXVIII (July 1968) on this point.

[17] This is similar to the categorization used by Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966), 548-61.

[18] Riggs (fn. 16).

[19] In the last decade dozens of articles and books have repeatedly referred to legitimacy. In most cases, however, no careful analysis for clarifying the concept was

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Legitimacy is a nettlesome concept, and it is easy to disagree over how it relates to other aspects of the political process. Nevertheless, two propositions about legitimacy that are advanced by Ilchman and Uphoff seem erroneous and should not be allowed to pass. First, the authors assert that "it is possible, at least in theory, that occupants of authority roles could have no legitimacy whatsoever. With enough other resources, compliance with public policies might still be secured" (p. 81). But with no legitimacy, it would seem to be an error in semantics to say that a regime had authority. Authority is legitimized power according to many standard definitions (including that of Leites and Wolf), and occupants of authority roles in a regime (or in a business, trade union, or church, for that matter) would have to have at least some legitimacy.[20]

The second assertion by Ilchman and Uphoff that seems questionable is that support freely given may "be freely withdrawn," while support that is coerced or bought may be more stable (p. 79). This is reminiscent of Machiavelli's dictum that between fear and love as the basis for a prince's rule, fear is the more reliable. However, support that is based on legitimacy is freely given and is more stable than coerced or bought support, which is likely to disappear wherever the regime is short on inducements. Such support, engendered by legitimacy, is less readily affected, since legitimacy is based on slowly changing norms and accumulated evaluations.

Similarly, Leites and Wolf argue that supply (resources) is more important than demand (popularity) in establishing authority. "The progress made by each side in the conflict influences the affiliations of most of the population as much as or more than it is influenced by those affiliations" (p. 151). But substitution of other resources for legitimacy can lead to a dangerous deflationary spiral that prompts insurrection. As Eric Nordlinger suggests, "once governments rely upon force, they tend to overreact to demands with the application of excessive force; the value of organizations with force at their disposal (the army and the police) is heightened; there is consequently a further loss of legiti-

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presented, and an empirical investigation of the phenomenon was rarer still. For instance, a most extensive research effort by David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York 1969) focused only on the acquisition of attitudes of "diffuse support" (Easton's definition of legitimacy) by children, and used few if any questions which relate directly to "the general idea of legitimacy," namely, the ethical acceptability of government (see p. 414).

[20] When legitimacy is quite low, authority becomes naked power, whereas when other resources vanish, authority is merely formal, not effective. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950), 135-41.

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macy; and finally the population itself turns to violence. . . ."[21] While some regimes with low legitimacy may retain authority by using a great deal of coercion, few (perhaps Haiti) have survived over a long period without using other strategies. On the other hand, regimes with high legitimacy can generate support freely given, without a *quid pro quo* (see Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 74).

The position of legitimacy within the exchanges between a regime and the populace is outlined in Figure 1. The downward arrows indicate the regime's outputs that serve as objects for response and evaluation, and the upward arrows illustrate "flows" of legitimacy, compliance, and support. Legitimacy may be accorded to the personnel, policies, or procedures of a regime. While a particular government action might initially contravene expectations, so that a large part of the

FIGURE 1. LEGITIMACY PROCESS: MACRO LEVEL



[21] Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 508.

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population would feel that it was wrong, it might be accepted as legitimate, provided most other actions were seen as rightful. An overflow from these other legitimate acts could legitimize the action, possibly altering norms. If the government is generally trusted to do what is right, a few questionable actions may not affect overall legitimacy.[22]

Figure 1 illustrates how the populace evaluates the effects of a regime's activity: through the appeal of its personnel, the costs and benefits of its policies, and the justice of its procedures. It may calculate "rationally" that it is to its advantage to comply with and support the regime, entering into what Ilchman and Uphoff refer to as "mutually beneficial exchanges." The effect upon support would be fairly immediate. But this calculation is essentially separate from the legitimation process, and is shown only because legitimacy affects similar variables, namely compliance and support. The legitimacy exchange illustrated involves a greater lag in response, as the government's actions affect the level of legitimacy.

Changes in principles or ideas about what is rightful for government are shown (hypothesized) to be based on the *interaction* of two variables. One is the degree of satisfaction with the policies of a regime; the other, a conglomerate and exogenous factor, is one's store of values based on experience in daily social, economic, and cultural activities. Social mobilization tends to alter this latter variable, creating new values and ideas about political participation and rights and the range of personal needs for which government is responsible. Changes in these two variables (and expanded demands on government may reduce policy satisfaction, although policies are unchanged) affect the evaluation process by eroding old ideas of what are just procedures on the part of leaders, and reinforcing those that conform to current values. The impact of mobilization and modernization upon values has altered the normative structure of societies, slowly eroding transcendental justifications of authority. Nevertheless, because legitimacy generally changes rather slowly, it can dampen the effects that fluctuations in performance may have upon support.

Four strategies for increasing legitimacy, and consequently support, are mentioned in the books under discussion: pursuit of satisfactory policies, possession of effective power, responsive action, and the shaping of normative structure. Ilchman and Uphoff state, "to acquire and

[22] See William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill. 1968), 45-54, whose concept of "generalized trust" parallels that of Easton's idea of "diffuse support" and may be related to legitimacy. A government is more likely to be seen as legitimate when one trusts that it will do what it should do, and there is a high probability of preferred outcomes being achieved.

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maintain legitimacy the statesman or anti-statesman must confer benefits. . . . Sectors will not grant legitimacy to the regime unless the regime in turn in some way enhances their well-being" (p. 74). The provision of desired benefits is similar to the strategy for building legitimacy suggested by Seymour Lipset. He states, "prolonged effectiveness over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system. In the modern world, such effectiveness means primarily constant economic development."[23] Another form of effectiveness considered more by Hobbes than by Lipset is the ability to maintain compliance through the judicious application of force. Force, rather than positive incentives, is usually considered an inefficient way to maintain a regime and hence is generally associated with regimes that lack legitimacy. However, the ability to deal out negative reinforcements to individuals who fail to comply with the regulations of the regime may also be an important source of effectiveness.

The second strategy by which a regime may gain legitimacy is by having the support of powerful sectors of society. This strategy is *apparently* the one Wriggins would recommend. Although he lists legitimacy as the first goal of leaders, he ignores legitimacy in his concluding section which relates strategy to goals. However, he does conclude that without building an "aggregation of power," "governance is impossible" (p. 263); Wriggins only briefly elaborates on this central concept, suggesting that aggregation entails acquiring the support of "individuals and groups who have power over still others" (p. 8). Since all of his eight strategies are supposed to help in aggregating power, their success presumably should aid in creating legitimacy.

Arthur Stinchcombe has suggested that "a power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective."[24] From this Richard Flacks concludes that we may "predict that individuals will tend to perceive the action of an authority as legitimate if that action has or is likely to have the support of other centers."[25] An individual also might accept a regime as legitimate on principle even when he did not like or trust it, if he felt most others accepted it as legitimate. Evidence of failure of officials in the regime or in other key institutions to support national authority would be a clear sign of eroding legiti-

[23] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y. 1960), 70.

[24] Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (New York 1968), 162, cited in Richard Flacks, "Protest or Conform: Some Social Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, v, No. 2 (1969), 134.

[25] Richard Flacks, *ibid.*

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macy. Conversely, if the populace perceived that key sectors accord legitimacy to a regime and make themselves available to help implement its policies, their "demonstration effect" should maintain legitimacy even when public opinion shifts against current office holders.

A third strategy for increasing legitimacy is responsiveness to expectations of right and justice. In more traditional society, rules grounded in religious doctrine could check a ruler's power and insure that his conformity to procedures and policies was responsive to the fairly limited and static needs and expectations of the populace. In modern society, various legitimizing principles have evolved to replace traditional ones. These doctrines usually aim at insuring responsiveness of regimes and avoiding tyranny. They nearly always include some notion of popular sovereignty and, frequently, means of protecting minorities.[26] Delegation of authority, limitation of power, and access to and participation in the decision-making process are perhaps the basic ways to insure a regime's responsiveness (Ilchman and Uphoff, on pp. 201-02, mention delegation of authority). This access, participation, and incorporation of individuals or groups in the regime may insure the desired responsiveness to their needs and values. Elections, legislatures, and local government are common devices to increase responsiveness. Since these devices tend to check "arbitrary" (illegitimate) power, a regime can promote its legitimacy by adhering to them. Greater access for individuals and groups to the decision-making process, through these popular mechanisms, is likely to increase negative (corrective) feedback in the system. Those with a cybernetic view of politics might argue that structures for participation help solve communications and control problems; thus, the political doctrines and myths of representation have been imbued with sanctity *because* of their efficacy.

Responsiveness may often take the form of symbolic output: a regime that is ineffective in providing improved living standards or in accumulating force to insure the compliance of subjects may nevertheless legitimize itself through words rather than deeds. Such a regime, by symbolic outputs responsive to the sentiments, expectations, and identities of the population, may elevate national self-images and secure support and legitimacy from the population even though, for example, living standards may be falling.

The fourth strategy for increasing legitimacy aims at shaping a society's normative structure through manipulation of political doctrines and formulae. Since the ideology of a populace, in the broad sense of the

[26] The Federalist Papers are a classic illustration of the history of the formulation of such doctrines.

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term used by Robert Lane,[27] contains the norms that determine what is considered legitimate, strategies to alter the ideological beliefs of a populace are needed in order to change the range of the legitimate use of power by authorities. Such strategies might involve using various agencies, such as the educational system, the press, or a political party to communicate new ideology which justifies changes in the "political formula" or myths that define accepted practices for a regime.[28] The introduction of new ideological components, either *sui generis* or by adoption from abroad, is a strategy frequently used in developing states to change the content of legitimacy norms (see Wriggins, pp. 129-44 and Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 239-41). Such forms of "legitimacy investments" involve manipulating the normative structure (Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 201). For instance, Donald Rothchild suggests that in Kenya the regime might "move to the left" in order to increase its legitimacy through the popularity which leftist egalitarian doctrines could generate.[29]

If the anticipated *consequences* on legitimacy were included when alternative strategies are weighed, better, more realistic policy assessments would result. The effects of legitimacy are quite tangible, but they often are long-term and overlooked. The Vietnam war, for instance, may have affected legitimacy within the United States, perhaps with consequences for several decades, owing to its special impact on people at impressionable ages—much as the depression of the 1930's had lasting effects on an earlier generation. Greater attention to legitimation processes could bring such consequences more clearly into focus.

By assessing a regime's *level* of legitimacy, priorities among policy alternatives can be more easily determined. If a regime is in dangerously short supply of legitimacy, it may wish to concentrate on actions to bolster its position; if it has a large stock, it may wish to expend some of it on policies that will be unpopular in the short run but are likely to yield high long-run dividends. Where legitimacy is low, manipulation of support is higher and the conditions for challenging a regime's authority are improved. Wolf suggests that the probability of insurgency seems to increase with economic development "over a considerable range" (p. 51). This apparent relationship may result through the effects of legitimacy as an intervening variable. Since economic change tends to create frustrations and weaken normative order, it is likely

[27] See Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York 1960).

[28] See Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 20), 126-34.

[29] This might also be a responsiveness strategy. See Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (September 1970), 753.

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to reduce legitimacy. If so, its effect upon legitimacy may be one of the reasons why economic change appears to create political unrest and increase the chances of insurgency.

III. Policy Studies of the Future

The merits and faults of these works suggest several recommendations for future policy-oriented empirical studies. First, the more analytical frameworks are relevant for the study of *any* political system, from the university to the modern nation state, the more useful they are likely to be. Wriggins' framework, especially, lacks the benefit of such universal applicability. As his purpose was to discuss politics in the African-Asian context, this may be an unfair criticism. However, a study of executive leadership in these environments need not be divorced from a study of executive leadership in general. A study of authority maintenance in "more developed" states should be as valuable an exercise as such a study in a "less developed" one, and the categories of analysis should be similar. Ilchman's and Uphoff's analysis, for instance, could have drawn more heavily on examples from developed states, particularly the United States, for which more data may exist that are relevant to the variables they wish to measure. Economists have, after all, had much more success in building models and predicting effects of policies in the more developed economies.

Second, studies that apply the model of executive strategy might usefully focus on the *important areas* that executives control. Instances of imperialism (neo-colonialism) and corruption in third-world states should be susceptible to analysis since these practices, however defined, include, or rest upon, the actions of leaders themselves. Among industrialized states, studies of political leadership and "political investment" strategies should be especially valuable since the resources controlled by leaders in these states are so great. In such studies, we can more readily move from a focus on political development that conceals our political preferences and confines the concepts we use, to a focus on political change.[30]

A third feature of future policy studies should be an emphasis upon *measuring* the processes of change. Within the general approach suggested by these books, measures of system performance are needed in addition to the more specific measures discussed, such as percentage

[30] Samuel P. Huntington makes a strong argument for shifting our attention from viewing the political process in terms of "development" to examining politics in terms of "change" in his essay, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 283-322.

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of voter turnout. For instance, could we calculate, over time, the total effects of a regime's policies on net national power (perhaps the average value of resources that maintain authority)? Such measurements could be one of the most critical new areas for imaginative research and inquiry in the social sciences. Focusing on the macro-effects of an executive strategy would require a technique for calculating equivalences between different kinds of resources. Ilchman and Uphoff describe such conversion rates between resources, but are unable to suggest how they might be calculated. However, if such measures were designed, we might be able to examine the gross and net effects of a particular policy on national resources.

We need empirical applications devoid of unnecessary concepts and theorizing. Ilchman and Uphoff state that "the more encompassing an explanation is, the less testable, the less varifiable, and the less certain it is as a causal explanation, and thus the weaker it is as a basis for prediction and choice" (p. 261). Unfortunately, the analytical frameworks discussed tend to be so encompassing that manageable research using selected variables from them will be difficult. Albert Hirschman has argued that there are hindrances to understanding that accompany a premature paradigm and high level of generalization. If paradigms or even extended economic analogies are used without caution, they may inhibit the flow of insights and understanding of specific contextual events, and result in mindless theorizing.[31]

Finally, ethical considerations can and should play an important role in the policy sciences. Otherwise, the view from the top tends to be a bloodless one, dominated by cold calculations of costs and benefits in a market place of competing interest groups, classes, or sectors, with one authority acting more in order to preserve itself than to deliver political goods such as liberty, security, welfare, or justice.[32] One can accept the need for and value of policy research without agreeing with Ilchman's and Uphoff's efficiency criteria of political man. They believe that wise statesmen are "political," maximizing efficiency in pursuing "collective ends" (p. 282); but the economy of a leader's choice is *not* independent of the ends pursued. Both those whose ends are "collected" and the content of these ends can affect the efficiency criterion.

Economists, for good or ill, have become regular advisors on domestic

[31] Some of the diagrams in Leites and Wolf and the distinctions made by Ilchman and Uphoff occasionally leave this impression. For the critique of "mindless theorizing" see Albert O. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), 329-43.

[32] See J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 415-34.

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policy, while political scientists are seldom consulted.[33] There is a definite position that could be filled by policy scientists devoted to questions of political strategy, if political scientists can develop the capacities to play such a role.[34] As economically developed societies seem to give greater attention to questions of value, ethical concerns will increasingly be considered an important part of policy analysis. Future "political economists" need not abandon the humanist's concern or relegate it to the last stage of analysis in developing the quantitative rigor and the focus on policy choice that a model of executive strategy will require.

[33] In the United States, for instance, there is no functional equivalent to the National Council of Economic Advisors for political policy, at least not one staffed by professional political scientists. Those who serve as advisors in the U.S. or abroad are nearly always specialists in comparative politics and political development who are asked to advise on policies of foreign and military strategy, or specialists in public administration and law who are consulted on problems in bureaucratic and agency performance. One reason for this situation is that until recently there has been little scholarship devoted to planning and policy among professional political scientists.

[34] James (Samuel) Coleman, at an International Political Science Roundtable on Quantitative Methods, in Mannheim, Germany, July 5-10, 1971, suggested that the impending important dispute in political science was likely to be between "political economists"—that is, a group who seek greater rigor in theoretical models and quantitative techniques—and those "behavioralists" who are satisfied with established data analysis and descriptive statistical approaches.

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NATIONAL PRIORITIES:

Demands, Resources, Dilemmas

By HAROLD SPROUT and MARGARET SPROUT

L. A. Lecht, *Goals, Priorities, and Dollars*. New York, Free Press, 1966, 365 pp., $6.95; $2.95 paper.

M. B. Schnapper, ed., *National Priorities: Military, Economic, and Social*. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1969, 176 pp., $4.50.

J. H. Logsdon, *The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Goals and the National Interest*. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1970, 187 pp., $10.00.

J. H. Clayton, ed., *The Economic Impact of the Cold War*. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970, 287 pp., $3.75.

C. L. Schultze, *Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget*. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1970, 192 pp., $2.95.

L. L. Lederman & M. L. Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources as an Indicator of National Goals and Priorities*. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969, 2 Parts: I, "Summary," 65 pp., $1.00; II, "Details," 255 pp., $3.75.

THE publications listed above exemplify the debate over national priorities that is gathering mass and momentum in the United States. With respect to each, we shall indicate the perspective of the author(s), scope of the work, and thrust of conclusions. We shall then suggest some broader sources and implications of this debate and its end product, the allocation of resources.

These publications stick closely to the problem of allocation priorities at the federal level in the United States, and so will our commentary; but the wider occurrence and broader implications of these phenomena must be kept in mind. The growing insufficiency of disposable resources bedevils government at every level in America, and increasingly in other countries.

Elsewhere, we have examined the problem of allocation priorities in the broader context of comparative and international politics. We have found it to be surfacing in several countries, imminent in others, and seemingly latent in all. We have ventured to advance the hypothesis that this "statesmen's dilemma" is a universal concomitant of progress along the road of technological-industrial-urban modernization. We have speculated on the possibility that the spread of this dilemma in increasingly acute forms may portend continuing transformation of the organization and politics of the planet earth.[1] These ramifying

[1] See "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, XX (July 1968), 660-91; and *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York 1971), esp. chaps. 15 and 19.

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possibilities are relevant to any discussion of the problem of allocation priorities; if space permitted, it might be fruitful to explore them further in the context of these recent writings on the priorities debate in America.

I

Goals, Priorities, and Dollars (cited hereafter as the NPA study), by L. A. Lecht and a team of fellow-economists, was issued in 1966 by the National Planning Association. It was not the first attempt to define national goals, but it was the first systematic attempt to link goals with costs, to estimate the resources likely to be available over the next decade, and to put the relationship between goals and resources into a scheme of ordered priorities. Hence, this study, though several years old, is the logical point of departure for a discussion of more recent writings.

The NPA study emphasizes that, in America, priorities are still determined largely in the market place; but implicit throughout is the expanding role of government in determining who gets how much and for what purposes. Also implicit is the widening gap between available goods and services and the demands for them by continuing commitments and by new and expanding "aspirations." However, the study falls short of recognizing that some of the more costly emerging demands are not merely "aspirations," but may be social and environmental requisites of viability in our increasingly complex society.[2]

Goals and costs are analyzed under the standard budgetary categories. These direct attention to competing demands within the domestic society and their impact on the military budget, and vice versa. The study recognizes "expectations of steadily rising living standards" to be a "built-in feature of our culture," and assumes that it would continue to be (pp. 53, 55). But it also recognizes that "even with a trillion-dollar GNP [which, in 1966, was generally deemed unlikely], the competing claims would create a need for priorities . . . to balance our aspirations with our resources" (p. 84).

The study anticipates that the military budget would take a "smaller share of the GNP in the 1970's," though not necessarily a smaller number of dollars. This prediction was based upon assumptions of "reasonably rapid economic growth" and no significant worsening of "international tensions" (p. 301). Chapters on urban development, welfare, health, transportation, and housing identify most of the needs that con-

[2] In a broad sense, social conditions are all part of the environment. However, we shall follow the prevailing usage that more or less consistently restricts the concept of environment to the physical habitat, including man-made structures and other changes upon, or associated with, the surface of the earth.

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tinue to agitate political waters today; but projected costs for meeting these needs fall far short of more recent estimates. Any explicit recognition of the impact of expanding domestic demands on future military and military-related commitments, and on our nonmilitary international relations, is conspicuously absent.

The NPA study reflects the milieu of the mid-1960's in two respects especially: (1) its failure to deal with the waste and lax accountability that the President and Congress allowed to continue within the military establishment; and (2) its failure to grasp the financial implications of the looming environmental crisis. Though published three years after Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, the NPA study shows no particular sense of urgency in dealing with the problem of pollution. The physical habitat receives attention mainly with reference to the adequacy and management of natural resources for economic and recreational purposes. Virtually nothing is said about the probable effect of expanding outlays for a cleaner and safer habitat on the cost of power, manufacturing, food production, transportation, and nearly everything else. For this and other reasons, the NPA study projects an image of the American political economy that grossly underestimates present and future pressures on disposable resources.

National Priorities: Military, Economic, and Social reflects salient changes in perspective and attitude between 1966 and 1969. This little book is a collection of excerpts from statements originally prepared for Senator Proxmire's Subcommittee on Economy in Government, of the Joint Congressional Economic Committee. Nearly all of the contributors held (or had previously held) positions in government. Their statements exhibit a broad spectrum of opinions, ranging from justification to severe criticism of existing budgetary allocations and practices.

Several witnesses deal with the loose and lax procedures, in the Budget Bureau and in Congress, that then enabled the military budget to escape the critical scrutiny to which domestic programs were subjected. Several accept, or seem to accept, the Pentagon's definition of military requirements as a variable beyond the reach of Congress and the public: that is to say, a set of demands to which all other claimants should have to adjust. There were two strong dissents from this fatalistic resignation, one by the economist Kenneth Boulding, and the other by the late Walter Reuther of the UAW.

Reuther, whose statement takes up nearly a quarter of the book, levels savagely at the Pentagon and its allies in Congress and industry, concluding: "We can continue to starve our society of its most essential needs. . . . We can continue to let poverty and frustration simmer and

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fester . . . or we can put our priorities in order [and rank the demands of the military] along with all our other urgent needs" (p. 109).

The Decision to Go to the Moon (1970) is included here mainly because it focuses specifically on the ordering of values that subordinates the domestic society to external goals. The book is a history of the decision. The author, political scientist J. M. Logsdon, disclaims any "attempt . . . to evaluate the *consequences* of the decision" (italics in original). But he does give us a well-researched description and explanation of (among other things) the "concept of national interest at the heart of the . . . decision" (p. xi), a concept which gives the goal of "global preeminence" priority over "improving the quality of our national life" (p. 168). Specifically he says, with reference to the President's thinking: "What Kennedy sought in deciding as he did was to maintain American preeminence in all aspects of national power . . . a conception of America's interests which assigns primacy to foreign over domestic goals"; and his "foreign policy goals included not just protection from external attack, or close relations with other nations with complementary cultures or interests, but rather extended to an expansive American mission of spreading its way of life to all corners of the globe" (p. 167).

The Economic Impact of the Cold War (1970) continues the debate over domestic versus external priorities, but from a different perspective. This book is an anthology of statistics and representative arguments by defenders and critics of ongoing priorities, all fitted into a framework by means of the extensive original contributions of the editor, J. L. Clayton, professor of history at the University of Utah. The book's main theme is the economic (more broadly social) consequences of the allocation of resources that the cold-war syndrome imposed upon American society.

The editor's own position is evident from his final summation: "The rise of the military-industrial complex has unquestionably spurred the economy to new heights, but the benefits have passed most people by. The rich have been getting richer . . . whereas the poor have received only 'crumbs from the table of Mars.' . . . The whole system has been built upon the philosophy . . . that power equals security. . . . Rarely have we considered nonmilitary solutions. Only recently have we become aware . . . that our resources are limited, and that monies spent on defense necessarily reduce our options in solving pressing domestic needs" (p. 281-82).[3]

[3] This and related themes are developed upon a larger canvas in Duane Lockard, *The Perverted Priorities of American Politics* (New York 1971). The author, professor of politics at Princeton University, is especially concerned with such questions as why

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In *Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget* (1970), C. L. Schultze, a well-known economist who served in the Johnson administration as Director of the Budget Bureau, brings both technical expertise and governmental experience to his case study of federal budget-making.

All of the major categories of federal expenditures are analyzed in the context of existing commitments, limited resources, and future possibilities as perceived by the author. He repeatedly notes the constrictive effect of ongoing programs tied to long-term financial commitments: for example, highway-building, military procurement, veterans' benefits, social security, medicare, and other "income maintenance" commitments. He maintains that, in the absence of a continuing large increase of disposable resources (from rapid economic growth or from heavier taxes), this mortgaging of future revenues sets rigid limits to new undertakings—a conclusion that ignores the notorious propensity of all governments to modify, scale down, or even repudiate continuing commitments when it suits political expediency to do so.

Schultze's conventional economic perspective is strikingly evident in his discussion of pollution. As in the NPA study, pollution is recognized to be a "problem." The public is warned that it will have to pay higher prices for a cleaner and safer environment. But nothing is said about the incidence of these additional costs on different income classes, depending upon the federal tax structure and the level of government-spending for environmental programs.

The author tells us that "we must weigh benefits against costs" in combating pollution. But he tells us nothing about how to go about weighing the benefits of a cleaner and safer environment against the profits of General Motors or the price of motor fuel. Moreover, he conveys no sense of urgency, no awareness of the possible *social* consequences of failure to give higher priority to programs for coping with environmental deterioration, no intimation of the possible *political* impact on the federal budget of the progressive worsening of pollution.

A comparable insensitivity to the political context pervades the treatment of domestic social programs. The needs—health, welfare, housing, urban renewal, education, and most of the rest—are recognized. New and ongoing programs are described. But one looks in vain for any sense of urgency, any clear recognition of the possible *political*, and hence

Americans so generally tolerate an ordering of priorities that progressively pollutes and depletes our once magnificent country, and erodes the moral as well as material supports of our national polity. More specifically, why do we tolerate "a relentless racism . . . a murderous imperialism, and the blind pursuit of economic advantage whatever the consequences?" (p. viii).

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FIGURE 1. OUTLAYS BY FUNCTIONAL FIELD
(Billions of Dollars)



Education and Knowledge	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.5	5.0	5.6	5.8
Agriculture	3.3	4.1	5.1	5.2	4.8	3.7	4.4	5.3	5.6
International Relations	3.4	4.6	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.6	5.0	5.1
Labor and Manpower	5.5	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.8	5.1
Veterans	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.5	5.3	4.9	4.9	4.9
Space	0.5	0.9	2.0	3.5	4.4	5.2	4.7	4.1	4.0
Housing	0.5	0.9	−0.9	−0.1	—	2.2	3.3	5.1	3.9
Natural Resources	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.5	3.7
General Government	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.8

Source: L. L. Lederman & M. L. Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources . . .*, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington 1969), Part I, chap. II, p. 9.

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FIGURE 2. FUNCTIONAL FIELD OUTLAYS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL OUTLAYS



	1961	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69
Education and Knowledge	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.8	3.3	3.4	3.3
Agriculture	3.6	4.1	4.9	4.6	4.3	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.2
International Relations	3.6	4.5	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.5	3.1	3.0	2.9
Labor and Manpower	6.0	4.3	3.8	3.6	3.3	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.9
Veterans	4.4	4.1	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.2	3.3	3.0	2.8
Space	0.5	0.9	1.9	3.1	3.9	4.1	3.1	2.5	2.3
Housing	0.6	0.9	−0.9	−0.1	—	1.7	2.2	3.0	2.3
Natural Resources	3.1	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.1	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.1
General Government	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.6

Source: L. L. Lederman & M. L. Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources . . .*, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington 1969), Part I, chap. II, p. 7.

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budgetary, repercussions of the Nixon administration's ordering of national priorities.

There are still other omissions. The book is silent on the notorious permissiveness of the Budget Bureau's scrutiny of Defense Department demands. There is a section on aviation, but no mention of the controversial SST project. There is nothing on the ominous pressure to reduce economic aid to modernizing countries, or on congressional parsimony in this and other nonmilitary sectors of foreign policy.

The report by Lederman and Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources as an Indicator of National Goals and Priorities* (1969), is an impressive statistical exhibit, with explanatory text, of functional trends in federal expenditures during the period 1961–69. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the purpose of identifying and predicting trends in allocations for research and development, both *in toto* and for specific functional programs, and in particular for future space programs. The report's significance, however, reaches far beyond its stated objective, since the analysis includes all the major budget categories.

The findings of Lederman and Windus are summarized in three tables, reproduced here as Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure 1 indicates in dollars the magnitude and year-by-year changes in funds allocated to various functional fields during the period 1961–69. Figure 2 indicates differential rates of change throughout the period in these same functional fields. Projected trends for the "next decade" are summarized in Figure 3. These projections were derived by extrapolating recent statistical trends, modified in the light of the analysts' "best judgment" (Part I, chap. II, p. 21). Part II of the report examines in detail both the evidence of past allocations and the assumptions and other considerations that governed the authors' estimates of future trends.

Their main predictions: Total federal spending will continue to rise. Defense expenditures will increase, but at a lesser rate than that of allocations to health, education, welfare (including all income-maintenance programs), housing, law enforcement, labor (especially vocational retraining), and environmental rescue and protection programs. Allocations to nonmilitary international relations (including foreign aid to modernizing countries and support of international organizations) and to space programs will continue to decline relative to the total.

The analysis by Lederman and Windus ends with fiscal year 1969. Figure 4 carries the data forward to official estimates for 1972. They confirm, in the main, the trends projected by these authors.

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FIGURE 3. RECENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL PRIORITIES, AND TRENDS DURING THE NEXT DECADE AS PREDICTED BY LEDERMAN AND WINDUS

Functional Field	*Total Gross Expenditures*			*Growth Relative to Average*	
	1969 $ Millions	*Per cent of Total*	*Change, % 1967 to 1969*	*1967 to 1969*	*Likely Future*
National Security[a]	78,636	44.8	+13	Below	Below
Welfare	36,171	20.6	+25	Above	Above
Health	12,227	7.0	+50	Well Above	Well Above
Commerce, Transportation, and Communications[b]	8,518	4.9	+13	Below	Below
Education and Knowledge[c]	5,484	3.1	+20	About Average	Above
Agriculture	4,516	2.6	+41	Well Above	Well Above
International Relations	4,612	2.6	+ 2	Well Below	Well Below
Labor and Manpower	5,053	2.9	+27	Above	Above
Veterans	5,472	3.1	+ 5	Well Below	Well Below
Space[d]	3,959	2.3	−15	Well Below	Well Below
Housing and Community Development	2,776	1.6	+84	Well Above	Well Above
Natural Resources and Environmental	5,074	2.9	+11	Below	Below
General Government[e]	3,039	1.7	+13	Below	About Average
Total	175,537	100.0	+17		

[a] An end to the Vietnam war and no existing "hot" war assumed, but no significant decrease in other international tensions.

[b] Total gross expenditures could grow at average or even above average rates depending on what happens to ground transportation, which is 53% of total.

[c] Increased priority for education likely to increase total expenditures (especially post-Vietnam). Increase in R&D growth rate to below average because of some lessening in fundamental research funding constraints.

[d] R&D virtually all expenditures (98%).

[e] Increase in relative growth rate for total gross expenditures due to increased priority on law enforcement.

Source: L. L. Lederman & M. L. Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources . . .*, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington 1969), Part I, chap. II, pp. 23-24.

Federal allocations, as noted at the outset, reveal only part of the picture. They indicate nothing about allocations of funds raised by state and local governments. Nor do allocation statistics *per se* reveal the indirect allocative effects of tax policies and other actions at all levels of government. They give no more than ambiguous clues to trends in the distribution of goods and services in the private sector.

However, with these limitations, the hard data analyzed by Lederman and Windus, and to some extent by the other authors under review, provide important information about *actual* continuing trends in national priorities. These data bypass the empty rhetoric of party platforms, and the sometimes deceptive public utterances of politicians and

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FIGURE 4. ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL BUDGET RESOURCES, FY 1969–FY 1972

	Functional Fields as Percentage of Total Outlays				*Allocations in Billions of Dollars*
	1969 actual	*1970 actual*	*1971 estimated*	*1972 estimated*	*1972 estimated*
National Security	44.0	40.8	35.9	33.8	$77.5
Welfare (income-maintenance)	20.4	22.3	26.1	26.5	$60.7
Health	6.3	6.6	7.0	7.0	$16.0
Commerce & Transportation	4.3	4.7	5.4	4.8	$10.9
Education & Knowledge	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.8	$8.8
Agricultural & Rural Development	3.4	3.2	2.5	2.5	$5.8
International Relations (nonmilitary)	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.8	$4.0
Veterans' Benefits & Services	4.1	4.4	4.7	4.6	$10.6
Space & Technology	2.3	1.9	1.6	1.4	$3.1
Housing & Community Development	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.0	$4.5
Natural Resources (including environmental protection)	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.9	$4.2
General Government	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.2	$4.9
Other	5.8	6.1	6.1	7.7	

Source: *The U.S. Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year 1972*, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1971. Slight discrepancies between Figures 3 and 4, in the 1969 column, derive in part from differences between advance estimates and actual expenditures, in part from slight differences in the content of certain functional fields. The discrepancies do not affect the overall picture of trends significantly.

bureaucrats. In short, federal budget data go directly to the end product of the debate on priorities at the national level. Furthermore, allocation statistics help one to visualize the multiple rising pressures on disposable revenues, and they evoke questions regarding possible future impacts of these pressures on domestic politics and foreign policy.

II

A common theme, implicit in all of the publications summarized above, is the growing insufficiency of Federal revenues, which fail to come anywhere close to meeting expanding demands in nearly all categories of expenditure. This is the essence of the "statesmen's dilemma," noted in the opening paragraphs.

This dilemma is not new. Resources at the disposal of government have rarely if ever covered the demands on them. What is new is a concurrence of conditions that pose the dilemma in especially acute form within the United States at this time—and, prospectively, for a long time to come.

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One of these conditions is the widespread expectation of endlessly expanding affluence, characterized in the NPA study as a "built-in feature of our culture" (p. 53). A large segment of our people, it is true, have not shared significantly in the affluence to which increasing millions have become accustomed during the past twenty-five years. But the expectation of ever more for everyone persists and fosters a climate of opinion that makes politicians hesitate to impose much heavier taxes or shift priorities in other ways that would be widely perceived as a threat to this American dream.

The image of perpetually expanding affluence acquires additional salience from the presence of a second reality: the growing leverage on government and economy that is wielded by those who perform essential services in both the public and the private sectors. It is wielded not merely by those who direct these services, but by those who actually harvest the crops, mine the coal, drive the trucks, trains, and planes, service the machines, fight fires, collect trash and garbage, deliver the mail, teach in the schools, enforce order, tend the power grids, and do all the other tasks essential to continued functioning of our technologically complex society.

There was a time when most of those who performed essential civic services were part of the "invisible poor." They were invisible in the sense of having little or no access to government. Those who ruled could largely ignore their needs without fear of significant consequences. Many of them were, in effect, aliens in the society of which they were nominal members.

Some of them still are, but their number is diminishing. Those who speak on behalf of the performers of vital services can make their demands heard; and these demands are more likely to be heeded now than they were formerly. This is no doubt attributable in part to stronger organization and leadership. But this rising political potential derives also from our society's vulnerability to disruptive breakdown.

This vulnerability has been fleetingly revealed on many occasions—by strikes of trash and garbage collectors, truck drivers and air controllers, postmen and firefighters, school teachers, and many other performers of essential services. What it might portend has been demonstrated by partial and total walkouts of the police in numerous cities. It was driven home by the spectre of a paralyzing epidemic toward the end of the prolonged sanitation workers' strike in New York City in 1968. In short, because of the inherent vulnerability of technologically complex modern societies, the performers of essential services are becoming increasingly formidable competitors for scarce resources; and

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their growing political muscle and expanding demands constitute a major dimension of the crisis of priorities.

A third source of the statesmen's dilemma—likewise related to those already cited—is the spreading awareness of a deepening social malaise: intractable poverty in the midst of affluence, urban decay, suburban sprawl, disorder in the schools, crime in the streets, vocational displacement, and other evidences of a society in deep trouble. Many of these problems have been around for some time, some for a long time. What is new is not the condition, but the escalating price of coping with it effectively and a rising sense of urgency to do so—a climate of opinion plainly reflected in the changing pattern of budgetary allocations.

A fourth contributing condition is the recently awakened public concern over the advanced stage of environmental deterioration. Despite persistent efforts in some quarters to shrug off this concern as a passing fad, the environmental issue has not subsided. Its continuing hold on public attention is indicated in newspaper reports and editorials, books and magazine articles, television documentaries, educational programs, legislative hearings, government reports, tightened regulations—and a growing trickle of public funds that some experts predict will have to be greatly augmented if our children and grandchildren are to inherit a livable habitat.

A fifth source of the statesmen's dilemma is the inflexibility of government budgets at every level—federal, state and local—but considered here mainly at the federal level. This inflexibility derives in large part from advance commitment of revenues in nearly all fields—defense, agriculture, highways, aviation, education, and the rest. Advance commitments are especially constraining in the area of "income maintenance" which includes social security, other retirement pensions, veterans' benefits, grants for public assistance, etc., as emphasized by the NPA study, by Schultze, and by Lederman and Windus. Income-maintenance mortgages on future revenues alone preempt at least a quarter of federal funds. If one adds all the other mortgages on future revenues, immobility from this source rises to 50 per cent or more, and is climbing all the time.

Structural features of the American political system—the organization of, and interrelations between, Congress and the executive agencies, federal-state relations, the party system, etc.—contribute in various ways to the priorities crisis. These factors receive some attention in *The Decision to Go to the Moon*, and superficial notice in some of the other books under review, but far less than they deserve.[4]

[4] One recent book on national priorities that does give major attention to political

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Sooner or later any discussion of national priorities is certain to focus on the military budget, for at least two reasons—its sheer size, and the changing context of American politics. As indicated in Figure 1, spending for military and military-related purposes in 1961 was about $38 billion. By 1969, dollar expenditures for these purposes had risen to $80 billion, an increase of over 100 per cent.[5]

The official estimate for 1972 projects a military budget of approximately $77.5 billion. Assuming that expenditures will overrun the estimate by at least $3 billion (as in 1969), this would still represent a reduction of 20 per cent or more in *real* outlay in the four-year period (1969–72) if inflation continued at the rate of 5–10 per cent a year.

What is perhaps more significant as a portent of things to come, the *percentage* of federal revenue allocated to military purposes declined from 50 to 40 per cent during the 1960's. An official estimate (see Figure 4) predicts a continuing decline to about 34 per cent by 1972. That is to say, we are now moving into the second consecutive decade in which military expenditures have risen less, in proportion to total expenditures, than have allocations in several nonmilitary categories. To put it in another way, the military establishment has been taking a relatively smaller slice of a larger pie, as measured in dollars of diminishing value —and this has occurred despite outlays for the war in Indochina.

In addition to the sources of the statesmen's dilemma that are cited above, certain conditions appear to be working against the recent high level of support for the military establishment and military-related foreign policies. These include some fading (at least temporarily) of chauvinistic nationalism, the progressive mergence of domestic and external politics, and the staggering cost of the global mission envisaged by every administration since World War II.

Chauvinistic nationalism certainly has not disappeared from the American scene, but it is not as aggressive a motivating force as it used to be. Its fading is reflected in numerous trends, including public at-

structures and interagency and intergovernmental relations is Professor Lockard's *The Perverted Priorities of American Politics*. This book includes a fresh look at Congress, the courts, the executive establishment, federal-state relations, and the party system. It also emphasizes the dehumanizing tendencies that Lockard perceives in American society: among others, the progressive displacement of people by machines, elimination of humane considerations in the "setting of priorities because human beings do not need to be considered," the impersonality "characteristic of massive operations in business, education, industry, or government," a spreading sense of individual isolation and helplessness, a concomitant dulling of moral sensibilities, and chronic inability of most Americans to comprehend, or even to believe, the evidence of misery and injustice that the American juggernaut mindlessly inflicts on millions of its own citizens as well as on countless millions in other countries. *Ibid.*, 306, 308, and passim.

[5] The total of $77 billion for 1969 in the Lederman-Windus analysis represented an advance estimate which fell short of actual expenditures by over $3 billion.

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titudes toward the state and toward service to the state. It is also reflected in changing congressional attitudes toward budgetary priorities.

Normally, if not invariably, since the 1940's commitments verbalized by the executive in terms of *national security, national power* and *prestige*, or *international mission* and *responsibility* have taken precedence over new domestic programs. When such precedence has been questioned, the stock reply has been that we are locked in a mortal struggle with evil, cruel, and relentless foes who pose a threat far more dangerous than anything that can happen inside the United States. Frequently those who gave precedence to external goals have talked as if appropriations for military purposes drew funds from some mysterious "surplus" outside the pool of resources available to the domestic society.

Throughout the cold war it has been widely taken for granted that the domestic society would have to make do with whatever might be left after the claims of security, power, and global mission had been satisfied. When such a presupposition is overtly as well as covertly challenged, as it increasingly is, and when challengers openly defy the imagery of chauvinistic nationalism and appeals to global mission, military claims on dollars compete with other claims on more nearly equal terms.

Debates on military appropriations and on military-related policies and operations are no longer carried on with little or no reference to the society's internal conditions and needs. Military commitments and expenditures are judged, to a degree that was rare in the past, by their moral as well as economic impacts on the domestic society. This change has moved one of academia's strong advocates of a "pax Americana" to conclude that "the United States cannot effectively implement a global primacy . . . unless it manages to insulate its society and economy from traumatic impacts by each and every peripheral military involvement."[6]

In contrast to the astronomical cost of American commitments overseas in our era, the price of Britain's nineteenth-century global primacy seems incredibly cheap. "At the peak of British power and influence, the decade of the 1860's, total expenditures for military purposes averaged less than £30 million per year. Adjusting for inflation and changes in the dollar price of sterling, this works out to something in the range of 1-2 per cent of average U.S. military expenditures in the 1950's and early 1960's. In short, mid-nineteenth-century British governments policed a worldwide empire . . . and exerted on other nations an influence

[6] George Liska, *Imperial America* (Baltimore 1967), 106.

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as great as, if not considerably greater than, that the United States can achieve today at a real cost fifty to one hundred times larger."[7]

Even without the Vietnam war, the mushrooming growth of domestic needs, both social and environmental, might sooner or later have compelled a review of military outlays and military-related international commitments. But the protracted delay in liquidating that demoralizing war has had the catalytic effect of forcing this issue at a pace and in a manner that are scarcely conducive to rational reassessment. The concomitant precipitation of the social and environmental issues has simply amplified this adverse effect.

There is a temptation to focus too narrowly on military, social, and environmental programs and costs. Also involved are the space program, the SST project, and others that have been defended in terms of their conjectured boost to employment at home and to American prestige and influence abroad. Targets of controversy also include agricultural subsidies, the federal highway program, and nonmilitary international relations, among others.

The adverse effect on nonmilitary international relations is especially troublesome. Allocations in this category include the support of international organizations and economic assistance to modernizing countries; every President since World War II has declared both of these to be in the vital interest of the United States. Never in recent years have nonmilitary international programs and operations taken a large share of the federal budget. The combined cost of all functions in this category rose from 3.4 per cent of federal expenditures in 1961 to 4.1 per cent in 1964. Thereafter, it declined to 1.8 per cent in 1970, with further erosion predicted (Figures 2, 3, and 4). The original official estimate for 1972, later reduced, allocates about $4 billion to nonmilitary international relations, compared with $77.7 billion to the military departments. This is a stark reminder of the low priority that the President and Congress assign to diplomacy, international institutions, and resource-sharing with the Third World—pious rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

As is emphasized in several of the books under review, as well as earlier in this section, nearly all federal programs (but some more than others) tie down funds in advance—in some instances many years in advance. Such continuing commitments, *if honored*, obviously limit the funds that are allocable to new programs—unless there is sufficient

[7] H. and M. Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources" (fn. 1), 667-68.

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increase of revenue. What is not so generally recognized in the debate over priorities is that many social and environmental programs—social security, health, and antipollution programs, among others—preempt future revenues on a scale comparable to commitments for missiles, spacecraft, and some of the other programs under heavy attack.

It is essential, in this connection, to distinguish legal obligation from moral commitment, and the latter from mere declaration of intent, and to bear in mind the instability of all commitments in an era of rapid and widespread changes such as the present. For instance, when contracts are let for building a highway, that action definitely commits future revenues—unless (as is not unknown) the government repudiates its contracts. But when Congress simply authorizes a highway-building program that will run through several years, a future Congress may modify the program or abandon it altogether, even after large funds have been allocated and work is well advanced.

As the SST project has demonstrated, the lines between legal and moral obligation, and between the latter and declaration of intent, are apt to be indistinct. Experience also suggests that moral restraint buttresses legal obligation more strongly in some fields than in others: for example, one suspects that Congress would be much more hesitant to reduce social security or veterans' benefits than it was to deny funds to the SST project in 1971.

If, as seems to us to be the case, a viable domestic society and a livable physical habitat are *requisites* of international stature and potential as well as of the well-being of our people, and if these requisites are going to cost a great deal more than previously imagined, where will the money come from? One obvious source will be the growth of the national product, with correspondingly higher tax yields. But this source seems likely to fall far short of providing the extra billions required for these domestic imperatives if the additional costs are simply added to ongoing programs.

There seem to be two further alternatives: higher taxes, or major changes in allocations. Politicians have shown great reluctance to opt for the former. Under these conditions, the military budget and large outlays for prestige projects, research and development, and the role in international politics with which these programs and operations are associated, seem likely to remain prime targets for those who seek much larger allocations for abatement of pollution, future environmental protection, public health, low-income housing, urban renewal, and the war on poverty.

It is self-evident that the concurrent peaking of demands and costs

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bedevils the allocation of resources in every budgetary sector and at every level of government. Any quick and tidy resolution of the statesmen's dilemma is obviously unlikely. It would be naive to anticipate the emergence of a master plan for major reordering of national priorities. Massive changes could not be carried out in a single stroke, even if there were a consensus on what should be done—which, manifestly, there is not. But the society's multiple expanding needs and vulnerabilities are not going to fade away by being ignored or treated with palliatives. Nor will pious rhetoric arrest the worsening ecological crisis.

There is some evidence that the costs of maintaining a viable society and a livable habitat increase acceleratively with progress along the road of technological-industrial-urban development. If this is so, the implications for foreign policy and international politics are likely to be far-reaching. From this perspective, there appear to be grounds for querying whether any society—the United States included—can long pay the price of competition for global political and military primacy without progressively eroding and eventually destroying the material and moral supports upon which national power and influence ultimately depend.

Relatively few students of international relations have yet given much attention to the cluster of issues implicit in this query, and, more generally, to the debate over priorities that is going on, not only within the United States, but in many other countries too. This neglect suggests a need for reexamining research priorities. To put it bluntly, when will more scholars begin to give serious attention to the international bearings of changes in the ordering of priorities and the allocation of resources, not only in one or two or a few major countries, but in all?

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